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The role of foreign-owned investments in the economic transformation of host economies 
cannot be overstated. Foreign-owned investments are associated with higher levels of 
employment; higher mean wages; technological transfer via spill-overs to domestic firms; high 
capital and export intensities. Through these positive features, foreign investments are 
generally associated with positive effects on economic growth. Economies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) have been cognisant of these positive benefits, as is manifested by their national 
development plans for the near future. As more foreign-owned investments have flowed in the 
region, there has been visible economic growth, but with dismal effects in terms of employment 
creation in both numbers and quality. Exportation remains low and the impact on poverty 
remains mild. These poor results undermine the strength of the supposedly empirical 
association between foreign-owned investments and economic transformation of typical host 
economies, at least in SSA.  
Existing empirical knowledge on the nature of foreign-owned investments in SSA and their 
likely effects on economic welfare of host economies has either remained scanty or mainly 
been at the macro level due to limited data. This thesis attempts to sidestep this challenge by 
utilizing three different firm-level data sets to examine the nature and effects of foreign 
investments in relation to domestic firms in SSA from a microeconomic perspective. Firstly, a 
relatively novel, unsupervised, machine-learning approach has been used to classify firms so 
as to study their characteristic features. In this attempt, firm-level performance features, which 
have empirically been found by existing studies to distinguish foreign from domestic firms, are 
re-examined. This inquiry is a robustness check for previous studies and is undertaken from 
both a one-country and a multi-country perspective. Most studies that have utilised firm-level 
data to classify firms have in most cases been based on assumptions specified a priori. Using 
performance indicators such as output, employment and exports, correlation results from these 
studies are reported based on these classifications. In this thesis, firms are classified and their 
performance features examined without prior assumptions set especially regarding data 
distribution. Agglomerative clustering methods have been used to generate groups of firms a 
posteriori before examining these groups descriptively along performance indicators. Key 
findings indicate that foreign-owned firms systematically differ from domestically owned firms 
along numerous performance indicators, while there is a high likelihood of intra-foreign-owned 
firms’ heterogeneities.  
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In the second and final analysis, this thesis has employed regression and matching techniques 
with difference-in-differences estimation methods to investigate the existence and nature of 
effect of foreign ownership on firm-level performance in SSA. This thesis considers foreign 
ownership arising out of acquisition of a local firm by foreigners. This provides crucial 
evidence as to whether foreign-owned investments in SSA truly influence host economies’ 
welfare from a firm-level perspective. Empirical findings in this thesis indicate that, although 
cream-skimming is prevalent in foreign acquisition of formerly domestically owned firms, 
foreign ownership has positive effects on firm performance. This thesis finds positive 
acquisition effects on employment, wages, productivity, output, skill intensity, and capital 
investments. These positive effects are significant for wages, output, and productivity. By 
implication, through their effects at firm-level, foreign-owned investments are still a potential 
channel through which sustained welfare enhancements in SSA can be achieved, given well-








Die rol van beleggings in buitelandse besit in die ekonomiese transformasie van 
gasheerekonomieë kan nie oorbeklemtoon word nie. Beleggings in buitelandse besit hou 
verband met hoër indiensnemingsvlakke; hoër gemiddelde lone; tegnologiese oordrag via 
stortings na huishoudelike firmas; hoë kapitaal- en uitvoerintensiteite. Deur hierdie positiewe 
eienskappe word buitelandse beleggings meestal geassosieer met 'n positiewe uitwerking op 
ekonomiese groei. Hierdie positiewe voordele is bewus van die ekonomieë in Afrika suid van 
die Sahara (SSA), soos blyk uit hul nasionale ontwikkelingsplanne vir die nabye toekoms. 
Namate meer beleggings in buitelandse besit in die streek gevloei het, was daar sigbare 
ekonomiese groei, maar met 'n aaklige uitwerking wat betref die skepping van indiensneming 
in getalle en kwaliteit. Uitvoer bly laag en die impak op armoede bly mild. Hierdie swak 
resultate ondermyn die sterkte van die vermeende empiriese verband tussen beleggings in 
buitelandse besit en ekonomiese transformasie van tipiese gasheerekonomieë, ten minste in 
SSA. 
Bestaande empiriese kennis oor die aard van buitelandse beleggings in SSA en die 
waarskynlike gevolge daarvan vir die ekonomiese welvaart van gasheerekonomieë het nogal 
gebly of hoofsaaklik op makro-vlak gebly as gevolg van beperkte gegewens. Hierdie tesis poog 
om hierdie uitdaging te benadeel deur drie verskillende datastelle te gebruik om die aard en 
gevolge van buitelandse beleggings met betrekking tot plaaslike ondernemings in SSA vanuit 
'n mikro-ekonomiese perspektief te ondersoek. Eerstens is 'n relatief nuwe, sonder toesig, 
masjienleer-benadering gebruik om ondernemings te klassifiseer om hul kenmerkende 
kenmerke te bestudeer. In hierdie poging word prestasie-funksies op firma-vlak, wat deur 
bestaande studies empiries gevind is om buitelandse en plaaslike ondernemings te onderskei, 
heroorweeg. Hierdie ondersoek is 'n robuustheidsondersoek vir vorige studies en word 
onderneem vanuit 'n een-land- en 'n multi-landse perspektief. Die meeste studies wat data op 
firma-vlak gebruik het om ondernemings te klassifiseer, is in die meeste gevalle gebaseer op a 
priori-aannames. Op grond van hierdie klassifikasies word prestasie-aanwysers soos uitset, 
indiensneming en uitvoere gerapporteer. In hierdie tesis word firmas geklassifiseer en hul 
prestasie-eienskappe ondersoek sonder voorafgaande aannames, veral met betrekking tot 
dataverspreiding. Agglomeratiewe groeperingsmetodes is gebruik om groepe firmas a 
posteriori te genereer voordat hierdie groepe beskrywend met prestasie-aanwysers ondersoek 
word. Belangrike bevindings dui aan dat ondernemings in buitelandse besit stelselmatig verskil 
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van ondernemings in plaaslike besit volgens talle prestasie-aanwysers, terwyl die groot 
waarskynlikheid bestaan dat ondernemings in buitelandse besit se heterogeniteit bestaan. 
In die tweede en finale ontleding het hierdie tesis regressie- en bypassingstegnieke gebruik met 
beramingmetodes van difference-in-differences om die bestaan en aard van die effek van 
buitelandse eienaarskap op firma-vlakprestasie in SSA te ondersoek. In hierdie proefskrif word 
buitelandse eienaarskap voortspruitend uit die verkryging van 'n plaaslike firma deur 
buitelanders. Dit lewer 'n belangrike bewys of beleggings in buitelandse besit in SSA die 
welvaart van die gasheerekonomie werklik vanuit 'n vaste perspektief beïnvloed. Empiriese 
bevindings in hierdie proefskrif dui aan dat, hoewel kremskeep algemeen voorkom in die 
buitelandse verkryging van voorheen plaaslike ondernemings, buitelandse eienaarskap 'n 
positiewe uitwerking op die onderneming se prestasie het. Hierdie tesis vind 
verkrygingseffekte op indiensneming, lone, produktiwiteit, produksie en kapitaalbeleggings. 
Hierdie positiewe gevolge is beduidend vir lone, produksie en produktiwiteit. By implikasie is 
beleggings in buitelandse besit deur die gevolge daarvan op firma-vlak steeds 'n potensiële 
kanaal waardeur volgehoue welsynverbeterings in SSA bereik kan word, gegewe die 
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1.1 Motivation and Context 
Private investments, both foreign-owned and domestically-owned, have been a subject of 
empirical investigation for a long time and literature on these investments continues to grow. 
Foreign-owned firms, which are popularly referred to as foreign direct investments (FDIs) in 
literature have increasingly been studied in comparison with domestically-owned investments 
in typical host-economy environments. Many of the empirical studies have focused on, among 
other aspects, firm-level characteristics and performance of these investments. Specific 
attention has, among other aspects, been on characteristic features of foreign-owned 
investments relative to those that are domestically-owned. Attention has also been on the firm-
level performance of these investments, specifically the superior performance of foreign-
owned investments when compared to domestically-owned plants. Some studies have also 
focused on whether and how foreign-owned investments affect performance of domestically-
owned investments particularly via spill-overs. Empirical investigation on these investments 
has been recently promoted mainly by increased access to firm-level data, especially in the 
developed world. 
Historically, however, empirical literature on foreign-owned investments or FDIs, particularly 
on their characteristics and performance in relation to  domestically-owned investments, has 
its roots in the seminal work of Stephen Hymer in the 1960s. Hymer’s work (Hymer, 1960) 
was the first to highlight the typical differences between foreign-owned and domestically-
owned firms. He shed light on how these differences, manifesting mainly in terms of firms’ 
structural features, were the most likely explanation for foreign-owned investments’ usually 
superior performance. Along with other aspects, Hymer highlighted the fact that foreign-owned 
firms have specific ownership advantages that tend to enable them to perform relatively better 
than domestically-owned firms in a typical host economy environment. Hymer’s work led to 
the emergence of more scholarly investigations into the structural and performance features of 
FDIs, including Kindleberger (1969), Aliber (1970), Caves (1971), Knickerbocker (1973), 





Occurring simultaneously with access to firm-level data was the development of further 
theoretical formulations. These theories attempted to explain behavioural characteristics of 
foreign-owned firms in relation to domestically-owned firms. A case in point is Buckley and 
Casson’s (1976) internalisation theoretical model, which is based on earlier works by Coase 
(Coase, 1937). John H Dunning (1988) later developed the eclectic theory, building on the 
strengths of the internalization theory and other previous theories. He incorporated time, 
location and ownership dimensions in his new framework. The eclectic theory is now the most 
popularly used in analyses. 
With access to data and the existence of theoretical formulations, it is not surprising that 
literature on foreign-owned and domestically-owned private investments has continued to 
grow. As a result, it is now a stylized fact that foreign-owned investments tend to differ from 
and are likely to perform relatively better than domestically-owned firms on several 
performance indicators (Peluffo, 2015: 1). Findings in literature associate foreign-owned 
investments with; higher wages, higher productivity levels, a tendency to being more export 
oriented, employment of more workers, and being more skill and capital intensive when 
compared to domestically-owned firms. Studies by Almeida (2007), Girma and Gorg (2007a), 
Matthias and Javorcik (2009) and Njikam (2018) have confirmed these firm-level performance 
features among foreign-owned firms. However, these studies, along with many more that have 
examined these investments, do not clarify whether the characteristic and performance 
differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms are a consequence of 
foreign ownership; nor do they consider whether, especially for non-greenfield investments, 
foreign investors, during acquisition of previously domestically-owned firms, merely target 
firms that are already performing strongly, resulting in post-acquisition differences that may 
not be due to foreign ownership itself. Additionally, these studies do not clarify whether the 
observed characteristic differences between the two types of firms are simply a reflection of 
comparisons between sub-groups of firms (such as between firms in high wage sectors, where 
foreign-owned firms are likely to be concentrated, and firms in lower wage sectors) or 
systematic differences exist between the two types of investment firms. Moreover, if foreign 
ownership supposedly accounts for the observed differences and consequent performance 
outcomes – this being the causal effect – its magnitude is still inadequately delineated, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In delineating such effects, it is prudent to note that it 
is not easy to rule out the influence of ‘cream-skimming’ tendencies on the acquisition decision 





typical host economy. Should such ‘cream-skimming’ be the case, then any attempt to ascribe 
the resulting performance to foreign-ownership itself will be subject to selection bias. 
Scholars have attempted to answer some of the questions outlined above but most analysts have 
focused mainly on the developed, Asian and Latin American economies. This may be because 
most foreign-owned investments across the globe are, among other reasons, located in these 
economies. Few studies have focused on low developing countries, especially SSA. Data 
availability has been cited as one of the hindrances to the growth of empirical literature on 
foreign-owned firms in relation to domestically-owned firms in SSA. Nevertheless, empirical 
findings from the few studies conducted in SSA tend, to some extent, mirror those addressing 
other parts of the world. The findings of empirical investigations conducted in SSA by Rankin, 
Söderbom and Teal (2005), Coniglio, Prota and Seric (2015), Blanas, Seric and Viegelahn 
(2017), and Njikam (2018) echo those of the developed world, along with some emerging 
economies.  
In the last decade, SSA has witnessed increased inflows of foreign investments. However, 
despite such increased inflows of late, anticipated benefits as alluded to in the previous 
discussion like export volumes remain dismal, being mainly in primary commodities 
(International Monetary Fund, 2018: 15), and with manufactured goods only accounting for 
19% of Africa’s exports to the rest of the world in 2015 (International Monetary Fund, 2018: 
23). This contradicts for example the belief that economies with foreign investments are more 
likely to export finished products to the world market (Libanda, Nyasa & Marshall, 2017: 4). 
In 2018, labour productivity growth in SSA remained at 0.6%, which is below the average of 
3.1% in the rest of the world; and employment growth in SSA only averaged at 3.1% between 
2017 and 2019 (International Labor Organization, 2019: 28). This implies that the expected 
benefits/features associated with foreign-owned investments in relation to domestically-owned 
investments remain unimpressive even as more foreign investments continue to flow into the 
region.  The unimpressive outcomes amidst increased inflows of foreign investments, together 
with the questions alluded to in the previous discussion, re-ignite the debate about the likely 
effects of foreign ownership on firm-level performance and hence justify further empirical 
examination of private investments at least in SSA. Are the foreign-owned investments flowing 
into the region characteristically superior to domestically-owned investments as empirical 
literature suggests for other parts of the world? If this is the case, then as more investments 
flow into SSA, the expectation would be corresponding outcomes like more employment, 





up investments or after partial or full takeover of a hitherto domestically-owned investments 
whose performance would be expected to improve. This thesis attempts to further empirical 
examination and contribution to the growing literature on foreign-owned and domestically-
owned private investments in developing economies, focusing on SSA where, as evidence 
shows, economic outcomes seem not corresponding to increased inflows of foreign 
investments as available empirical studies tend to predict. The thesis furthers the empirical 
literature through micro analyses of firms since performance of economies is simply a 
reflection of behaviour and hence performance of micro-production units like firms. This thesis 
therefore utilises three unique but comparable firm-level data sets from; the World Bank, 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), and the Centre for the Study 
of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University. The World Bank data set is a 
comprehensive survey of firms within Uganda’s manufacturing and service sectors. The 
UNIDO data set is a comprehensive survey of over 6000 firms from 19 countries in SSA, 
providing an opportunity to investigate phenomena from a multi-country context. The third 
data set is a panel data set on manufacturing firms in Ghana, collected in six rounds by the 
World Bank and the Oxford CSAE under the Regional Program for Enterprise Development 
(RPED) project.  
Using the three unique but comparable data sets, this thesis provides evidence on two key 
empirical questions, which are; (i) whether, as available empirical studies have confirmed 
elsewhere, the two types of private investments systematically differ from each other in terms 
of firm-level performance and characteristic features in SSA economies and (ii) whether 
foreign ownership has any effect on firm-level performance in SSA as it has been confirmed 
or dispelled elsewhere. The expectation was that answers to these questions would further 
empirical understanding of foreign-owned in relation to domestically-owned investments and 
provide critical insights into the noncorresponding (to increased FDI inflows) economic 
outcomes in SSA. Whether the deviation from what available literature says should be 
attributed to other factors or to the least, scholarly investigation should delineate the extent to 
which foreign ownership ought to be associated with performance of firms. 
Guided by the available data sets, the thesis studies the first empirical question from two 
contexts, one being country (Uganda) specific and the other, a multi-country context. The 
second empirical question is also studied from a specific country (Ghana) context. The choice 
of the geographical scope (specific country/multi-country) in this thesis was motivated by 





opportunity of investigating the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance in a small 
developing economy. Ghana had also adopted a new policy that exogenously influenced 
hitherto domestically owned firms to change ownership either partially or wholly to foreign 
ownership, which enabled me to estimate empirically the effect of changeover from domestic 
to foreign ownership on firm-level performance. 
The first empirical question is answered in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, the 
empirical research question is answered by re-examining the characteristic features of foreign-
owned firms and investigating whether these firms systematically differ from domestically-
owned firms along selected performance and characteristic features. This investigation 
confirms whether or not, comparing the two types of firms comes down to merely comparing 
sub-groups of firms as earlier hinted on. This analysis is based on a specific economy, being 
Uganda. The choice of Uganda as the case study was motivated by mainly data availability and 
the fact that the situational evidence alluded to earlier in SSA is comparable to that in Uganda 
as it will be seen later. Elsewhere, empirical investigation on foreign direct investments 
sometimes necessitates focus on specific countries and firm characteristics rather than a general 
orientation of firms and countries (O’Brien & Williams, 2013: 195). To achieve the main 
objective of this chapter, unlike earlier studies that have employed conventional econometric 
methods, in this thesis unsupervised machine learning techniques are used to identify 
homogeneous clusters of firms. These clusters have been analysed in terms of average 
performance across numerous performance indicators using descriptive statistics. The use of 
cluster analysis methodologies has gained ground in areas of psychology and clinical medicine 
(Everitt, Landau, Leese & Stahl, 2011) but has only been minimally utilized in the fields of 
business and economics. The expectation in this chapter was that such investigation would 
provide evidence to validate or dispel, earlier empirical findings, moreover after employing 
alternative methods of analysis that have been not widely utilised in economics. Indeed, after 
applying the preferred methods of analysis on Ugandan firms, I found results that are largely 
similar to those in the available international literature on foreign-owned firms in relation 
domestically-owned firms. Findings specifically indicate that foreign-owned firms do indeed 
differ from domestically-owned firms systematically along numerous performance and 
characteristic variables. The chapter finds no significant differences amongst domestically-
owned firms themselves, except in terms of workers’ education. In the segmentation process, 
foreign ownership is found to be a very important factor in firm classification, even when it is 





makers in Uganda and SSA in general since these economies aim to attract increased foreign 
investment inflows. These results justify efforts aimed at attracting and incentivizing foreign 
investments in Uganda; and can probably be extended to apply to relatively comparable 
economies. A key contribution of Chapter 2 is the use of alternative methods of analysis; 
specifically, cluster analysis using machine learning. Unlike previous studies whose analyses 
are largely based on assumptions especially regarding data distribution, cluster analysis lets the 
data itself, irrespective of distribution, determine how firms are classified before resulting 
groups are analysed. As earlier noted, these methods have previously not been widely used in 
economic analyses and so, their use provides an effective robustness check on earlier empirical 
findings.  
Chapter 3 replicates the methods used in Chapter 2 on a broader data set covering 19 countries 
in SSA. Because private investments, especially foreign direct investments are topical globally, 
findings of investigations on such firms may vary across relatively similar economies even 
when the same phenomenon is investigated. Additionally, country-specific investigations may 
be subject to small sample data problems, irrespective of the methods used in the analyses. For 
these reasons, Chapter 3 uses a broader data set to examine the same empirical question as in 
Chapter 2, but from a multi-country perspective. The specific aim is to investigate whether the 
systematic differences between foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms as revealed 
in Chapter 2 are or can be unique to firms in a specific country, in this case Uganda, or instead, 
a phenomenon that probably typifies firms in relatively comparable economies in SSA. In 
furtherance of scholarly understanding, I also aim to establish whether study findings in 
Chapter 2 hold for internationally known economic groupings of economies, such as 
classifications by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  After employing methods 
similar to those in Chapter 2, results in Chapter 3 largely reflect those in Chapter 2. However, 
in addition to these findings, results in Chapter 3 reveal intra-foreign-owned firms’ 
heterogeneities, a result not found in Chapter 2 probably due to the smaller data set used. 
Exportation is found as a key segmenting variable amongst foreign-owned firms and hugely 
explains these intra- foreign-owned firms’ differences. This may point to critical differences 
among foreign-owned firms themselves probably on even other firm-level characteristics. This 
may also have sound implications for policy targeting, since even foreign-owned firms may 
not be homogenous along the superior performance and characteristic features associated with 
them in the literature. However, in terms of general findings, foreign-owned firms are found to 





incorporated in the analysis, for instance, lower-income versus middle-income groups. This 
may provide support for policy replication across some economies in SSA. Though important, 
findings on the systematic differences between foreign-owned and domestically owned firms 
in Chapters 2 and 3 do not adequately provide evidence on the magnitude of the effect of 
foreign ownership on firm-level performance. This makes it hard to proportionately ascribe the 
resulting economic performance outcomes detailed earlier to foreign investments and/or other 
factors thought to be correlated with foreign ownership at firm level.   This other key empirical 
gap/question is what Chapter 4 of this thesis attempts to close/answer. 
Chapter 4 uses panel data to examine the effect of foreign ownership on performance of firms. 
I specifically consider foreign ownership arising from acquisition of previously domestically-
owned firms. This analysis provides empirical insights into the direction and magnitude of the 
effect of foreign ownership which, to the best of my knowledge, is still inadequately examined 
in the developing world, especially in SSA. As with Chapter 2, Chapter 4 utilises firm-level 
data on a specific country, Ghana. According to Naughtin and Rankin (2016), these types of 
investigations are very important for economic policy makers but require comprehensive and 
representative micro data, an opportunity the Ghana case provided. Therefore, Chapter 4’s 
contribution to this thesis is the use of a 12-year-long panel data set of Ghanaian manufacturing 
plants to empirically estimate the effect of foreign ownership on firm-level performance. It 
provides evidence on the extent to which firm-level performance should be ascribed to 
ownership status per se. Given the inherent sample size issues and the implications this might 
have on the results, after careful utilization of regression methods to provide the needed 
evidence, analysis in this chapter applies some of the popular traditional impact evaluation 
methods to provide robustness checks of the main results. Specifically, the analysis involves 
application of matching and difference-in-differences estimation methods for the purpose of 
robustness checks on main regression findings. These methods enabled me to handle possible 
endogeneity arising from selection bias pertaining to the acquisition decision, un-observed 
firm-level heterogeneity that might influence outcomes of interest and other econometric 
issues. 
Empirical findings from chapter 4 indicate that the likelihood of ‘cherry-picking’ tendencies 
during foreign investors’ acquisition of domestically-owned firms is high. In short, foreign 
investors tend to target high-performing firms during the acquisition process, a fact not 
adequately highlighted by earlier studies in SSA. Additionally, the chapter reveals positive and 





investments of acquired firms in Ghana. Effects on performance outcomes such as employment 
and skill intensity are positive although not statistically significant. A surprising result is on 
capital intensity, which totally contradicts predictions of firm production theory. This may be 
due to sample size issues and missing data problems. Another finding worth noting from the 
matching specifically is that using this estimation method, wage increases are not associated 
with increases in labour productivity, contrary to the predictions of mainstream firm theory. 
This might be attributed to the weakness and impreciseness of this method as noted in 
econometric literature. All in all, these results are largely in agreement with numerous scholarly 
investigations that have been conducted outside SSA. These findings further justify the need 
for economic policies aimed at attracting more foreign investment inflows to take advantage 
of the positive effects from these investments, especially in SSA. Most importantly, results 
tend to imply that the dismal economic performance outcomes detailed earlier and which 
motivated the rigorous empirical inquiry in this thesis, may not entirely be ascribed to increases 
in foreign investment inflows but also to numerous other factors that are beyond the scope of 
this thesis’ inquiry. The extent to which foreign investments can affect positively the 
performance of firms and ultimately that of entire host economies is as far as the estimated 
results in this thesis tend to suggest, ceteris paribus. 
The innovation in this thesis is twofold. Firstly, this thesis employs a wide range of 
methodological techniques such as cluster analysis using machine learning that have hardly 
been used before by earlier studies in this type of analysis. I also employ conventional 
regression but also other traditional impact evaluation approaches in my analysis as robustness 
checks for validation of some of the results, particularly in Chapter 4. Secondly, I utilise three 
unique but comparable comprehensive micro data sets in the analyses and extend the empirical 
investigation to examine the likely effect of foreign ownership on firm performance in SSA, 











Foreign Ownership and Private Enterprises in Developing Economies 
A Cluster Analysis of Ugandan Firms 
2.1 Introduction 
Foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms, in a typical host economy environment, are on 
average, different. Foreign-owned firms for instance, have been associated with higher export 
levels, higher average wages, intensive expenditure on research and development, high 
employment levels, larger firm sizes; and they are generally more productive than 
domestically-owned firms (Kimura & Kiyota, 2006) (Erdal & Göçer, 2015a). These generally 
positive firm characteristics make foreign-owned firms particularly attractive to policy makers. 
As indicated in chapter 1, much of the existing research on foreign-owned investments at the 
firm level does not adequately answer the questions of; whether foreign ownership causes these 
differences, whether foreigners acquire better-performing firms or whether comparing foreign-
owned and domestically-owned firms in fact compares different types of firms in which foreign 
ownership cannot be associated with the observed differences in outcomes. This chapter 
investigates this last point in more detail: whether the observed differences between foreign-
owned and domestically-owned firms are due to comparisons between different sub-groups, 
such as between large firms (where foreign ownership is more prevalent) and small firms, or 
whether foreign-owned firms are systematically different from domestically-owned firms 
across a number of dimensions. 
In this investigation, this chapter contributes to the growing literature on foreign-owned 
investments by using a relatively novel method of analysis, in a developing country – Uganda 
– where analysis of foreign-owned investments has been limited. Suitability of Uganda as a 
case in this thesis was partly derived from the fact that, besides data availability, her key 
domestic economic policy frameworks have embraced the promotion of private investment 
with a focus on incentivising foreign-owned investment over domestically-owned investment. 
However, just like the SSA situation alluded to in chapter 1, the anticipated economic outcomes 





$121.45 million over the period 1993 to 20171, youth unemployment documented to be at 
19.7% by 2011/12 2 or even higher at between 64% and 70% by 20143 are still prevalent. Over 
80% of the manufacturing industrial sector is still made up of firms of small size that produce 
goods of low value. The manufacturing sector contribution of only 7% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), which is below the average of 11% for less-developed countries (LDCs), and 
also below the East African regional average of 10%4also attest to the observation above.  
These outcomes make Uganda a suitable case that is reflective of the SSA economic outlook 
pointed out in chapter 1. Amidst increasing foreign-owned investment inflows into Uganda 
over the years, the outcomes abovementioned reflect less of the characteristics associated with 
foreign-owned firms as also highlighted in chapter 1. They equally imply that foreign 
investments have had less of a contribution to the country’s welfare as opposed to what is 
expected and commonly noted in the empirical literature about such investments. This anomaly 
makes scholarly inquiry into firm-level features of private investments in Uganda valid, timely, 
and hence appropriate in the SSA context as a case study. Evidence from analysing Uganda’s 
case will reveal whether the kind of private foreign investments attracted and incentivised 
mirror the conclusions in literature; and with the dismal economic outcomes thus potentially 
being attributable to probably other factors. Moreover, findings will set a firm stage for a much 
broader inquiry about these investments in SSA. In Uganda just like probably in comparable 
economies in SSA, less evidence is available on the superiority or abilities of foreign-owned 
firms relative to domestically-owned firms since relatively little firm-level research has been 
conducted there, especially regarding firm characteristics in relation to or associated with 
ownership. Moreover, the scanty evidence sometimes shows conflicting findings. Moss and 
Ramachandran (2004), and Wilson and Cacho (2007), for example, find that foreign-owned 
firms are, on average, larger and more productive than domestically-owned firms. However, 
Niringiye and Tuyiragize (2010), and Obwona (1998) find most  firms to be small and medium. 
This scarcity of evidence limits not only frontiers of knowledge but also fails to provide much-
needed guidance for policy development.  
 
 
1 Trading Economics 2017 Uganda chapter 
2 Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2015 Statistical Abstract- page 28 
3 Magelah and Ntambirweki-ACODE (2014)- Youth unemployment and job creation in Uganda: Challenges and 
Opportunities, page ii 
4 African Development Bank Report of Eastern Africa Manufacturing sector, promoting technology, innovation, 





In terms of approach, unlike previous studies that are based on a priori assumptions, in this 
chapter I use cluster analysis, which reverses the process by allowing the data to classify firms. 
The characteristics are then analysed based on group classifications. This methodological 
approach allows this chapter to have an additional contribution as a robustness check on earlier 
studies and their conclusions. Cluster analysis is a strong tool of multivariate exploratory data 
analysis. It is effective in aggregating objects like firms based on their characteristic similarities 
(Murry, 2016). It involves a great number of techniques, methods, and algorithms that are 
applicable in various fields, including economics (Řezanková, 2014). Its aim is to identify 
groups of similar objects (households, firms or countries) according to selected variables like 
employment and poverty indicators (Řezanková, 2014). Through data exploration, cluster 
analysis is useful in generating hypotheses and in testing their presence in the data; and also, 
in testing groupings developed by other studies using other methodologies. It is also useful in 
the development of typologies and investigation of useful conceptual schemes for grouping 
entities (Gries, 2007). 
Historically, cluster analysis was firstly used within the disciplines of biology and ecology 
(Yim & Ramdeen, 2015: 9). Although this technique has been utilised in the field of social 
sciences, it has not gained as much widespread popularity as in the natural sciences. Some of 
the fields in which  custering techniques have been applied are; marketing (Mooi & Marko, 
2011), clinical medicine and health sciences (Fersini et al., 2012), and machine learning, 
pattern recognition, image analysis, information retrieval and bioinformatics (Bijura, 2013). In 
the available literature, cluster analysis is also referred to as mathematical taxonomy or 
unsupervised classification. It has also been referred to as segmentation and partition analysis, 
although these terms are often contested5 (Tryfos, 2002). A general interest in cluster analysis 
increased in the 1960s, leading to the development of several new algorithms that expanded 
possibilities of analysis. Moreover, in recent decades, there has been gradually increasing 
incorporation of cluster analysis in the areas of health and social sciences (Yim & Ramdeen, 
2015: 9). However, despite this growth, the application of cluster analysis in economics gained 
traction only recently (Michael, (2016).  
Therefore, the work in this thesis and this chapter in particular extends the application of cluster 
analysis in economics and makes use of the World Bank Enterprise Survey data to classify 
 
 
5 Irrespective of the name, all the techniques aim at identifying groups in the data by classifying cases into groups 





Ugandan firms based on performance indicator variables. The major aim is to establish whether 
the observed differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms are due to 
comparisons between different sub-groups (for example, between large firms where foreign-
ownership is more prevalent and small firms where foreign-ownership is less prevalent); or 
whether foreign-owned firms differ from domestically-owned firms systematically and 
significantly across a number of dimensions. This will help to confirm or contradict earlier 
studies on the characteristic features of private firm enterprises in Uganda and also set the stage 
for broader analysis of the same on SSA. These study findings will further provide a blueprint 
for economic policy reorientation not only in Uganda but also in comparable developing 
economies in SSA.  
 This study is the first to analyse firm-level data for Ugandan firms using cluster analysis and 
application of ClustOfVar. The latter is a relatively novel algorithm for dimensionality 
reduction on various types of data, including mixed data. This approach has, however, been 
previously employed successfully elsewhere by other scholars, such as Naughtin and Rankin 
(2016), on South African manufacturing and exporting firms.  
The analysis of characteristics of firm clusters in this chapter shows a group or cluster of firms 
that is more likely to differ from other clusters on a number of performance indicators. Relative 
to other groups, firms in this cluster are generally likely to: be larger in size, exhibit higher 
labour productivity, to spend on R&D, be capital intensive, possess relatively experienced 
management, offer formal training to workers, and export part of their output. Above all, firms 
in this cluster are, on average, associated with higher foreign ownership stake, pointing to the 
likelihood that such a cluster is composed of mainly foreign-owned firms. When variables are 
classified also, and their cluster characteristics analysed, results indicate the following: greater 
association between ownership status, employment, and experience within the same cluster; 
moderate association between ownership and variables such as exports, worker_educ, and 
capital_intensity; and almost zero correlation with wage, labour productivity, and material use. 
When a classification and regression tree analysis was performed, ownership status, 
worker_educ, management experience and labour productivity were revealed as some of the 
important variables that sort firms into particular clusters.  
The remainder of this chapter is laid out as follows:  





• Section 2.3 presents the empirical literature review on characteristic determinants of 
foreign direct investments; 
• Section 2.4 contains a discussion on the theoretical underpinnings of cluster analysis; 
• Section 2.5 presents an empirical literature review on cluster analysis; 
• Section 2.6 presents a description of the methodology, data and the results; and  
• Section 2.7 contains the study conclusions. 
 
2.2 Theoretical background 
There are a number of theoretical explanations of foreign direct investment. Dunning (2003: 
176), Feng (2017: 1), Faeth (2009), Hosseini (2005) summarise this well. Some of these 
theoretical explanations are discussed in this section and form the theoretical guide for analyses 
in this chapter. In the early attempts of theoretically explaining foreign direct investment, the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) neoclassical theory was the most dominant (Faeth, 2009: 166). The HO 
model was based on the assumption of a fixed endowment of capital and labour for each 
country, with each country producing a mix of products that made the best possible use of its 
resource endowment, access to homogeneous technologies by each country and the existence 
of perfect markets for both inputs and goods. It further assumed only two countries, constant 
returns to scale production functions and zero transport costs. In this theory, trade is driven by 
the differences in endowments across countries and relative differences in commodity factor-
use intensities. Therefore, a country exports goods which, in their production, use the country’s 
abundant factor intensively. For example, countries with surplus capital would export capital-
intensive goods. In the absence of commodity trade, firms would move capital to foreign 
capital-deficit economies where higher returns are anticipated. Movement of capital in this case 
is what gives rise to a foreign-owned firm (popularly referred to as foreign direct investment 
firm in literature) in another country. 
Associated with the HO theory were theories such as MacDougall(1960) and Aliber (1970). 
MacDougall assumed perfect competition, constant returns to scale, full employment of 
resources, two factor inputs and only one good. Both MacDougall (1960) and Aliber (1970) 
agree that capital moves to where returns are higher, as with HO. Aliber’s departure is in the 
cause of differences in returns to capital, which, according to him, emanates from not only 
capital endowments but also currency risks. Such risks are associated with the interest premium 
charged inclusive of the expected currency depreciation. Foreign-owned firms, which are 





currencies to finance similar investment streams more easily than domestically-owned firms in 
host economies. This advantage alone acts as a stimulant for foreign-owned firms to invest in 
host economies, hence growth of foreign direct investment. Given the HO and associated 
theories’ assumptions, flows and growth of foreign direct investment were more likely 
determined by differences in resource endowments between origin and host countries; 
differences in relative factor intensities of goods produced; and differences in currency risks 
between economies.  
The HO theory, however, is featured by some limitations in explaining the emergence and 
operations of the foreign-owned firm in relation to the domestically-owned firms in a given 
economy. One such limitation is the assumption of perfect competition, which is unrealistic. 
Moreover, absence of transaction costs in this theory leaves no ground to distinguish between 
direct and indirect investment (Hosseini, 2005: 531). Also, economies can manipulate returns 
on capital and flows of capital by imposing taxes on international capital movements to 
improve their welfare. Using this theory, it is further difficult to account for foreign-owned 
investment flows between countries with unified currency areas, such as the European Union 
(EU). The above limitations motivated Kindleberger (1969) and Hymer (1976), two of the first 
scholars to criticise the neoclassical approach and HO theories, to advance the theory of 
ownership advantages as an alternative. 
The main argument and/or fundamental assumption of the theory of ownership advantages is 
that foreign direct investments can only flourish under structural market imperfections. Based 
on the ‘monopolistic advantage’ hypothesis, Hymer and Kindleberger posit that distortions are 
necessary in international markets if foreign direct investment is to arise. To this end, foreign-
owned firms must have specific ownership advantages that give them a competitive edge over 
domestically-owned firms in countries where foreign-owned firms intend to start production 
operations. These advantages, which must outweigh the penalties of being foreign include 
product differentiation (imperfect good markets), managerial expertise, new technology or 
patents (imperfect input markets) (Denisia, 1998), the existence of external or internal 
economies of scale (Faeth, 2009: 167), superior access to capital (Kindleberger, 1969) and 
superior brands (Caves, 1971: 6).  
Two notable strands support this hypothesis with minor variations. Firstly, Caves (1971) 
focuses on the advantage of product differentiation to substantiate the likelihood of horizontal 





than licensing or exportation, once knowledge is used to differentiate products other than 
managerial skills. The second strand is the oligopolistic reaction perspective put forward by 
Knickerbocker (1973) who proposes that, although firms operate in imperfect markets and 
foreign direct investment flourishes under such conditions, the basis is an oligopolistic reaction, 
especially the ‘follow the leader’ strategy or reaction to foreign firms ‘invading’ the foreign-
owned firms’ home market (Faeth, 2009: 168). Based on the above assumptions and from the 
perspectives of the monopolistic and oligopolistic hypotheses, the theoretical prediction is that, 
once firms have these advantages outweighing those of domestically-owned firms, they will be 
motivated to invest directly in the foreign country. This motivation is driven by the desire to 
reduce international competition among firms and the need to increase gains from firm-specific 
characteristics or advantages (Hosseini, 2005). Visible in this theory, too, is the centrality of 
firm-specific characteristics and the imperfections in international markets in any attempt to 
analyse flows and growth in foreign direct investment. This centrality of firm-level 
characteristics or advantages points to the likelihood of systematic differences between foreign-
owned and domestically-owned firms even prior to foreign investors setting foot in the host 
economy. An investigation of whether this theoretical prediction holds for Uganda and indeed 
SSA is what empirical work in this thesis attempts to confirm.  
Despite its apparently strong explanatory power of the foreign direct investment firm, this 
theory doesn’t justify why firms opt for direct investment rather than licensing their ownership 
advantages to domestically-owned firms abroad and earning economic rents through licensing 
fees while sidestepping the costs of doing business abroad. In other words, this theory falls 
short at explaining the desire for direct involvement or a visible hand in business abroad. 
Elsewhere, this theory falls short at explaining why only some firms have these ownership 
advantages and others don’t; and how those that actually have, obtained such advantages. As 
put forward by Buckley and Casson (2009), the answer to these interesting questions, lies partly 
in the fact that the cost of licensing may even be higher than the costs associated with business 
operations abroad. The above limitations of Hymer and Kindleberg’s theory elicited further 
scholarly response to overcome them, which response gave birth to one of the notable post-
Hymer theories, the internalisation theory. 
The internalisation theory is associated with the works of Buckley and Casson (1976), Casson 
(1983) and Rugman (1981). According to Feng (2017: 3),  this theory integrates Coase’s (1937) 
theory of the firm with theories of international trade and economic geography, such as those 





corporations. This theory is also cognisant of the fact that firms operate under imperfect 
markets. Its fundamental assumption is that of rational action: rational agents will internalise 
markets when the anticipated returns are more than the associated costs; and profit-oriented 
managers of a firm will internalise intermediate product markets up to the point where the costs 
and benefits of internalisation cancel each other out (Buckley & Casson, 2009: 5). Other key 
principles of this theory are that a firm’s profitability and the dynamics of its growth are based 
upon a continuous process of innovation resulting from Research and Development; and that 
firms seek out the lowest-cost location for each activity, taking the activity’s linkages with 
other activities into account (Buckley & Casson, 2009: 6). This principle highlights, R&D, one 
of the likely key distinguishing firm-level features between foreign-owned and domestically-
owned firms and which has implications for firm-level performance.  
Hymer and Kindleberg’s theory indicated that the ownership advantages of firms are subject 
to imperfect markets; and that these advantages include production and marketing technology, 
marketing skills, R&D, and services. They are, however, marked by high risk and uncertainty, 
resulting into high transaction costs in terms of; enforcement, information, and bargaining costs 
according to Faeth (2009: 168). They are further subject to difficulties of appropriability due 
to their ‘public good’ nature, for example, technology (Magee, 1977 as quoted by Faeth 
(2009)). These features make the transaction costs associated with the ownership advantages 
very high. If left to the whim of the market mechanism, such costs keep rising. By rational 
action, the rise in transaction costs motivate profit-maximising firms to eliminate such 
imperfections and costs through either the internalisation of the flow of knowledge originating 
from R&D undertakings or by the internalisation of operations involving the flow of 
intermediate products through sequential production stages and channels of distribution. With 
internalisation, the activities that were previously linked through the market mechanism (an 
invisible hand) are brought under control and common ownership in a “market” internal  to the 
firm (a visible hand) (Buckley & Casson, 2009: 2).  
The internalisation process can lead to direct investment in a foreign economy because it can 
occur either within or across national boundaries. Once internalisation takes place across 
national boundaries, a foreign direct investment firm is born, arising from the firm’s desire to 
get involved directly in business management as opposed to via a licensing model. For instance, 
knowledge internalisation stimulates foreign direct investment because of what is known as 
‘buyer uncertainty’. A knowledge-generating firm would easily license such knowledge 





a nightmare because of potential payment default arising from probable suspicions about lack 
of novelty of generated knowledge, the ability of the buyer in a foreign country to invent around 
the novel technology, and the likelihood of the buyer selling the knowledge to the competitors 
of the knowledge generating firm. These factors can lead to direct investment being the optimal 
choice. From this perspective, the theoretical prediction of internalisation easily points to more 
foreign direct investment presence in knowledge-intensive industries and sectors. Another 
predictive strand of this theory is from Hennart (1982, 1991), whose theorisation is derived 
from McManus’s (1972) theory of property rights and Williamson’s (1975) ‘market and 
hierarchies’ (Faeth, 2009: 169). According to Hennart, internalisation advantages can emanate 
from a firm’s reputation or know-how – leading to horizontal integration – or failure in other 
markets – leading to vertical integration. The above cases of firm reputation or market failure 
would stimulate foreign direct investment in a bid to replace the price system of the market in 
order to gain efficiency and avoid transaction costs. 
The internalisation theory unlike earlier theories reveals the theory of the foreign direct 
investment firm as a distinctive case of a general theory of the firm that embraces both 
multinational and domestic firms (Buckley & Casson, 2009: 11). It explains why firms are not 
willing to license their ownership advantages, such as technologies to others in foreign 
economies, and gain rents. It further explains why foreign direct investment is mainly found in 
knowledge-intensive industries; and supports the empirical postulations that foreign-owned 
firms are characterised by higher levels of R&D expenditure, high advertising expenditure and 
the employment of a highly skilled labour force. It further supports earlier theories that firm 
ownership advantages and characteristics are key determinants of foreign direct investments. 
In this theory, entrepreneurs pinpoint profit prospects and then build viable global markets, 
supported by global production systems and a commitment to ongoing research and 
development (Buckley & Casson, 2009: 11).  
Despite its explanatory power, the internalisation theory doesn’t explain the timing of foreign 
direct investment, its subsequent expansion or the choice of country of location, amongst other 
shortcomings. For instance, after World War 2, European countries were, unlike economies in 
Africa, popular destinations of foreign direct investment, yet for sure domestically-owned firms 
in Africa were more inferior (compared to those in Europe) to foreign direct investment firms 
and little in number, which would ideally mean more foreign direct investment inflows to 





countries attract more foreign direct investment than African economies, with the exception of 
South Africa. 
The limitations of the internalisation theory and previous theories to fully account for variations 
in foreign direct investment flows around the world were addressed by Dunning (1977, 1979) 
in a new theoretical formulation that focused on the location specifics of foreign direct 
investment firms, while at the same time incorporating arguments on both firm-specific 
advantages and internalisation. Dunning’s theory, known as the ‘Eclectic paradigm’, is based 
on four principles or assumptions that must be fulfilled by any firm intending to internationalise 
(Dunning, 1993),(Dunning, 1993a: pp 79) (Stoian & Filippaios, 2008). These principles are; 
1) ownership advantage: the firm must have specific ownership advantages compared to 
firms located in the country where it intends to establish new plants; 
2) internalisation advantage: the benefits of internalisation must offset the costs or those 
benefits associated with other alternatives of serving the foreign market, for instance 
exportation and licensing; 
3) location advantage: it must be beneficial to utilise the firm’s ownership advantages 
abroad rather than at home in concurrence with domestic resources in the foreign 
country; and 
4)  the extent to which the firm feels internalization is consistent with its long-term 
management strategy  
The first three principles listed above are also referred to as the “OLI” (ownership-location-
internationalization) framework. 
Ownership advantages in the OLI framework are enshrined in the firm’s production process, 
ensuring a competitive advantage over domestically-owned firms. These include patents, 
management know-how, technical knowledge and reputation. The more competitive 
advantages, the more the firm is motivated to invest directly in the foreign economy (Dunning, 
1980). Location advantages that are motives for producing in the foreign country include lower 
costs of production and transport, favourable tax regimes, access to protected markets and low 
domestic competition. As mentioned earlier, internalisation arises from the ‘public good’ 
attributes of ownership advantages and is motivated by the need to lower transaction costs, 
minimise technology imitation and control the firm’s brands and reputation through effective 
management and quality control (Faeth, 2009: 171). This theory further distinguishes the 





firm whose internalisation is a choice of the firm; and those ownership advantages whose 
exploitation is only possible if internalised. According to Dunning, the latter are transaction-
ownership advantages, while the former are asset-ownership advantages. 
The triumvirate underpinning the eclectic paradigm (of ownership, location and internalisation) 
highlights the theoretical predictions that are associated with this framework regarding the 
determinants of flows and growth of foreign direct investments around the world, from origin 
to host economies. These predictions are dependent on whether the enquiry is focused on 
location or internalisation; ownership; countries, firms or industries; or even different forms of 
foreign direct investment. It thus provides a comprehensive framework that suits any form of 
inquiry including the key focus of this study, being firm-level characteristics. 
Among other predictions, the L component in OLI is likely to be influenced by market size, 
labour costs, human capital, economic openness, cultural affinity, the frequency and likelihood 
of government change, natural resources, infrastructure, population, property rights protection 
and fiscal policies. The ownership and internalisation aspects of the firm that intends to 
internationalise are as discussed in the associated theories. In the OLI framework, the 
ownership advantage involves the following: technological strengths; monopolistic power, 
economies of scale; and internalisation advantage that organises productive activities within a 
firm across national boundaries; and the location advantage (this being an area where 
determinants of foreign direct investment are abundant) (Feng, 2017: 5). However, the OLI 
advantages vary depending on whether the country is developed or developing, small or large, 
industrialized or not; additional factors are whether firms are large or small, innovating or 
imitating, technologically limited or advanced, competitive or monopolistic, and assembling 
or processing (Dunning, 1988). 
Although most scholars concur that the eclectic theory is the most comprehensively applicable 
theory for foreign direct investment analysis, it has also been criticised for a number of reasons. 
It has many variables, making analysis complicated; it exhibits bias against developing 
economies in which firms lack the ownership advantages; and it falls short in not spelling out 
the menial role of financial aspects in the foreign direct investment decision (Forssbeck & 
Oxelheim, 2008). But its efficacy in aiding foreign direct investment analysis at both micro 
and macro level is thorough; and it provides theoretical support for the fact that imperfections 
in international markets dictate flows of foreign-owned firm activities, which in turn underline 





dimensions. Dunning’s theory and those discussed thus far do not account for the entire 
spectrum of a firm’s desires to invest abroad. Further elaboration of this spectrum can be found 
in the factor-proportions and proximity-concentration theories.  
The factor-proportions theory attempts to explain movement and growth of foreign direct 
investment from the perspective of a firm’s desire to integrate production vertically across 
national boundaries in order to take advantage of factor-price differences associated with 
different relative factor supplies (Brainard, 1993a). Under this theoretical framework, trade 
costs are set to zero, firms are assumed to prefer producing in one location due to increasing 
returns to scale, internalisation of production is taken as given, and information regarding factor 
endowments is asymmetric. Based on these assumptions, the factor-proportions hypothesis 
predicts that firms will establish production units abroad once differences in terms of factor 
endowments between home and foreign economies are large and when factor price differences 
actually exist. Specifically, under asymmetric information on factor endowments, firms from 
human-capital-surplus economies will be stimulated to establish units in human-capital-deficit 
economies, giving birth to vertical foreign direct investments. Exporting services (like R&D 
and advertising) and intermediate goods from foreign direct investment headquarters to new 
production units in foreign markets makes intra-firm trade a key feature of vertical integration 
Firms are stimulated to establish the production unit in a foreign economy in order to avoid 
duplication of their knowledge capital, this being a basic advantage they have over domestic 
firms. With knowledge capital and its joint-input attribute, the operation of multi-plants ensures 
growth in firm-level scale economies (Faeth, 2009). 
The proximity-concentration theory seeks to explain flows and growth of foreign direct 
investment from the perspective of a trade-off between maximising nearness to customers and 
the concentration of production in one geographical place so as to enjoy economies of large-
scale production. This theoretical thinking accounts for the emergence of horizontal foreign 
direct investment across boundaries of economies. It is associated with the scholarly works of 
Krugman (1983), Horstmann and Markusen (1996), Brainard (1993a), and Markusen and 
Venables (2000). This theory assumes that there are firm-specific costs, tariffs, and transport 
costs that motivate firms to engage in both domestic and foreign production. It also assumes 
that there are plant-scale economies that incentivise firms to produce at home only and to export 
to the foreign market (Faeth, 2009: 175). In terms of theoretical prediction, the proximity-
concentration hypothesis posits that firms are more likely to establish production units in 





investment barriers are low, and the size of economies of scale at firm level is low relative to 
plant level (Brainard, 1993b:520). This also implies that foreign-owned investments are more 
likely to exist in industries and sectors with large firm-specific costs along with high tariff and 
transport costs; and that they are less likely to be found in industries or sectors with relatively 
small plant-scale economies. Logically, a firm wouldn’t set up a plant abroad when transport 
costs are negligible (meaning exportation makes sense economically) yet it has to incur fixed 
costs in setting up such a plant in the first place, but without saving significant costs in terms 
of transport. Hence, high transport costs, trade barriers and large-firm-level economies vis-à-
vis plant economies are what provide the logical motivation for firms to go foreign. Intuitively, 
the proximity-concentration hypothesis predicts the emergence of horizontal foreign-owned 
firms as a consequence of possible substitutability between exportation and foreign production. 
The factor-proportions and proximity-concentration theories are not without their inherent 
limitations in explaining emergence and growth of foreign direct investment. The proximity-
concentration hypothesis, for instance, predicts the growth of horizontal foreign direct 
investment on the premise that different activities use either factor inputs in the same 
proportion or only one factor input. In such a situation, there is no factor price justification for 
vertical foreign direct investment. A key assumption of the factor proportions hypothesis is the 
absence of trade costs, which eliminates any reason for horizontal foreign direct investment 
(Anghel, 2007: 5). Horizontal foreign direct investment is also predicted as likely to occur 
between countries at the same stage of development, which is far from reality. These and other 
shortcomings played a vital role in motivating Markusen and other scholars to come up with 
the Knowledge-Capital Model of foreign direct investment. 
The KCM is an integration of both the factor-proportions and proximity-concentration models 
of foreign direct investment in a single general equilibrium model. It allows for the building of 
multiple plants and the separation of headquarters services, like R&D, advertising and 
production as distinct (Faeth, 2009). Unlike the factor-proportions theory, the KCM assumes 
the existence of trade costs between economies, hence allowing for both low and high costs of 
transport between countries. Unlike the proximity-concentration hypothesis, the KCM assumes 
dissimilar factor-inputs intensities across activities (Anghel, 2007: 5). Other assumptions 
derived from its early formulation include a 2x2x2 formulation with one good exhibiting 
constant returns to scale and the second with plant and firm-level economies of scale and 





The KCM is a result of the works of Markusen (1997; 2000), in which horizontal stimuli of 
foreign direct investment are combined with vertical stimuli. Horizontal stimuli are associated 
with firms’ desire to take production nearer to customers and elude trade costs, while vertical 
stimuli express the desire to engage in unskilled, labour-intensive production activities in areas 
with relative surpluses of unskilled labour. Based on this view, similarities in market size, 
resource endowments and transport costs are some of the causes of horizontal foreign direct 
investment, whereas vertical foreign direct investment is much better explained by differences 
in relative resource endowments (Faeth, 2009: 179).  
Based on these assumptions, KCM’s theoretical prediction is far more accommodating than 
other hypotheses, with firms having alternatives of either geographically separating their 
headquarters from a single plant or setting up numerous plants. In both cases, there are 
possibilities of firms integrating horizontally or vertically, or even deciding to remain domestic 
and to serve foreign markets via exportation. It turns out vividly that the underlying factor for 
either vertical or horizontal foreign direct investment emergence is possession of knowledge 
capital, which, if not possessed by a firm, relegates it to the domestic market, with this pointing 
to how foreign-owned firms differ from domestically oriented firms even in the countries of 
origin. 
As indicated earlier, theoretical explanations of foreign direct investment are numerous. While 
earlier attempts by the neoclassical theory received criticism due to its assumptions related to 
perfect competition, several other theories have been developed based on imperfect market 
analyses. Theories like those based on internalisation, ownership advantages, product life cycle 
formulations, vertical or horizontal integration formulations, and policy variable theories 
appear in the vast foreign direct investment literature, all with the single goal of explaining the 
motivating factors behind the flows and growth of foreign direct investments. However, by 
scholarly consensus, Dunning’s OLI theoretical formulation remains a strong approach for 
explaining foreign direct investment. His theory combines ownership, location, and 
internalisation advantages as key determinants of foreign direct investment. Ownership and 
internalisation were highlighted by previous theories and more theoretical modifications 
continue to emerge in modern foreign direct investment analyses. As put forward by Faeth 
(2009: 188), analysis of foreign direct investment should not be based on a single theory but 
rather more broadly on a combination of ownership advantages, such as market size, 
agglomeration economics, market characteristics, cost factors, risk and policy variables. 





or theories of foreign direct investment. This study will also follow this approach in its attempt 
to analyse systematic differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms in 
Uganda and SSA generally. This theoretical analysis provides firm guidance in selection of 
key variables to use in the analyses. 
2.3 Empirical Literature Review  
The theoretical review in the previous section has been enhanced by empirical research 
findings. All the theories discussed in the previous section have been empirically tested in 
various scholarly works. Table 2.1 provides a summary of some of the empirical studies in 
which these theories have been tested and evaluated in terms of their ability to explain the 
features and flows of foreign direct investments around the world. In terms of scope, relatively 
more studies have been at micro level. At the micro level, studies have exploited firm-level 
data to investigate the extent to which theoretical formulations hold in as far as accounting for 
foreign direct investment growth is concerned. Macro- and industrial-level approaches have 
used industry-level data and macro variables to explain the motivations of firms engaging in 
international production. In terms of geographic scope, most studies have been carried out in 
affluent economies, with only a few similar studies having been undertaken in developing 
economies. In terms of methodology, most empirical studies have employed conventional 
















Table 2. 1: Selected empirical studies on characteristics and determinants of FDI  
Author (s) Country Method Data 
Correa da Silveira et al. (2017) Brazil Logistic Regression Firm-level 
Ablov (2015) Poland Pooled OLS Firm-level 
Leman and Ismet (2015) Asia Panel regressions Firm-level 
Wakasugi et al. (2014) Japan Descriptive statistics Firm-level 
Feng-Jyh Lin (2010) China Hazard modelling Firm-level 
Falk and Wolfmayr(2010) Austria Matching and DID Firm-level 
Cai and Guney (2010) China FE and GMM (Panel) Firm-level 
Lee, Huang and Chan (2009) China Logistic regressions Firm-level 
Barther et al. (2008) Ghana OLS Firm-level 
Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) Europe Gravity regressions Firm-level 
Raff and Ryan (2006) Japan Hazard models Firm-level 
Kimura and Kiyota (2006) Japan Regression Firm-level 
Moss and Vijaya (2005) East Africa Regression Firm-level 
Love and Lage-Hildago (2000) Mexico/US Cointegration analysis Time series 
Rubio and Rivero (1994) Spain Cointegration analysis Time series 
Source: Author’s own compilation based on literature review 
The standard neoclassical theory’s ability to explain flows and distribution of foreign owned 
investments across economies has been empirically tested. Harm Zebregs (1998) investigates 
whether the observed distribution of foreign direct investments across developing economies 
can adequately be explained by the neoclassical theory or by its extended modifications in 
which technologies are allowed to vary across countries. Zebregs estimates production 
functions that fulfil the assumptions of the neoclassical theory as constant returns to scale and 
diminishing marginal returns to capital and labour. Marginal rates of return to capital are 
computed on the basis of the estimated production functions and compared with the pattern 
flows of foreign direct investments across developing economies. The findings suggest that the 
marginal product of capital as defined by the neoclassical theory cannot explain the distribution 
of foreign direct investments in developing countries. If the neoclassical theory is to be taken 
in its form, with only labour and capital, and with technological homogeneity across 
economies, then poorer economies should have large foreign direct investment inflows due to 





The ownership advantages theory has been empirically tested, with results revealing foreign 
direct investment firms being characteristically unique and possessing ownership advantages 
when compared with domestically-owned firms, irrespective of whether the inquiry is focused 
on firms from the same country (where foreign firms are outward – as opposed to inward – 
investment) or not. Regression and other associated methods have been popularly used, and 
ownership advantages have been confirmed to be characteristic determinants of foreign direct 
investment. The earlier studies first provided evidence to Hymer and Kindelberg’s 
monopolistic hypothesis. One such study by Horst (1972), based on data from over 1000 
manufacturing firms in the US, analysed the market share of United States (US) industries in 
Canada. A key result from Horst’s analysis was that most foreign direct investments are of 
larger size than comparable domestically-owned firms. This result resonates with the empirical 
analyses conducted at industry level, especially in the developed world. For instance, Wolf 
(1977) analysed industry-level data on US manufacturing firms using regression techniques. 
Wolf’s findings indicated that sales of US foreign affiliates as a percentage of domestic 
production were increasing in average firm size and technical manpower (Faeth, 2009: 169). 
Further industry-level evidence on other features besides firm size is visible in Lall’s (1980) 
study using data from 25 US industries involved in foreign production and exportation. Key 
results of this study were the significant increases, for foreign affiliates of US firms, in 
expenditure relating to R&D, advertising, and average wage for employment. These results 
concur with those of a later study by Saunders (1982), whose analysis found advertising, R&D, 
and managerial resources to be significant characteristics of foreign direct investments. Other 
empirical studies, using cross-sectional data from primarily the US and Sweden acknowledged 
the above theoretical underpinnings, although to varying degrees. For instance, Blomstrom and 
Lipsey (1986) found that firm size had only a threshold effect on foreign direct investment but 
with either less or no effect thereafter. Studies like Blomstrom and Lipsey (1986) highlight one 
other element noticeable in foreign direct investment literature, namely, the variance in 
empirical results regarding significance associated with ownership advantages of foreign direct 
investment firms.  
Elsewhere, focusing on a few ownership advantages, Falk and Wolfmayr (2010) apply 
matching methods and difference-in-differences estimation technique to investigate the 
features of Austrian firms. Their study found Austrian firms that internationalised as outward 
foreign direct investments to be significantly different from Austrian firms that were 





large in terms of employment and sales figures, capital intensive, they paid higher wages and 
were more likely to hire highly educated workers. These findings, which are also found to hold 
for inward foreign direct investment firms from the rest of the world, point to the conclusion 
that “firms that start foreign activities are ex-ante different from non-investing purely domestic 
firms” (Falk & Wolfmayr, 2010: 1). Before firms decide to directly invest abroad instead of 
licensing or exporting, several firm-specific characteristics determine such a decision.  
In a methodologically different study, Ablov (2015) applied OLS and panel-data econometric 
methods on the firm-level data of 147,878 Polish companies from all sectors of economy to 
investigate firm-level characteristic determinants of foreign direct investment. The results 
indicated that firm productivity, R&D, firm size, and highly skilled workers were significant 
features of foreign direct investment firms that established investments in Poland (Ablov, 2015: 
91). Lin (2010) adduces further evidence in her investigation of Taiwanese foreign direct 
investments in China’s IT sector from 1996 to 2005. Using firm-level financial data and 
employing event history techniques under Cox’s maximum likelihood proportional hazard 
modelling, Lin finds export orientation, capital intensity, firm performance, R&D, and firm 
size positively influencing firms’ engagement in foreign investment. By implication, before 
internationalisation, firms are characterised by ownership advantages that not only stimulate 
them to invest in foreign markets but also distinguish them from domestically-owned 
enterprises located in economies where such foreign-owned firms intend to invest.  
Focusing on capital intensity, the ownership advantage theory has further been empirically 
tested in the recent past. Among recent scholars with such specific evidence are; Cipollina, 
Pozzolo, Giovannetti & Filomena (2012), Cole and Elliot (2005), and Aaron, Iregui & Ramírez 
(2014). Visibility of foreign ownership in capital-intensive sectors is one argument that has 
been used to support the conclusion that foreign-owned firms are relatively more capital 
intensive than domestically-owned firms and it is a source of competitive advantage. One other 
explanation that has been put forward in support of foreign-owned firms being capital intensive 
is the fact that the decision to invest directly in a foreign economy is traded off with that of 
continued exportation to the foreign economy. The former alternative involves greater sunk 
costs, implying that the firm must have reached a given level of productivity and volume of 
capital (Melitz, 2002; Raff, Michael & Staehler, 2006). This tends to imply that foreign direct 
investment firms are capital intensive ex-ante. Lin (2010) and Siddharthan and Nollen (2007) 
conclude that it is capital intensity that gives foreign-owned firms superiority in terms of 





modelling to study the determinants of foreign direct investment in Columbia. Their findings 
suggested that firms that listed on the stock market, engaged in foreign trade activities, and 
operating in sectors with higher capital intensity were more likely to be recipients of foreign 
investment. Specifically, study findings revealed a 0.3% marginal effect on foreign 
participation arising from increased capital intensity in largely social and community sectors 
of Columbia. This affirms capital intensity to be an important characteristic of firms with 
foreign ownership. These study findings resonate with those of Karpaty and Poldahl (2006) in 
Swedish firms and scholarly findings by Giulietti, McCorriston and Osborne (2004). The 
capital intensity of firms is pertinent in determining foreign direct investment levels as the size 
of the resource commitments required to participate in foreign investment can vary 
substantially depending on how capital-intensive firms are (Lin, 2010). Several other studies 
that have recently investigated the interlinkages between firm and industry-specific 
characteristics and foreign direct investment include; Hagemejer and Tyrowicz (2012), Wang, 
Alba and Park (2013), Liu and Nunnenkamp (2011), Raff and Ryan (2008), Hilber and Voicu 
(2010). These have provided further evidence of the significance of firm ownership advantages 
and foreign direct investment, highlighting the dichotomy between foreign-owned and 
domestically-owned firms. 
 
The ownership advantages theory has also received some attention in developing economies 
more recently. Moss and Ramachandran (2004) uses the World Bank’s Regional Program on 
Enterprise Development (RPED) data on 300 - 400 manufacturing firms in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania, providing further evidence of ownership advantages for foreign-owned firms. Using 
regression techniques, their analysis found foreign-owned firms employing more workers, 
likely to offer formal training programs to their workers and registered higher value added per-
worker than domestically-owned firms. In Uganda, for example, the average number of 
workers for foreign-owned firms was found to be nine times that of domestically-owned firms, 
with an average of 20% more foreign-owned firms likely to offer formal training to their 
workers when compared to domestically-owned firms.  
Barthel, Busse and Osei (2008) employed multivariate analysis on the World Bank Enterprise 
Survey data for Ghana in an attempt to investigate the salient characteristics and determinants 
of foreign direct investments. Their investigation also investigated how domestically-owned 
firms differ from foreign-owned firms. Key amongst their study findings was that foreign-





to invest or export more than their domestically-owned counterparts (Barthel et al., 2008: 9). 
These findings deviate from earlier studies that have investigated ownership advantages of 
export intensity and management ability of foreign-owned firms. Whether this contradiction in 
empirical study findings has to do with the level of development of the economy in question 
or not is not conclusively answered by my literature review. However, in terms of firm size, 
Barthel et al. (2008) are in agreement with existing studies in that foreign-owned firms  were  
found to be generally larger than domestically-owned firms, with a marginal change in the 
number of workers found to be significantly associated with a 4.5% increase in the likelihood 
that the firm was entirely or partially foreign owned. 
Noticeable in the empirical studies that have tested the ownership theory is that all are based 
on developed economies with virtually no evidence from developing countries, SSA in 
particular. Where similar studies, although scanty, have been conducted in SSA, findings are 
to some extent dissimilar to those based on developed economies and also to some conducted 
in developing economies for instance findings by Barthel, Busse and Osei (2008) on Ghana 
when compared to those by Moss and Ramachandran (2004) on economies in East Africa. 
Whereas most studies conducted in the developed world, in detail, analyse features of foreign-
owned investments, almost none clarifies whether observed superior performance of foreign-
owned investments is because such firms are in sectors that are featured by the observed 
superior characteristics or these foreign-owned firms are simply systematically superior to their 
domestically-owned counterparts. Empirical studies reviewed and their findings remain 
inconclusive so far on this matter.  For instance, Aaron et al. (2014) established that Colombian 
firms anchored in capital intensive sectors were likely recipients of foreign investment. These 
findings tend to imply that observed differences between foreign and purely domestically-
owned firms are attributable to foreign investors acquiring hitherto domestically-owned firms 
that were already performing well in terms of capital intensity. This further implies that 
observed differences may not be due to foreign ownership per se.   
In this thesis, I attempt to fill the above identified gaps, manifested in terms of inconclusiveness 
of findings in the literature and evidence that is still mainly from the developed world. 
Regarding the later, I provide evidence specific to developing economies, particularly in SSA. 
Moreover, by employing alternative methods, this thesis provides a robustness check for 





Where specific attention has been on those firm-level features amenable to internalisation, firm 
characteristics like R&D expenditure, advertising, managerial expertise, and marketing skills 
have received further empirical enquiry, further bolstering the legitimacy of the internalisation 
theoretical. Can, Dogan & Deger  (2017) used Pedroni and Kao Cointegration Tests, as well as  
Panel Granger Causality methods to investigate the relationship between R&D expenditures, 
foreign direct investment and economic growth over the period 1996–2011 in a sample of G-7 
countries. The results indicated a causality relationship between foreign direct investment and 
R&D specifically from foreign direct investment to R&D spending at a 1% significance level 
(Can et al., 2017: 66). Kamata, Sato & Tanaka (2017) used data on Vietnamese manufacturing 
firms in a study on the internalisation of firms and management practices. Their results 
indicated that foreign-owned firms had more highly educated managers than domestically-
owned firms by a margin of 5%, indicating how skill-intensive foreign direct investments are 
likely to be when compared to domestically-owned investments. Additionally, 15% more of 
foreign-owned firms were found to require past managerial experience in similar firms as a 
recruitment criterion than domestically-owned firms. These findings echoed Saunders’s (1982) 
investigation of the intangible assets hypothesis on Canadian firms. A significant determinant 
of foreign direct investment activity in his study was management resources. Erdal and Göçer 
(2015b), who employed panel causality and cointegration methods to investigate the effects of 
foreign direct investment on R&D and innovation activities in 10 developing economies in 
Asia, provided further evidence in support of firm level features associated with the 
internalisation theory. These find a one point increase in the amount of foreign direct 
investment inflow being associated with a 0.83% increase in R&D expenditures and a 0.42% 
increase in patent applications in these countries for the 1996–-2013 period (Erdal & Göçer, 
2015a: 757). Such findings imply that foreign-owned investments are among other features, 
associated with high levels of R&D. Empirical findings like those of Kamata et al.(2017) imply 
that differences between foreign and domestically-owned firms in terms of features like 
management experience are not only identifiable during firm operations and based on years of 
stay in the industry but also prior to foreign-owned firms taking the decision to invest in the 
economy in question as well at the time of recruitment. These results may hold even more in 
case foreign-owned firms target regional markets for exportation of their products. The extent 
to which a foreign-owned firm supplies regional markets (export oriented) significantly 
influences the firm’s commitment to R&D and hence the associated expenditure (Blomstrom 





The more generally accepted and, by consensus, most popular theory, the eclectic paradigm 
(OLI), has equally received empirical support. Dunning (1988) showed that OLI advantages 
vary from country to country depending on whether countries are developed or not, whether 
they are small or large, and on their level and nature of industrialisation (Faeth, 2009: 171). 
This probably accounts for the variations in earlier empirical tests on the ownership advantages 
or internalisation theories by studies conducted in developing economies. The OLI theory has 
been empirically investigated to varying degrees, depending on whether the focus is on location 
or internalisation advantages, ownership, industries or firms, or even different kinds of foreign 
direct investment. 
In his own empirical assessment, Dunning (1981) investigates whether the competitive 
advantage of foreign direct investments is dependent on a combination of location and 
ownership advantages. Dunning’s analysis of export and local production data of US 
manufacturing foreign-owned firms from seven countries finds a significantly negative 
coefficient of relative market size, and the reverse for skilled employment ratio. More studies 
testing other ownership advantages have followed that of Dunning’s, with some still finding 
differing results. For instance, Santiago (1987) investigates US firms in Puerto Rico at industry 
level. Although he finds industry-level foreign investment increasing with relative profits and 
size of the firms, ownership advantages like capital intensity, relative firm productivity, 
average firm profits and productivity, are not significant determinants of the share of foreign 
firms. This dissimilar finding is also evident in other empirical works, for instance in Cai and 
Guney (2010). In their study of European Union (EU) manufacturing foreign-owned firms in 
China, using fixed effects modelling and GMM system estimation techniques, results of some 
ownership advantages like technology and firm profitability do not agree with theoretical 
predictions, although foreign ownership is still positively associated with export intensity and 
labour cost. 
The significance of ownership and location advantages for foreign-owned firms is affirmed 
further by Ray (1989) in his investigation on foreign direct investment in the US. At the 
industry level, Ray finds location aspects, the US growth trend and exchange rate regime, 
together with ownership advantages, industry R&D intensity, market concentration, capital 
intensity and industry size significantly explained foreign direct investments. These findings 
were mirrored by Barrell and Pain (1996), who identified R&D expenditure, the growth and 
level of gross national product (GNP), firm profits, and the relative production costs in the US 





In another recent study, Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2010) employ cointegration analysis to 
empirically investigate the location advantages as set out in the OLI framework. Their study of 
Mexican foreign direct investments from the US provides further evidence that the market size 
and the differences in the real wages between the two economies significantly accounted for 
foreign direct investment flows in Mexico. These results resonate very well with both earlier 
studies and current empirical studies. For instance, Culem (1988) finds that market size 
positively influences US foreign direct investment in the European Economic Community 
(EEC). Martins, Dias & Triches (2017) investigated the determinants of foreign direct 
investment in Brazil using vector error-correction modelling methods on firm-level data . They 
find the level of economic activity, wages productivity, the exchange rate regime, and the 
stability of the national economy to be statistically significant. These results also echo those 
recently put forward by Tsaurai (2017) in his empirical enquiry into the dynamics of foreign 
direct investments in BRICS countries. This confirms the explanatory power of the O and L 
components of the eclectic theory. 
Although showing varying findings that suggest further investigation (possibly using 
alternative methodologies such as cluster analysis), studies based on the OLI theoretical 
underpinnings have established that combinations of internalisation, location and ownership 
advantages are the main characteristic determinants of foreign direct investments. Ownership 
advantages are firm-specific; those with public ownership attributes can be internalised, while 
the location features are exogenous to the firm. Other factors are more institutional in nature, 
such as corruption, rule of law and regime type. It is noticeable that empirical evidence guided 
by the OLI theory does not clearly point out whether foreign-owned establishments 
systematically differ from domestically-owned firms and so the observed differences in 
performance may be linked to ownership status of firms. Most studies test Dunning’s theory 
with greater focus on the location aspects, which does not straightforward answer the empirical 
question of this study and also leaves the earlier gaps identified. For instance, still most studies 
focus on western economies like Mexico and the US and utilize conventional methods in their 
analyses. 
Empirical evidence in support of the factor-proportion and proximity-concentration theories is 
available too in the literature. Several studies have been conducted to this effect although with 
varying results that further support the need for further empirical enquiry. One such attempt is 
by Mathä (1999) who uses plant- and firm-level data on Swedish multinationals to investigate 





Mathä’s censored regression analyses indicate that horizontal multinationals are promoted if 
costs of trade are large, firm-level economies are larger than plant-level economies, and R&D 
intensity is low. Coefficients on economies of scale, factor endowment similarities, host 
country size, and industry-specific trade costs are found to be significant at either a 5% or a 1% 
level. The reverse is true for the case of vertical multinationals, supporting the theoretical 
prediction of the proximity-concentration hypothesis (Mathä, 1999: 15). This result agrees with 
earlier empirical studies by Brainard (1993a), and Horstman and Markusen (1996). 
Mathä further finds the coefficient of R&D is positively significant for vertical relative to 
horizontal multinationals in his econometric specifications. R&D intensity is found to have 
more effect on foreign production shares of vertical multinationals, confirming such firms’ 
preference to establish plant affiliates in foreign markets and to export headquarters’ services 
and intermediates to affiliates, a feature of intra-firm trading, as the factor-proportion theory 
predicts. However, this study finds insignificant effect of factor endowment differences for 
vertical multinationals, a result that contradicts some earlier empirical findings like Helpman 
(1984). Helpman uses a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition in 
horizontally differentiated goods to explain multinational enterprises (MNEs) but finds that the 
location of firms abroad is better explained by differences in factor endowments and 
consequently factor price differences (Faeth, 2009: 175). Additional evidence is provided by 
Brainard (1993b) who uses US data to examine the extent to which multinational location 
decisions reveal a trade-off between attaining proximity to customers and concentrating 
production to realise scale economies. Brainard uses the Probit and OLS regression techniques 
and finds that, relative to exports, the US’s multinational production overseas increases as 
transport costs rise, as trade and investment barriers decrease, and with lower economies of 
scale at plant level relative to corporate level. Brainard finds the proximity-concentration 
theory to be fairly robust (Brainard, 1993b: 538).  
Recent empirical evidence, however, indicates that the proximity-concentration hypothesis 
holds more for non-multi-plant firms in which the trade-off will yield a single option. 
Otherwise, the coexistence of foreign ownership and exportation is possible and varies with 
time. Bricongne, Bedoya & Forero (2016) exploit data on French firms to investigate the 
possible coexistence of foreign ownership and exportation using an analysis based on gravity 
equations. Their results indicate that substitutability only occurs in core products of the firm, 
and immediately after the decision to invest in an economy where the demand for the firm’s 





similar to those that tested the OLI theory i.e. skewed to the western world, more macro in 
nature, and do not directly provide answers to our main empirical question. 
The knowledge-capital theory has also received empirical attention from various scholarly 
circles. The evidence, however, has remained inconclusive till to date. Using a panel of inward 
and outward sales data of US foreign affiliates and some other 36 countries, Carr, Markusen & 
Maskus (2003) estimate the knowledge-capital model. Their results indicate support for this 
theory with strong statistical significance found for most variables including; market size, 
transport costs, and factor endowments. But Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003: 980) contends 
that Carr et al.’s (2003) results are subject to estimation issues, specifically the mis-
specification of the underlying theory in their central estimating equation. When one correctly 
specifies the regression equation, Blonigen et al. (2003) argue that the horizontal model cannot 
be rejected in approval of the KCM. Blonigen et al.’s (2003) new estimation results support 
the horizontal foreign direct investment model against KCM since MNE activity is found to be 
smaller the more the countries differ in their relative factor endowments. Blonigen et al.’s 
argument might, however, be due to their failure to distinguish between estimation and testing 
or as a result of complexities surrounding the KCM estimation, given that the relationships 
predicted by the model are both nonlinear and non-monotonic (Carr et al., 2003: 995). 
Mariel, Orbe & Rodr (2007) add to the inconclusiveness of empirical support for the KCM by 
adopting a time-varying coefficients approach in its estimation. Their OLS estimation of the 
model based on panel data finds that the vertical component of the KCM is relevant even in 
the context of European countries with relatively similar factor endowments (Mariel et al. 
2007: 16). These results echo those earlier found by Braconier et al. (2002) in their analysis of 
Swedish and US outward foreign direct investment data, in which the vertical foreign direct 
investment was alternatively based on the assumption of a skilled-wage premium as opposed 
to differences in relative factor endowments. All in all, empirical evidence associated with the 
KCM remains mixed. 
Empirical research on foreign direct investments in relation to domestically-owned investments 
in Uganda, especially at firm level is still limited, probably owing to the scarcity of firm-level 
data. Most studies on foreign direct investments in Uganda have been undertaken at macro 
level, making them inadequate at explaining marginal aspects associated with firm behaviour. 
Most of such studies have therefore only presented average understanding of the foreign direct 





on foreign direct investments in Uganda have been undertaken by Obwona (1998), Riddervold 
and Kristiansen (2011), and Wakyereza (2017). As hinted, although they provide good insights 
on characteristic features of foreign-owned firms in Uganda (particularly Obwona), all these 
are macro studies. Specifically, Obwona (1998), Wilson and Cacho (2007), and Moss & Vijaya 
(2004) have produced some likenesses to the international literature. These studies, although 
still inadequate, find significant differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned 
firms in Uganda on various dimensions like; management exp, worker_educ, firm size 
measured by output, employment levels, and R&D. These studies provide supportive evidence 
for some of the theoretical frameworks discussed earlier in this chapter. 
With reference to the above review, it is clear that empirical investigations regarding foreign 
and domestically-owned investments have majorly focused on the developed world. Little 
scholarly attention has been on developing economies, particularly Africa. Even with such bias, 
findings have been dissimilar in certain cases making it clear that the debate is still 
inconclusive.   
This chapter provides further contribution to the literature especially in Uganda by addressing 
the issue of the characteristic features of foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms using a 
relatively novel analytical method that makes use of a rich World Bank Enterprise Survey data 
set. This chapter attempts to contribute to previous works on Uganda’s foreign and 
domestically-owned investment enterprises at the firm-level by determining whether the 
previous findings of the characteristic features and implied differences between foreign-owned 
and domestically-owned firms still hold or not, when alternative methods of analysis are used. 
In this endeavour, findings are expected to provide a robustness check for earlier findings, 
provide evidence that is reflective of developing economies unlike available studies, and 
ultimately contribute to resolving the inconclusiveness in the literature as highlighted earlier. 
Given the review of empirical literature, analysis is guided by the OLI and ownership 
theoretical formulations. Specifically, the latter is micro-oriented and focuses on most of the 
critical variables that this thesis utilises in the analyses. As will be seen later, analysis in this 
chapter utilises cluster analysis methods with the help of machine learning techniques to 
generate clusters of firms, which are summarised and evaluated meaningfully. Choice of cluster 
analysis as the alternative method was motivated by; (i) its relatively minimal use in economic 
analyses yet it is a strong tool of multivariate exploratory analysis (Rezankova, 2014). This 
makes the method suitable given that one of the study aims was to yield results that would act 





and (iii) its simplicity in not requiring prior assumptions on the data unlike conventional 
methods, an attribute that allows this method to straightforward answer the key empirical 
question at hand. In the following sub-section, a brief description of the principles underlying 
this method is presented.  
2.4 Theoretical Underpinnings of Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis refers to a set of statistical techniques concerned with exploring data sets to 
evaluate whether or not they can be summarised meaningfully in terms of a relatively lesser 
number of groups of objects that are similar to each other; and which are dissimilar in some 
respects from individuals in other groups (Everitt et al., 2011). It is therefore a numerical 
technique which entails the classification of multivariate data into a restricted number of 
groups, which are heterogeneous (dissimilar) between themselves yet homogeneous (similar) 
within, with the aim of attaining maximum homogeneity and minimum heterogeneity (Johnson 
& Wichern, 2007). 
Historically, cluster analysis can be traced to the period prior to the 2nd World War, originating 
in anthropology by Driver and Kroeber (1932). The technique was introduced in the field of 
abnormal and social psychology by Zubin (1938) and Tryon in 1939. It was famously used by 
Cattell from 1943 for trait theory classification in personality psychology. However, according 
to Bock (2008), cluster analysis emerged as a major topic in the 1960s and 1970s when the 
monograph, ‘The Principles and Practice of Numerical Taxonomy’ by Sneath and Sokal (1963) 
motivated world-wide research on clustering methods. The monograph heralded the 
publication of a broad range of books, such as Les Bases de la Classification Automatique 
(Lerman, 1970), Mathematical Taxonomy (Jardine & Sibson, 1971) and Cluster Analysis for 
Applications (Anderberg, 1973). Cluster analysis has witnessed increased use in various 
disciplines since 2000, with various methods for clustering data having been developed6. One 
of the central elements in cluster analysis is the measurement of proximity of objects under 
investigation. Proximity, also referred to as association or resemblance of objects, is the logical 
determination of how similar or dissimilar items or objects under investigation are to each 
other. Different ways have been developed to measure the proximity of objects being studied 
 
 
6 For some of the methods that have been recently developed, see Kaufman and Rousseauw (2005), Rezankova 





but they are generally of two types, namely, the matching type measures and the distance-type 
measures. 
 
Distance-type measures are specifically employed in the estimation of the distance between 
objects under investigation, such as firms, individuals or households. They are mostly 
appropriate for continuous variables. Matching-type measures are usually applied to 
categorical variables. The use of distance-type measurement is based on a similarity or 
dissimilarity matrix of m by m dimension. This matrix contains the pairwise dissimilarities or 
similarities between the objects under study. For instance, if xi and xj are the i
th and jth objects 
respectively, then the entry at the ith row and jth column of the matrix is the similarity sij, or the 
dissimilarity dij, between xi and xj.  
 
Within these two types of measuring proximity, there exists a number of techniques for 
estimating distances between objects or determining the matching between objects. For data 
containing multivariate continuous variables, the most popular technique is the Euclidean 
distance estimation or formally the l2 norm measure
7. This measure assumes that the space of 
standardised variables is orthogonal. However, if some components of variables are correlated, 
weights are used. This measure is specified formally as: 
 





                                             (2.1) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑘 and 𝑥𝑗𝑘 respectively denote the value of the k
th variable of the p-dimensional 
observations for individuals i and j. This measure is quite appealing due to its property that 𝑑𝑖𝑗 
can be interpreted as physical distances between two p-dimensional points 𝑋𝑖
′ = (𝑥𝑖1 ⋅ ⋯ 𝑥𝑖𝑝) 
and 𝑋𝑗
′ =  (𝑥𝑗1 ⋅ ⋯ 𝑥𝑗𝑝) in Euclidean space (Everitt et al., 2011). An observation i is declared 
to be closer or more similar to j than to k if 𝑑𝑖𝑗 < 𝑑𝑖𝑘 . 
Besides the Euclidean technique, another popular measure is the rectilinear or taxicab measure. 
This measure is also known as the Manhattan, l1 norm, or city block distance measure (Everitt 









                                                                   𝑑𝑖𝑗 = ∑ |𝑥𝑖𝑘 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘|
𝑝
𝑘=1
                                             (2.2) 
The rectilinear technique measures distances in a street configuration. The Euclidean and 
rectilinear measures are both special cases of the general Minkowski distance or lr norm 
measure. Other measures include the Canberra distance, the Pearson correlation, and the 
Angular separation measures (Everitt et al., 2011; Gower & Legendre, 1986). These measures 
are appropriate when the analyst intends not to use categorical variables in the clustering 
process. 
 
When the data contains categorical variables, different measures are employed and most of 
these are defined in terms of the entries in a cross-classification of the counts of mismatches 
and matches in the “p” variables for two observations. Table 2.2 shows the general version of 
the cross-classification, while Table 2.3 illustrates the list of similarity measures that can be 
used. 
Table 2. 2: Counts of binary outcomes for two individuals  
 
                                                                                  Individual i 
 
                                        Outcome               1                    0                                    Total 
                                           1                      a                     b                                  a + b 
 Individual j                            
                                              0                      c                     d                                  c + d 
 
                                         Total                     a + c               b + d                       p = a + b + c + d         
Source: Adapted from Everitt et al. (2011:46) 
 
Table 2. 3: Similarity measures for binary data  
 
 Measure                                                                     Formula 
S1: Matching Coefficient                                         sij = (a + b) ∕ [a + b + c + d] 
  S2: Jaccard Coefficient (Jaccard, 1908)                    si̇j = a ∕ (a + b + c) 
  S3: Rogers and Tanimoto (1960)                              sij = (a + d) ∕ [a + 2(b + c) + d]  
  S4: Sneath and Sokal (1973)                                     sij = a|[a + 2(b + c)] 
  S5: Gower and Legendre (1986)                               sij = (a + d) ∕ [a +
1
2⁄ (b + c) + d] 
  S6: Gower and Legendre (1986)                               sij = a ∕ [a +
1
2⁄ (b + c)] 






The simple matching coefficient (S1) is the most popular and, as indicated, it is the ratio of the 
number of matches or mismatches to the total number of attributes. Measures S2–S6 are 
alternatives developed to counter the shortcomings of S1, for instance, those which arise when 
dealing with zero-zero matches or uninformative co-absences. For categorical variables with 
more than two levels, Everitt et al. (2011) suggest allocating a score 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑘  of zero or one to each 
variable k, depending on whether the two observations i and j are the same on such variable.  
An average of the scores over all “p” variables is then generated to give the necessary similarity 
coefficient specified as: 
 






                                                            (2.3) 
 
However, most of the current data sets contain both categorical and continuous variables; and 
some of the categorical variables may have more than two levels. This kind of data structure 
creates a challenge when using the aforementioned proximity measures. One solution is to 
dichotomise all variables and employ measures for binary data; however, this solution comes 
at a cost of losing some information due to the transformation. Wright et al. (2003) suggests 
rescaling all the variables so that they are on the same scale. This scaling is done by replacing 
variable values by their ranks among the observations (objects) and thereafter employing a 
measure for continuous data. Another option is to construct a dissimilarity measure for each 
type of variable and combine them, either with or without differential weighting, into a single 
coefficient (Everitt et al., 2011). Because of the above challenge, more complicated measures 
for mixed data have been developed. The most popular is the one developed by Gower (1971). 
Gower’s general similarity coefficient caters for mixed data and its varying variable 
components. Its specification is as seen in (2.4) 
 






⁄                                    (2.4) 
 
In (2.4), 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑘   is the similarity between the i
th and jth objects as measured by the kth variable. 
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘  is the assigned weight function and typically it is equal to one if the comparison is valid 
or zero if comparison is invalid. 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘  will also be zero if the outcome of the k
th variable is 
missing for either or both of the objects i and j. For binary variables and categorical variables 





objects have the same value and 0 otherwise (Everitt et al., 2011). When the variables are 
continuous, Gower suggested use of the following measure:  
 
                                                      𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 1 − |𝑥𝑖𝑘 − 𝑥𝑗𝑘| ∕ 𝑅𝑘                                                     (2.5) 
 
where 𝑅𝑘  is the range of observations for the k
th variable. This means that the city block 
distance measure is employed after scaling the kth variable to unit range. 
 
After deciding on the proximity measure to use, the next step is to decide on which algorithm 
to use in the clustering. An algorithm is a step-by-step procedure or method designed to 
perform an operation, leading to the sought result once correctly performed. Cluster analysis 
uses algorithms in grouping items and these algorithms are of two categories; hierarchical and 
non-hierarchical algorithms. In applying hierarchical algorithms, classification involves a 
series of partitions which may run from a single cluster containing all the observations to “n” 
clusters each containing a single item (Everitt et al., 2011). Hierarchical clustering can be either 
divisive or agglomerative. Agglomerative clustering is perhaps the most widely used technique 
(Everitt et al., 2011). Agglomerative clustering begins with objects considered as individual 
clusters and the clusters are then stepwise linked until all objects are linked in one cluster 
(Řezanková, 2014). Divisive clustering follows the reverse procedure by starting with a single 
cluster consisting of all observations and ending with as many clusters as there are 
observations. It is the direct opposite of agglomerative clustering (Everitt et al., 2011; Tryfos, 
2002). During the process of dividing or agglomerating items into clusters, analysts use several 
methods at each stage to join or link similar items. These include but are not limited to each of 
the methods described below: 
 
The single linkage method 
This method is also referred to as the MIN version or near neighbourhood method of 
hierarchical clustering (Tryfos, 2002). Under this method, the proximity of two clusters is 
defined as the minimum of the distance between any two points in two different clusters. The 
minimum distance is actually a measure of maximum similarity. In this method, only pairs 







The complete linkage method  
This method is also referred to as the MAX version of hierarchical clustering or the furthest 
neighbourhood method (Everitt et al., 2011; Tryfos, 2002). It is the direct opposite of single 
linkage method and, in this case, the distance between two clusters is equivalent to the distance 
between their two most distant members. 
The average linkage method 
The single linkage and complete linkage are not without their own shortcomings. A 
compromise between these two is the average linkage method. Under this method, the distance 
between any two clusters is defined as the average of the distances of all pairs of observations, 
with one observation in the pair taken from the first cluster and the other observation taken 
from the second cluster (Tryfos, 2002). According to Everitt et al. (2011: 76), it is also referred 
to as the unweighted pair group method (UPGMA), which uses the average approach. 
The centroid method 
Also referred to as the unweighted pair group method, the centroid method derives its name 
from the use of the centroid approach. It entails merging clusters that have the most similar 
mean vectors and instead of a proximity matrix it   uses a data matrix (Everitt et al., 2011). The 
method involves computing the geometric center (centroid) of each cluster. The distance 
between any two clusters is then defined as the distance between the two centroids. 
Median linkage 
This method is also known as the weighted pair group method (WPGMC) using the centroid 
approach. In this method, the centroids of the constituent clusters are given equal weights to 
produce the new centroid of the merged cluster. This method reduces the likelihood of objects 
in the most frequent of the pair of clusters to be merged, dominating those in the smaller cluster. 
It therefore yields an intermediate new centroid between two constituent clusters. 
Ward’s method 
Ward introduced this method in 1963. It involves merging clusters based on the size of an error 
sum-of-squares criterion. The key aim at each stage of cluster merging is to minimise the 
increase in the total within-cluster error sum of squares. The error sum of squares (E) is given 
by: 
  
                                                                          𝐸 = ∑ 𝐸𝑚
𝑔












                      (2.7) 
 
in which ?̅?𝑚,𝑘  is defined as  (1/𝑛𝑚) ∑ 𝑥𝑚𝑙,𝑘
𝑛𝑚
𝑙=1
 which is the mean of the mth cluster for the kth 
variable and 𝑥𝑚𝑙,𝑘 is the score on the k
th variable for the lth object in the mth cluster. This method 
utilises Euclidean distances and is mainly applicable to continuous data. 
 
The non-hierarchical Clustering algorithm or method is popularly referred to as the partitioning 
method. Just as with the hierarchical clustering method, there exist several ways of cluster 
formation under the partitioning approach. One of the most popular methods is the K-means 
procedure. Unlike the previous methods, which are based on the Euclidean distances or city 
block distances, the K-means method uses the within-cluster variation as a measure to generate 
homogeneous clusters (Mooi & Marko, 2011). Its fundamental objective is segmenting data in 
such a way so as to minimise within-cluster variation as much as possible. 
 
Tryfos (2002) describes the K-means method as consisting of the following steps; 
 
1. Step 1: Specify the number of clusters and, arbitrarily or deliberately, the members of 
each cluster. 
 
2. Step 2: Calculate each cluster's centroid and the distances between each observation 
and the centroid. If an observation is nearer the centroid of a cluster other than the one 
to which it currently belongs, re-assign it to the nearer cluster. 
 
3. Step 3: Repeat Step 2 until all observations are nearest the centroid of the cluster to 
which they belong. 
 
4. Step 4: If the number of clusters cannot be specified with confidence in advance, repeat 
Steps 1 to 3 with a different number of clusters; and conduct an evaluation of the results. 
 
In terms of preference by most analysts, hierarchical agglomerative clustering methods have 





been that the creation of a taxonomy generally requires a hierarchy. Elsewhere, this method 
has been associated with the ability to generate high-quality clusters. However, even with such 
strengths, there is no consensus so far as to which algorithm is the most appropriate in any field 
of study. This lack of consensus is because any algorithm will find clusters in a data set, even 
when such a data set does not naturally have the clusters. Indeed, there is no clustering function 
“f”, for each n >= 2, which satisfies scale invariance, richness and consistency (Kleinberg, 
2002). Because of this reality, several scholars have devised cluster evaluation methods and 
robustness checks in the field of cluster analysis. For instance, after a particular algorithm has 
been applied in clustering data, cluster validity can be performed by use of the cohesion and 
isolation methods. This evaluation and robustness check can further be coupled with a rerun of 
the analysis process on the same data set using different algorithms or methods (Everitt et al., 
2011; Gallegos & Ritter, 2005; Mooi & Marko, 2011). Further, assessments of validity of 
results can be conducted based on the extent to which clusters are parsimonious, accessible, 
and actionable, among other criteria (Naughtin & Rankin, 2016). Given the merits associated 
with cluster analysis as earlier mentioned, numerous scholars have utilised it in both natural 
and social science research, let alone in business and marketing. As the following brief review 
of literature confirms, clustering techniques have been embraced in many empirical fields, 
except in economics where it has been not widely utilized.  
 2.5 Cluster Analysis: A brief review of empirical Literature 
A significant body of literature regarding the empirical application of cluster analysis does exist 
and continues to grow. Its existence is visible in various fields such as marketing, medicine, 
psychology, development, socioeconomic field, science and innovation, and taxation. In 
marketing and business, cluster analysis has been used to study and consequently segment 
clients for the purpose of developing and marketing profitable goods and services. By 
clustering consumers based on similar attributes, segments can be created, promotional 
messages promptly targeted, and products customised to such segments. James and Michael 
(2008), using a household sample of 500 grocery shoppers, employed cluster analysis 
techniques to segment shoppers and to understand their characteristics based on the preferred 
characteristics of their grocery store choices. This study used a K-means clustering algorithm. 
They found that opening times and competitive prices were the most influential factors in the 
choice of grocery store for Alabama shoppers. Scholars, such as Mangaraj and Senauer (2001), 






In medicine, scholars such as Beckstead (2002) have used cluster analysis to investigate 
questions related to the field of nursing, while Clinton et al. (2004) employed cluster analysis 
to investigate key diagnostic variables influencing eating disorders among patients. Clinton’s 
study used ten key clinical variables of primary significance in diagnosing eating disorders 
among patients. Vogt and Nagel (1992) highlights the strength of cluster analysis in clinical 
diagnosis while Liao, Li, Kianifard, Obi & Arcona (2016) applied K-means and hierarchical 
cluster analysis with various linkage methods onto health claims data to investigate end-stage 
renal disease patients who initiated haemodialysis. In astronomy, cluster analysis has been 
utilised in organising star catalogues, for instance the second Palomar Observatory Sky Survey 
(POSSII), in Yoo et al., (1996). In psychology, Borgen and Barnett (1987) articulated the 
indispensability of cluster analysis in counselling. Ullrich-French and Cox (2009), applied 
cluster analysis to explore naturally occurring combinations of regulation motivations in the 
US among physical education students. The study identified motivation profiles of students 
based on the four types of motivation i.e. intrinsic, identified, external and introjected 
motivation. Using both K-means and hierarchical clustering approaches, Ullrich-French and 
Cox (2009), confirmed that the relative levels of students’ self-determination may not 
distinguish among physical education experiences for those students with certain combinations 
of motivation regulations. Elsewhere, Tanton, Dodd, Woodfield & Mabhala (2015) used two-
step cluster analysis to study the eating behaviours of British university students.  
 
As much as the use of cluster analysis in multiple disciplines commands significant popularity, 
similar application in other social sciences gained significance only recently, especially in the 
field of economics. Surprisingly, the roots of the clustering concept are highly associated with 
early works of Marshal (1920) who identified a triad of external economies that tend to account 
for local clustering of economic activity (Lazzeretti, Sedita & Caloffi, 2012). The refining of 
the concept in the 1990s has mainly been attributed to economic geographers and exponents of 
New Economic Geography (NEG), especially the works of Paul Krugman (1991). The use of 
cluster analysis, however, has now gained popularity among economic scholars and policy 
makers at different levels of engagement (Lazzeretti et al., 2012; Murry, 2016). There is clear 
evidence regarding the growing use of cluster analysis in development economics in a bid to 
stimulate and direct transformational policies. Ieva Brauksa (2013) used cluster analysis to 
study the differences in municipal levels of development in Latvia and the factors, which 
account for the observed differences. By classifying municipalities based on economic 





municipalities in urgent need of development stimulation. At a global level, Grein et al.(2010) 
uses hierarchical clustering techniques to study the role of corruption and the implications for 
global firms using a sample of 39 countries. Other than grouping countries based on 
geographical proximity, emerging versus developed economies, or middle versus low income 
perspectives, clustering allowed Grein et al. (2010) to cluster countries based on economic, 
technological, cultural and quality of life covariates. Grein et al. (2010) sheds light on how 
corruption has altered the conventional market analysis which global firms have to undertake 
in the process of choosing where to invest, and related strategy formulation. Grein et al.’s 
(2010) study opens gates for further research focused on hypothesis testing involving 
corruption and other key variables that influence the economic environment in which global 
firms operate. 
 
Cluster analysis has also been applied in the field of socioeconomic research with numerous 
studies about this. Lombardo and Falcone (2011) uses partitioning around medoids, a clustering 
method, to investigate the interactions between criminal activity, geographical location, and 
economic performance. Among other findings, the study provides evidence regarding 
significant disparities in the spatiotemporal evolution of crime across provincial units in Italy. 
Additionally, criminal activities are found to be not inseparably associated with geographical 
location, as it had been previously proposed in scholarly literature. Findings of Lombardo and 
Falcone (2011) attest to the ability and merits of cluster analysis in providing robustness checks 
for earlier empirical findings, especially where other conventional methods were applied. 
Elsewhere, Rovan and Sambt (2003) investigated socioeconomic differences between 
Slovenian municipalities using the hierarchical and K-means clustering approaches for the first 
and second phases of their investigation. This study aimed to provide development policy 
evidence regarding the need to keep differences in economic indicators among regions in 
sustainable limits for the general welfare of the economy in question. Study findings were in 
agreement with studies that attempted to identify and characterise welfare regime typologies, 
for instance in Minas et al. (2014). Cluster analysis has also been used in the field of science 
and innovation in the scholarly works of Yurtseven and Tandogan (2012) and Hollenstein 
(2003). In taxation literature, cluster analysis has been applied in predicting business firms with 





in the works of scholars such as Dias et al. (2016) and Nikola (2015), whose findings are very 
informative around policy, especially those targeting foreign direct investments.8 
 
Studies on foreign direct investments have also recently made use of cluster analysis in 
attempts to either answer new research questions or to confirm earlier findings. Most of these 
studies, however, have not specifically delved into firm-level characteristics and the issues 
relating to the investment determinants of foreign-owned in relation to domestically-owned 
firms, as this study does. One such a study is by Simionescu (2016)  who used cluster analysis, 
Bayesian techniques and panel data approaches to investigate the relationship between foreign 
direct investments and economic growth in 28 countries of the EU during the recent economic 
crisis.  Other studies that employed cluster analysis on foreign direct investment and growth 
include; Forte and Santos (2015), Gutiérrez Portilla et al. (2016), and Yu & Zhang (2007). As 
it may be noted, most of these studies employed clustering at either macro or international 
levels, with fewer or none at micro firm level and focusing on the area of this thesis.  
 
In Uganda, literature in the field of economics where cluster analysis techniques have been 
applied is either unavailable or minimal. Cluster analytical techniques have been used primarily 
in psychology, medical, biological, and agricultural sciences. Namisango et al. (2015) used 
cluster analysis to study symptoms of ambulatory HIV/AIDS patients in Uganda. Ward’s 
method of linkage was used to link patients based on symptom occurrence and a five-cluster 
solution was achieved (Namisango et al., 2015). Yada et al. (2010) used cluster analysis to 
characterise Ugandan sweet potato germplasm in which the use of fluorescent-labelled simple 
sequence repeat markers was made. The study sought to characterise the diversity of selected 
but superior sweet potato genotypes for purposes of conservation and breeding. Díaz-Bonilla 
and Thomas (2016) undertook a related study in which hierarchical and K-means clustering 
methods were applied to develop country typologies of food security. Clustering enabled the 
investigators to identify countries that were more food insecure relative to others. It is evident 
therefore that the use of cluster analysis in economics and particularly in Uganda is extremely 
scarce, more so at firm-level analysis. Its application to foreign and domestic firms’ analysis 
 
 
8 For more on application of cluster analysis in the taxation field, see Rybová (2015), Mihóková et al. (2016), 





will immensely enrich scholarly understanding of how these enterprises differ and behave in 
terms of performance.   
 
The use of cluster analysis in this study differs to some extent from how the cluster concept is 
applied in the field of industrial economics. In industrial economies, clusters are used to refer 
to geographic concentrations of industries related by inputs, skills, demand, knowledge, and 
other useful industrially-related linkages (Delgado, Porter & Stern, 2014: 1787; Kuah, 2002: 
207). Clusters and their use in industrial economics are more linked or equated to 
agglomeration in which prior assumptions are postulated before studying industrial groups. In 
industrial economics, although agglomeration has been recognised for generations, the cluster 
concept is more associated with earlier works on nations’ competitive advantages; as per the 
work of economist Porter who used concept of clusters in the early 1990s. Porter defined 
clusters as groups of interconnected firms, suppliers, related industries and specialised 
institutions in specific fields, visible in specific locations. Recently, however, clustering 
algorithms similar to those applied in this thesis have also been explored to assess and study 
groups of closely related industries (Delgado et al., 2014: 1791). Therefore, whereas industrial 
economists use clusters to investigate value chains and industrial characteristics associated with 
geographic concentrations of industrial establishments, this chapter differs to some extent. This 
chapter uses clustering techniques that are exploratory in nature without imposing assumptions 
a priori. Using Ugandan data, this study generates groups of firms that are homogeneous within 
but distinct between themselves; it analyses the characteristics of these groups; and it compares 
the results to earlier studies and conclusions, which underpin literature. 
 
This chapter will greatly contribute to the growing literature in many ways. It is one of the first 
studies to utilise unsupervised, machine-learning techniques, specifically cluster analysis, to 
analyse private firm enterprises in Uganda. Additionally, while some studies have applied 
cluster analysis in Uganda, this application has been mainly in natural sciences; and to the best 
of the authors’ knowledge, this study is one of the first studies to use this type of analysis in 
the economics field on Ugandan data. Cluster analysis presents a methodological opportunity 
to generate results to either confirm or dispel earlier empirical findings. The next section 





2.6 Methodology and Results 
The overall analytical aim of this chapter is to examine the characteristics of foreign-owned 
and domestically-owned enterprises in Uganda; and to gain empirical insights into how they 
differ and whether observed performance differences arise from comparisons between different 
sub-groups or whether foreign-owned firms differ systematically across a number of 
dimensions. I also aimed to establish whether a firm’s ownership status, i.e. foreign or 
domestic, is an important factor that helps, with other variables, to group particular firms into 
certain clusters. I adopted a three-stage methodology, using World Bank survey data on firms 
in Uganda. 
2.6.1 Data Description and Transformation 
In this chapter, I used data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES). The ES collects data 
from key manufacturing and service sectors in every region of the world. Sampling for the ES 
data collection is based on stratified random sampling. In this case all population units (in this 
case firms) are clustered within homogeneous clusters and simple random samples are selected 
within each cluster. This method enables computing estimates for each of the strata with a 
specified level of precision. This inherent precision has implications regarding the validity of 
results obtained from these data, given the methods employed. The sampling equally involves 
weighting which caters for the varying probabilities of selection across different strata. This 
weighting implies that population estimates can equally be obtained with a certain level of 
precision. In my clustering, I utilise linkage methods that incorporate weights in the analysis 
so as to lend credence to the results from the context of all private enterprises in Uganda. 
The ES use standardised survey instruments and a uniform sampling methodology to minimise 
measurement error and to yield data that is comparable across the world’s economies. This 
implies that results obtained from analysing Uganda can also be comparable to other relatively 
similar economies around the world. The primary sampling unit of the surveys is the 
establishment or firm, being a physical location where industrial production or provision of 
services takes place. Large firms are intentionally oversampled because most economies have 
mainly small and medium enterprises. This might have implications for the results from the 
analyses and hence the need for some caution while utilizing them and attaching meaning.  
The surveys cover 13 topics, being: control information; general information; infrastructure 
and services; sales and supplies; degree of competition; capacity; land; crime; finance; 






For Uganda, the surveys have been conducted more than once; and for this study, I used the 
most recent, being the 2006 and 2013 surveys. The firms are industrially classified into the 
following: food; textiles; garments; leather; wood; paper; publishing, printing and recorded 
media; chemicals; plastics and rubber; non-metallic mineral products; basic metals; fabricated 
metal products; machinery and equipment; electronics ; transport machines; furniture; 
recycling; construction; motor vehicle servicing; wholesale; retail; hotels and restaurants; 
transport; and information technology. 
 
2.6.1.1  Variable Selection, Measurement, and Transformation 
Selection of  variables used in the analysis was guided by; the theoretical analyses earlier 
discussed, most especially the ownership advantages and eclectic theory, earlier studies on 
Uganda by scholars such as Obwona (1998) and Wilson and Cacho (2007),  studies related to 
the topic but conducted elsewhere, and subject matter knowledge. Scholars who have analysed 
firms in other economies on related topics have also used many of these variables in their 
analyses. A case in point on the South African Economy are the works by Rankin (2013), and 
Naughtin & Rankin (2016). Moreover, some scholars have it that in clustering, common sense 
also plays a role, as the number of legs can be used to differentiate spiders from insects but 
may not be helpful in differentiating between spiders and cats. I selected variables thought to 
be relatively associated with firms’ performance. These variables are presented in Table 2.4, 
which includes their labels and how they are measured. However, I generated other variables 


















Table 2. 4: Variable description  
Variable name Variable label Variable Measurement 
Employment ln_employment log (№ of fulltime employees) 
Labour productivity ln_lbr_prdvty log (real firm output/ № of employees) 
Foreign ownership  fdi-stake % of firm shares owned by foreigners 
Capital intensity ln_capital_intensity log (NBV machinery/№ of employees) 
Material per worker ln_material_perworker log (real value of materials/ № of employees) 
Management experience ln_mgt_exp log (№ of years spent in industry) 
Wage ln_wage log (total labour cost/ № of employees) 
Worker education ln_worker_educ log (№ of years of employee education) 
Absolute firm exports ln_exports_absolute log (%of exports*real firm sales) 
Firm age firm_age year of survey minus year of firm start 
Firm output real_sales log (real firm sales) 
Source: Author’s own description based on data 
 
I performed a log transformation of the variables in order to remove any inherent skewness and 
to make patterns in the data more interpretable. After this transformation, descriptive statistics 
were generated. Variables used in clustering further underwent a linear transformation. These 
variables were standardised so that all have a mean value of 0 and a variance of 1. This 
standardisation was performed because the data consists of variables measured using different 
scales which made comparisons challenging. Also, centring variables makes them more 
compatible with cluster analysis. I divided the data set into three subsets, namely: firms 
surveyed in 2006; firms surveyed in 2013; and a combination of the two surveys. I named these 
in the following order: NData2006, NData2013 and CNData. The combined data set would 
provide a much larger sample for the cluster analysis while further analysis of each survey 
specifically was thought to shed light on the consistency of the clustering algorithm and hence 
lend credence to the results. This is what motivated the creation of the three sub-data sets.  
Because of this division and also due to the need to use values devoid of the inflation effect in 
the analysis, I deflated some variables for both NData2006 and NData2013 before combining 
the two subsets to form CNData. I thus used the 2006 and 2013 GDP deflators and obtained 
real values based on the 2002 base year, as provided by the Ugandan statistics bureau. In this 





shares belonging to individuals or parties from nationalities other than Ugandan. Choice of the 
10% threshold was motivated by the OECD’s (2008) benchmark definition of foreign direct 
investment. Whereas a 50% threshold has been used by some scholars and would probably be 
more suitable for an economy like Uganda, the 10% threshold was thought to provide more 
space for the algorithm to group firms based on similarities at the lowest level of foreign 
ownership stake. This would add to the nuance of the comparisons.   In the descriptive statistical 
analysis and regression, the fdi-stake is a dummy variable equal to 1 for foreign-owned firms 
and 0 otherwise. However, in the clustering stage of the analysis, fdi-stake is used as a 
continuous variable.   
 
2.6.1.2  Dealing with missing values  
Missing values for some or all variables of interest is one of the biggest challenges to clustering 
data. A missing value, represented by NA in statistical software packages like R, is a 
placeholder for a datum of which the type is known but its value is not. Therefore, it is difficult 
to perform statistical analysis on data where one or more values in the data are missing (de 
Jonge & van der Loo, 2013). The survey data I used in this study also had missing values on 
several variables. There are several ways of dealing with missing values when undertaking 
cluster analysis. These include partial data cluster analysis, replacing missing values with 
means and imputation, all of which are discussed below. 
 
2.6.1.3  Partial data cluster analysis 
This method involves grouping items based on the data that they have in common. Whereas it 
improves on other methods like complete case clustering, it is not the recommended method 
for dealing with missing values. Partial analysis may leave out important information in the 
process. 
 
2.6.1.4  Replacing missing values with means 
Another method of dealing with missing data is to replace missing values with the average 
values of the variables in question. Such mean replacement, however, fundamentally alters the 
underlying structure of the data. The implication of this replacement method is that when 
clustering is performed, the resulting clusters are to some extent a consequence of the decision 
taken by the analyst to replace missing values, with means as opposed to the data itself 






2.6.1.5  Imputation 
This method involves replacing missing data with sensible estimates of the values missing. It 
is based on a similar logic to that which underlies partial data cluster analysis. It is, however, 
more superior to partial data analysis because it takes into account relevant information that is 
usually ignored by partial cluster analysis. However, it requires the use of modern imputation 
algorithms, mainly those integrated in R like those in multivariate imputation by chained 
equation (MICE) and multiple imputation (MI) packages (Bock, 2017)9. Using imputation 
ought to be done skilfully. It is advisable to use it concurrently with partial data cluster analysis 
for comparison purposes. 
 
In this chapter, I used the imputation method to deal with missing values. There are several 
techniques for employing the imputation method. These include the basic numeric imputation 
modelling, hot deck imputation techniques and kNN-imputation10. I also used the hot deck 
imputation technique, using the random procedure. In hot deck imputation, missing values are 
filled in by copying values from similar records in the same data set. By notation, we let ?̂?𝑖 = 
𝛹𝑗 where 𝛹𝑗 is taken from the observed values. ?̂?𝑖  is the imputed value for a missing value for 
variable Ψ. Moreover, hot deck imputation is applicable to both numerical and categorical data 
as long as enough donor records are available (de Jonge & van der Loo, 2013). However, I 
imputed values for missing data only when clustering because the algorithms I used are not 
compatible with missing values i.e. NAs. After clusters have been formed, I describe them 
based on original data-set variables.  
 2.6.2 Study analysis 
In my attempt to understand the characteristics of foreign-owned and domestically-owned 
firms, whether the observed differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms 
are due to comparisons between different sub-groups, or whether foreign-owned firms and 
domestically-owned firms differ systematically across a number of performance dimensions, I 
conducted two stages of analysis. 
The first stage of the analysis involved descriptive statistics, using means and medians for 
numeric variables and frequencies for non-numeric variables. I did this separately for foreign 
and domestic firms to compare the two groups. This descriptive analysis allowed me to 
 
 
9  Bock is the founder of Diplayr, an R package that is useful in cluster analysis. 





investigate properties of the distributions of the variables, such as the normality property. This 
first stage also involved the use of regression analysis, using firms’ ownership status (fdi-stake) 
as the regressor and selected variables as regressands and controls. Some of the regressors used 
include employment, labour productivity, management experience and wage. Using firm 
ownership status as a dummy equal to 1 if a firm is foreign-owned and 0 otherwise, this analysis 
allowed me to investigate how foreign ownership is likely to be associated with aspects like 
firm size, productivity, and wages. I ran these regressions using an R package called ‘robust’, 
found in the CRAN repository. The subsection that follows presents the results of the 
descriptive statistics and regression. 
 
2.6.2.1  Descriptive Statistical Results  
In Table 2.5, the weighted descriptive statistics in terms of mean and median real values for 
the numerical variables are presented. These were generated based on the overall data set. The 
first column contains values for firms in the overall data set, while the other two columns 






















Table 2. 5: Descriptive statistics, weighted mean and median (real) values CNData- 
combined data set  
Variable All (N=1319) Foreign(N=202) Domestic(N=1117) 
Mean    
log employment 2.41 3.07 2.31 
log labour productivity 15.68 17.14 15.46 
log capital intensity 14.14 14.92 13.96 
log material/worker 14.46 15.74 14.26 
log management experience 2.16 2.33 2.13 
log wage 13.53 14.07 13.44 
log workers’ education 2.43 2.44 2.43 
log exports 18.80 20.93 18.12 
actual employment 23.86 42.20 21.02 
Median    
log employment 2.20 3.00 2.08 
log labour productivity 15.48 16.67 15.34 
log capital intensity 14.16 15.32 13.85 
log material/worker 14.33 15.88 14.23 
log management experience 2.30 2.40 2.20 
log wage 13.63 13.96 13.58 
log workers’ education 2.56 2.64 2.56 
log exports 18.16 21.06 17.96 
actual employment 9.00 20.00 8.00 
Source: Author’s own computations based on World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2006/13 panel 
 
With reference to Table 2.5, it is observed that overall mean and median values for all variables, 
except actual employment, are approximately similar. This approximate similarity is 
suggestive of a symmetric distribution exhibited by the variables. Actual employment is an 
outlier because it was not subjected to log transformation. It is further evident that the mean 
and median real values for the overall column and the column for domestically-owned firms 
are approximately similar. Nevertheless, big differences are observed between the values of 
the second column, foreign firms, and the other two columns. The only exception is 





suggest that significant differences between firms in the data set are more associated with firm 
ownership status i.e. foreign versus domestic ownership than with other aspects. This is one of 
the key hypothetical assertions I sought to validate using cluster analysis. 
Table 2.6, shows descriptive statistics in the form of weighted percentage frequencies for non-
numeric variables. These were generated based on overall data and the NData2013. I eliminated 
NData2006 due to the high level of missing values.  
In Table 2.6, the first two columns indicate the weighted percentage composition of foreign-
owned and domestically-owned firms respectively, computed based on the overall data set 
(CNData). The last two columns indicate the weighted percentage compositions of foreign and 
domestically-owned firms respectively, computed based on specifically foreign and domestic 
subsets for firms surveyed in 2013. Because computation was based on these specific sub sets, 
the frequencies are reported by column for easy intra-firm comparison11. It is noticeable that in 
the first two columns, domestically-owned firms’ percentages outweigh foreign-owned firms’ 
percentages. This difference is probably due to lower numbers of foreign-owned firms relative 
to domestically-owned firms. Looking at the last two columns of 2013 surveyed firms, intra-
percentage comparisons on the sector level indicates that foreign-owned firms are more likely 
to be in either the “others” category (54.7%) or manufacturing (26.4%) than retail. This feature 
is the reverse for domestically-owned firms where actually the lowest percentage (25.5%) of 
these firms is in manufacturing.  The general picture for both types of firms reveals that the 
largest percentage is not in manufacturing. Less presence in the manufacturing sector has 
serious implications for job creation. This might be an initial indicator to the reasons for the 
earlier mentioned dismal economic outcomes even when foreign investments continue to flow 
into the country.  Additionally, over 80% of foreign-owned firms in the 2013 sample were 
located in Kampala, compared to a similar 74.1% of domestically-owned firms. This urban 
concentration around Kampala of both foreign and domestically-owned firms is probably due 
to easy access to markets and better infrastructure being available in urban areas. There are 
also many benefits associated with agglomeration. In terms of firm size, as measured by the 
number of workers, foreign-owned firms have higher values for large firms at 6.6% and for 
medium firms at 30.8% when compared to domestically-owned firms at 1.2% for large firms 
and 11.6% for medium firms. This implies, as revealed in the literature reviewed, that foreign-
 
 
11 The overall sample allows comparison between foreign and domestic firms, while the 2013 sample was used 





owned firms are more likely to be larger in size when compared to domestically-owned firms. 
The statistics also reveal that generally most firms are either small or medium in size whether 
domestic or foreign-owned in Uganda. 
Table 2. 6: Descriptive statistics for qualitative variables, weighted (%) frequency  
Variable Overall sample 2013 sample 
Sector type Foreign (%) Domestic (%) Foreign (%) Domestic (%) 
Manufacturing 10.7 89.0 26.4 25.5 
Retail 6.2 93.5 19.0 33.2 
Others 13.3 86.6 54.7 42.3 
Location     
Kampala 11.7 88.3 84.1 74.1 
Jinja 14.8 85.2 7.8 5.2 
Mbale 1.7 97.4 0.8 5.2 
Lira 2.7 97.3 0.6 2.4 
Mbarara 8.8 90.4 3.2 3.8 
Wakiso 4.3 95.4 3.6 9.3 
Firm size (№ of workers)     
Large (>=100) 37.9 59.0 6.6 1.2 
Small (>=5&<=19) 7.7 92.2 62.6 87.2 
Medium (>=20&<=99) 23.4 76.1 30.8 11.6 
Firm age     
<10 8.7 91.2 54.5 55.1 
>=10&<=50 8.8 91.0 44.4 44.7 
>50&<90 32.6 58.3 1.10 0.20 
R&D Expenditure     
No 7.5 92.4 59.3 71.4 
Yes 12.2 87.4 40.7 28.6 
Formal employee training     
No 9.7 90.2 60.9 65.9 
Yes 11.7 88.0 39.1 34.1 






Many firms in Uganda, as the results in Table 2.6 suggest, are not likely to prioritise R&D 
expenditure and formal training of employees. The percentage of firms that prioritise R&D 
expenditure is only 40.7% and 28.6% for respectively foreign and domestically-owned firms. 
R&D spending has been found to greatly influence firm performance and is likely to be more 
prioritised when such firms pursue product differentiation strategies. The results therefore 
might imply that domestic and foreign-owned firms tend to pursue different strategies, which 
ultimately translates into performance differences between the two types of firms. Most foreign 
firms engage in product differentiation so as to gain a competitive edge in the host economy.  
The percentage of firms that provide formal employee training is almost half as much as those 
that don’t provide both for foreign-owned (39.1% relative to 60.1%) and domestically-owned 
firms (34.1% relative to 65.9%). These descriptive statistical results are a preliminary pointer 
to the hypothesized differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms in 
Uganda, a hypothesis I ultimately test using clustering methods. While these statistics may 
point to the assumed differences, these might be incidental and not relational in nature. To 
further understand the hypothesized differences, I employed regression methods in an attempt 
to establish existence/absence of association between firms’ ownership status and the 
performance variables considered in the analysis. Procedures and results of this stage of 
analysis follow; 
2.6.2.2 Regression Results  
Using overall data (CNData), I estimated robust regressions using four dependent variables, 
namely employment as a proxy for firm size, labour productivity, wage, and management 
experience. In each case, a dummy variable for foreign-ownership status was used as a 
regressor to investigate if and how foreign ownership was likely to be associated with the 
dependent variables. I also used other variables as controls in order to gain more insights. 
Additionally, I broke foreign ownership into categories and regressed them against the 
dependent variables mentioned. In this attempt, I aimed to gain insights into whether 
categorical levels of foreign ownership are likely to differentially be associated with variations 
in the dependent variables. In Tables 2.7 and in 2G in the appendices, M1, M2 and M3 
correspond with the three regression equations that were estimated for each dependent variable. 
In M1, I used only the dummy variable as the regressor; in M2 I used fdi categories as the 






Table 2. 7: Regression results of firm ownership on employment and labour productivity 
Variables log employment log labour productivity 
 M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 












  1.87*** 
(0.26) 
 
fdi dummy (41-60%)  1.30*** 
(0.069) 
  2.17*** 
(0.184) 
 
fdi dummy (61-99%)  0.89*** 
(0.052) 
  2.96*** 
(0.134) 
 
all foreign  0.69*** 
(0.022) 
  1.34*** 
(0.064) 
 
sector type-retail   -0.30*** 
(0.019) 
  0.02 
(0.081) 
sector type-others   -0.15*** 
(0.018) 
  0.38*** 
(0.074) 
location cat-kampala   0.16*** 
(0.031) 
  1.03*** 
(0.139) 
location cat-lira   -0.22*** 
(0.057) 
  -0.25 
(0.209) 
location cat-mbale   -0.24*** 
(0.045) 
  0.68*** 
(0.199) 
location catmbarara   0.28*** 
(0.049) 
  0.90*** 
(0.188) 
location catwakiso   -0.13*** 
(0.039) 
  0.45*** 
(0.180) 
Constant      













Observations 1297 1296 734 1054 1053 493 
RSE 0.630 0.630 0.603 1.57 1.58 1.57 
Note:     *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
             figures in parenthesis are standard errors 
Source: Author’s own results generated based on World Bank Survey Data 2006/13 panel 
 
In Table 2.7, it is evident that firms that are foreign-owned are more likely to be associated 
with higher employment levels, and hence likely to be larger when compared to their domestic 
counterparts. They are also likely to be associated with higher levels of labour productivity. In 
M1, for instance, it is evident that foreign-owned firms tend to have 75% more workers (fdi 
dummy = 0 used as a reference) when compared to domestically-owned firms. This result is 
significant at 1%. In M2, fdi dummy categorisation reveals similar results, with the 40-60% 





sector type where firms are engaged, firm size in terms of employment numbers remains highly 
associated with ownership status. The fdi dummy coefficient of 0.66 is significant at 1%. For 
labour productivity, coefficients are not only significant but higher relative to employment. 
Results still indicate that foreign-owned firms are more likely to be associated with higher 
levels of labour productivity. In Table 2G in the appendices, when wage and management 
experience are used as the regressors, then it is again noted that coefficients for fdi dummy are 
significant at 1%, though they are lower than those in Table 2.7. Specifically, taking fdi dummy 
= 0 as a reference, foreign-owned firms tend to have 54% more in wages when compared to 
domestically-owned firms. This result is significant at 1%.  
 
The regression results in Tables 2.7 and 2G are further supported by illustrative figures. Figures 
2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 are box plots of firm ownership status versus; labour productivity, management 
experience, and average wage, all derived from the overall data set. In the box plots, the 
horizontal line in the middle of each box corresponds to the median value of the variable in 
question for both foreign and domestically-owned firms. The end of the upper whisker 
corresponds to the maximum value while the end of the lower whisker corresponds to the 
lowest value. The dots at the end of the whiskers indicate outliers. Focusing on Figure 2.4 first, 
it is noticeable that the lowest value of labour productivity for domestically-owned firms is 
about 11 with several outliers while for foreign-owned firms the minimum is exactly 12 without 
any outliers. Foreign-owned firms post a maximum log value of about 21 while domestic firms 
post a maximum of about 19. More than half of foreign-owned firms post productivity values 
above 16 unlike domestically-owned firms whose median level is even below 16. What is 









Figure 2. 1: Proportional difference between foreign and domestically-owned firms on 
labour productivity dimension  
 
 
Figure 2. 2: Proportional difference between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms 







Figure 2. 3: Proportional difference between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms 
on average wage dimension  
The results from both descriptive statistics and regressions provide insights into some of the 
key characteristics of firms in Uganda. They also provide preliminary evidence regarding the 
belief that foreign-owned firms are likely to differ from domestically-owned firms. This insight 
is evident even when foreign-owned firms are indicated to be proportionately fewer than their 
domestically-owned counterparts. In Figures 2.4 and 2.5, it is illustrated how proportionately 
few foreign-owned firms exist relative to domestically-owned firms; and how these foreign-
owned firms break down into the various categories. 
  







Figure 2. 5: How foreign-owned firms break down by percentage share category  
 
Figure 2.4 highlights the fact that foreign-owned firms are about 200 and represent about 15% 
of the total number of firms in the survey. In figure 2.5, the breakdown by category of these 
foreign-owned firms is illustrated. We notice that the tallest bar corresponds to 0-9.9 category 
and going by the OECD definition of foreign ownership, which guides this thesis, this category 
is constituted by domestically-owned firms. The rest of the bars except the last on the right, 
correspond to foreign-owned firms and it is evident that the largest percentage of foreign-
owned firms is composed of those whose ownership is 100% foreign, suggesting that 
ownership probably emerged from either complete takeovers or totally new plant being 
established. Categories 40-60% and 60-99% are proportionately similar with very few firms 
falling into the 10-40% category. The large percentage of completely foreign-owned firms 
lends more credence to the analysis. 
The first stage of analysis provided preliminary insights into the salient characteristics of 
foreign and domestic firms in Uganda. These results further highlighted the preliminary fact 
that foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms are likely to differ on a number of 
dimensions. However, it was still unclear and hence challenging to conclude whether the 
observed differences between foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms were due to 
comparisons between different sub-groups (for example, between large firms where foreign-
owned firms are more prevalent and small firms where they are not) or whether foreign-owned 
firms are different systematically across a number of dimensions. It was this challenge that led 





2.6.2.3  Standard Hierarchical Clustering 
This is the second stage of analysis in this chapter. Methodologically, I began with an 
assessment of whether the data I intended to cluster could be clustered. This action is what 
cluster analysts refer to as Cluster Tendency Assessment (CTA). CTA is essential because 
clustering algorithms will always yield clusters, even when the data does not indicate so. Data 
may simply contain objects that are randomly distributed and hence unfit to be clustered. It 
makes less sense to subject a data set without naturally inherent clusters to any kind of 
partitioning (Banerjee & Davé, 2004). Therefore, CTA is useful because it indicates to the 
analyst whether the available data contains inherent clusters and is therefore amenable to 
cluster analysis. Two methods of CTA are popular in the literature, namely statistical methods 
and visual methods. The most common statistical method is the Hopkins statistic (H), whereas 
the most common visual method is the Visual Assessment of cluster Tendency (VAT). VAT is 
challenging when there are many items to cluster, such as in this study. I therefore utilised the 
Hopkins (H) statistic to perform the CTA.  
The Hopkins Statistic (H) 
The H statistic measures the likelihood that a given data set is generated by a uniform data 
distribution. According to Charrad et al. (2014), the H statistic algorithm consists of five steps 
as briefly described below: 
1. Step 1: Sample uniformly n (p1,…….pn) points from the data set to be used, for example 
K. 
2. Step 2: For each point pi Є K, find its nearest neighbour pj; and compute the distance 
between pi and pj. This can be denoted as xi = dist (pi, pj). 
3. Step 3: Generate a simulated data set (random K) drawn from a random uniform 
distribution with n points (q1, ………, qn) and the same variation as the original real 
data set K. 
4. Step 4: For each point qi, find its nearest neighbour qj in K, and then compute the 
distance between qi and qj and denote it as yi = dist (qi, qj) 
5. Step 5: Calculate the H statistic as the mean nearest neighbour distance in the random 
data set relative to the sum of the mean nearest neighbour distances in the real and 





The H statistic is specified as: 










                                             (2.8) 
Interpretation 
If H is close to 0.5, it implies that ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  and ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  are close to each other and hence data 
set K is uniformly distributed. The null hypothesis is; the dataset K is uniformly distributed 
and therefore does not contain meaningful clusters. The alternative hypothesis is; the data set 
K is not uniformly distributed and hence contains clusters that are meaningful. If H is close to 
zero, then we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that data set K is indeed clusterable. In 
this chapter therefore, I perform the CTA and proceed to cluster analysis.  
I clustered the firms first, based on selected variables. Then I clustered the variables themselves 
to help generate groups of variables with similar information and gain insights into how far the 
correlation between variables might affect clustering results of firms. Scholars such as 
Naughtin and Rankin (2016) have successfully employed similar analytical procedures in 
segmenting and analysing characteristics of South African exporting firms. When clustering 
firms, I used the hierarchical agglomerative method. Due to its many advantages, I preferred 
this clustering algorithm over others, such as the K-means, self-organising maps, and 
expectation maximizing clustering algorithms. One such advantage is that, in cases where the 
data sets are smaller such as the one used in this chapter, hierarchical algorithms show more 
quality and accuracy when compared to other algorithms such as the K-means and self-
organising maps algorithm (Manpreet kaur & Usvir Kaur, 2013). Additionally, hierarchical 
algorithms are associated with embedded flexibility regarding granularity, with ease of 
handling any form of similarity or distance, and they are more versatile (Abbas, 2008). 
I achieved similarity between firms by first estimating the distances between them. I estimated 
these distances using Gower’s general similarity coefficient (equation 2.4) because it takes care 
of mixed data and has varying components of variables 12. Since the data set I had used for 
analysis consists of variables that are mixed, this coefficient was thought to be suitable. This 
suitability is derived from its ability to handle various types of data such as ordinal, nominal 
and binary variables, even when they appear in the same data set. 
 
 
12 Gower’s general similarity coefficient is an option in the daisy function of the R statistical software package, 





After estimating the distances between firms, the firms were clustered via a linkage technique 
called Ward’s linkage method. This linkage method is also called Ward’s minimum variance 
method. It minimises the sum of squares to form clusters, which is the reason why it is also 
called the incremental sum of squares method.  Ward’s linkage method was selected because 
of recommendations by earlier studies that were reviewed, but also because it is applicable to 
weighted clustering, unlike other methods such as average linkage, complete linkage and single 
linkage. Hands and Everitt (1987) conducted a comparative study of linkage methods and 
concluded that Ward’s linkage method performed better than other linkage methods applicable 
to hierarchical clustering. Blashfield (1976) also compared four types of hierarchical clustering 
methods (single linkage, complete linkage, average linkage and Ward’s method) for accuracy 
in recovery of original population clusters. His results indicated Ward’s method to be superior 
to other methods. A more recent comparative study of hierarchical linkage methods is by 
Ferreira and Hitchcock (2009), whose results also rank Ward’s method ahead of other methods. 
The major justification, however, for use of Ward’s linkage method in this study was the need 
to utilise its weighted clustering abilities, since the survey data had weights.  
Other scholars have, however, presented the strengths of other linkage methods. Šulc and 
Řezanková (2014) compare three linkage methods for hierarchical clustering of categorical 
data, and recommend use of either the complete linkage or average linkage method. These 
methods provide good differentiation of clusters, making it easy to cut a dendrogram at a given 
point, among other merits. Moreover, average linkage embodies a natural compromise between 
single linkage and complete linkage, as it is sensitive to the shape and size of clusters (Yim & 
Ramdeen, 2015). Overall, hierarchical methods form the backbone of cluster analysis, are 
widely available in software packages and are easy to use, leaving the analyst with only a 
decision to make regarding proximity measure and number of clusters (Everitt et al., 2011: 
110).  
After linking the firms and consequently generating a large number of firm clusters, the number 
of optimal clusters to use in further analyses had to be decided. Determination of the optimal 
number of clusters has been associated with subjectivity and based on expert judgement of the 
analyst in most cases. However, several methods have been developed to guide in determining 
the optimal number of clusters. The use of a dendrogram is one of the methods. This is a 
graphical illustration of how clusters are merged, allowing the analyst to identify the 
appropriate number of clusters. This provides a mathematical and pictorial representation of 





representing the distances at which clusters are joined (Everitt et al., 2011). Each node has two 
edges (binary trees) emanating from it; and the objects in question form the labels at the 
terminal nodes of the dendrogram. To determine the optimal number of clusters, this tree-like 
diagram is cut at a point where the distances are relatively large. This method, however, is 
susceptible to great challenges as the number of observations becomes larger. Visual 
establishment of the point at which to cut the tree is an enormous task. 
The agglomeration schedule is another method for selecting the number of clusters. The 
schedule shows the step-by-step process of the clustering. It is easily used and interpreted when 
the distances are plotted against the number of clusters, yielding a scree-plot graphical 
illustration. On the scree-plot, a distinct break-point, usually referred to as the elbow, will 
indicate the point at which joining further different clusters can only occur at greater distances. 
By implication, the number of clusters just before the elbow provides the solution to the optimal 
number of clusters to be considered by the analyst (Mooi & Marko, 2011). However, this 
method can provide ambiguous results in some instances. Both the agglomeration schedule and 
the dendrogram methods are thus associated with challenges. 
To surmount some of the challenges associated with the aforementioned methods, several 
precise methods have been proposed in the form of indices. These indices also guide in 
determining the optimal number of clusters during the analysis. The indices also have their own 
strengths and weaknesses. Several scholars have examined these, with each scholar 
recommending particular indices with related justification. For instance, Milligan and Cooper 
(1985) compared 30 indices of determining the optimal number of clusters in hierarchical 
clustering algorithms. Their results ranked the Calinski and Harabasz’s (CH) index as the best, 
followed by Duda and Hart’s (DH) index, with the C-index in third place. In a simulation study 
based on eight-dimensional outcome variables taken from a real case study of schizophrenic 
patients, Islam et al. (2015) also compared several indices. They found that the DH index, 
Hartigan (H) index and Gap/pc index are the best performing indices. These two studies appear 
to provide contradictory results. However, Milligan and Cooper’s findings have been supported 
by scholars like Yan (2005), Everitt et al. (2011) and  Řezanková (2014). Because of the 
varying recommendations in scholarly literature, some analysts compute all the indices and 





majority rule decision method. In this chapter, both the CH and majority rule methods were 
used. Majority rule method helps to robustly support the CH index results13.  
The CH index is based on a variance ratio criterion proposed by Caliñski and Harabasz (1974) 
specified as below:  
                                                          CHk =
ssB∕(k−1)
ssw∕(n−k)
                                                             (2.9) 
where k denotes the number of clusters, n denotes the number of objects (firms in this case), 
ssB measures the overall variation between segments, and ssw measures overall variation 
within segment with regard to all variables used in the clustering. The optimal number of 
clusters is the value of k that maximises CHk14.  
Once the optimal number of clusters had been determined, analysis of the characteristics of 
each cluster was undertaken and results presented and discussed. Each cluster’s characteristics 
were then analysed using descriptive statistics. Comparisons between clusters were undertaken, 
differences of cluster scores on each variable were established, and their significance was 
statistically tested using students’ T-tests. Regressions were also run on the variables, using 
clusters as factors to understand how these clusters are likely to be associated with variations 
in these variables. This regression result indicated which clusters were more likely than others 
to be associated significantly with certain performance indicators.  
After systematically applying the above clustering methodology, the results that follow were 
generated. 
2.5.2.2.2 Clusters of Firms 
The analysis starts with a statistical test of the clustering tendency on the data sets. In Table 
2.8, the Hopkins statistics are shown in the fourth column. In all the three sub data sets, the 
statistic is about 0.2. I hence rejected the null hypothesis that the data is uniformly distributed 





13 The R package clusterSim also contains some of the more recently introduced criteria including silhouette 
index and GAP- statistics. 






Table 2. 8: Cluster solutions and clustering tendency for the sub data sets 
Data set Optimal Clusters Value Index Hopkin’s Index 
NData2006 2.0 466.01 0.2618 
NData2013 3.0 461.58 0.2713 
CNData 3.0 809.16 0.2382 
Source: Author’s own results based on World Bank Enterprise Survey Data, 2006/13 panel 
Turning to a standard hierarchical clustering of firms using agglomerative procedures, the 
distance between firms was measured using Gower’s distance measures. Thereafter, firms were 
linked using Ward’s ‘Ward.D2’ method. Ward’s linkage method has the ability to integrate 
weights in the clustering process.  A weighted clustering for the three sub data sets (NData2006, 
NData2013 and CNData) was therefore performed. 
As indicated earlier on, the optimal number of clusters was selected, guided by visual 
illustrations like the dendrogram, Silhouette methods, majority rule of indices, and the Caliñski 
and Harabasz’s index. In Figure 2.6, the dendrograms demonstrate the arrangement of clusters 
produced by the corresponding analyses. On the x-axis are the firms that are clustered while on 
the y-axis are the distances at which the clusters are formed. A horizontal line drawn from one 
of the distances on the y-axis to the left will cross some vertical lines on the dendrograms. Each 
vertical line crossed corresponds to a cluster. For instance, with reference to the first 
dendrogram, a line drawn from 2.0 on the y-axis to the left, will cross two vertical lines yielding 
a two-cluster solution.  A visual inspection of dendrograms for the three sub data sets suggest 









Figure 2. 6: Cluster dendrograms for NData2006, NData2013 and CNData  
 
In Figure 2.7, we notice the silhouette illustration for 2006 firms. The average silhouette width 
across all firms shows the overall quality of the clustering result and this is indicated on the y 





superior overall quality of the clustering result and from the illustration, the largest is just 
slightly below 0.25, which corresponds to 2 clusters. However, an average silhouette width of 
0.25 shows that the structure is weak and calls for additional methods of analysis to be explored. 
This is why I utilised the indices i.e. the CH index and the majority rule method. 
 
Figure 2. 7: Silhouette method guide to optimal cluster selection  
 
In Figure 2.8, the silhouette illustration for overall data shows that the largest average silhouette 
width is about 2.5. which calls for other methods to be explored. However, silhouette method 











Figure 2. 8: Silhouette and elbow methods for respectively 2013 and combined data  
 
However: 
“…determining the optimal number of clusters in a data set is a fundamental issue 
in partitioning clustering, such as K-means clustering, which requires the user to 
specify the number of clusters k to be generated. Unfortunately, there is no 
definitive answer to this question. The optimal number of clusters is somehow 
subjective and depends on the method used for measuring similarities and the 
parameters used for partitioning. A simple and popular solution consists of 
inspecting the dendrogram produced using hierarchical clustering to see if it 
suggests a particular number of clusters. Unfortunately, this approach is also not 






In order to reduce such subjectivity, I turned to the majority index rule method and the Caliñski 
and Harabasz index. In Table 2.8, the optimal number of clusters for the three sub-data sets 
together with the associated value indexes are presented. The distances on the dendrograms 
were cut and marked based on results in Table 2.8. 
 
Also, in Table 2.8, it is noticeable that the majority rule decision and the CH index yield 2, 3 
and 3 clusters respectively for the 2006, 2013 and combined data. The combined data set 
yielded a three-cluster solution – as was the case for 2013 – but with a high value index and 
lowest Hopkins index (highly clusterable structure). The results were obtained using the 
NbClust R package15. Using this package, I was able to run over 20 indices and to detect what 
majority of scholars identify as the optimal number of clusters. Some of these indexes include 
but are not limited to: Krzanowski and Lai (1988), Calinski and Harabasz (1974), Duda and 
Hart (1973), Ratkowsky and Lance 1978, Frey and Van Groenewoud 1972, Halkidi and 
Vazirgiannis 2001, Halkidi et al. 2000, Tibshirani et al. 2001, Rousseeuw 1987, Milligan and 
Cooper 1985 and Hartigan 1975. It was additionally noticed that both the CH and majority 
indexes provided cluster numbers that were within those suggested by the dendrograms, the 






















2.6.2.4 Characteristic Features of Firms’ Clusters 
 
Clusters of the combined data set: CNData 
Table 2.9 shows the weighted mean and median real values of numeric variables for the three 
clusters of the overall data set.  
Table 2. 9: Descriptive Statistics, Weighted Mean and Median (real) values CNData  
Variable Cluster 1, N = 193 Cluster 2, N = 178 Cluster 3, N = 954 
log employment 3.06 2.28 2.32 
log labour productivity 17.15 15.93 15.37 
fdi stake 92.74 0.13 0.06 
log capital intensity 14.95 13.92 13.97 
log material/worker 15.77 14.86 14.17 
log management exp 2.34 2.00 2.15 
log wage 14.07 13.40 13.45 
log worker education 2.46 1.10 2.53 
log absolute exports 21.06 18.59 18.01 
actual employment 41.77 15.66 22.21 
Median    
log employment 3.00 2.20 2.08 
log labour productivity 16.67 15.62 15.25 
fdi stake 100.0 0.00 0.00 
log capital intensity 15.32 14.17 13.85 
log material/worker 15.88 14.71 14.11 
log management exp 2.40 1.95 2.30 
log wage 13.96 13.74 13.54 
log worker education 2.64 1.10 2.56 
log absolute exports 21.74 17.16 17.96 
actual employment 20.00 9.00 8.00 










Table 2.10 shows the results of the three clusters for qualitative variables in the overall data 
set.  
 
Table 2. 10: Descriptive statistics of qualitative variables for CNData clusters  
Variable Cluster1, N = 193 Cluster 2, N = 178 Cluster 3, N = 954 
sector type    
manufacturing 26.2% 14.4% 27.2% 
Retail 18.8% 15.2% 35.8% 
Others 55.0% 70.4% 37.0% 
firm size (№ of workers)    
large>=100 9.6% 1.1% 2.3% 
small>=5&<=19 51.7% 76.2% 83.1% 
medium>=20&<=99 38.7% 22.8% 14.6% 
firm age    
<10 51.4% 55.4% 51.9% 
>=10&<=50 46.4% 44.0% 47.6% 
>50&<90 2.2% 0.6% 0.5% 
R&D Expenditure    
No 60.3% 64.9% 72.1% 
Yes 39.7% 35.1% 27.9% 
formal employee training    
No 58.7% 58.9% 67.2% 
Yes 41.3% 41.1% 32.8% 
Source: Author’s own computations based on World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2006/13 panel 
 
According to the results in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, these clusters can be described as follows: 
 
Cluster 1:     Slightly large/medium, highly productive and capital-intensive firms    
(14.6% of the sample) 
It is noticeable that cluster 1 has a 92.74% fdi stake on average compared to cluster 2 and 3 
with less than 1%. This high fdi stake is suggestive of a cluster where foreign-owned firms are 
more likely to be found. Results in Table 2.8 indicate that mean and median scores of this 
cluster on all variables are above those of both cluster 2 and 3, the only exceptions being; 
median wage, and worker_educ. Cluster 1 firms employ on average 41.77 workers (‘log 
employment’ is also is 3.06) and have a median value of actual employment of 20 workers. 
This result suggests that firms in this cluster are more likely to be medium- but also possibly 
large-sized firms. In Table 2.9, it is noticeable that 9.6% of firms in this cluster are larger in 
size and 38.7% are medium-sized firms amounting to a combined percentage of 48.3%. 
Although 51.7% are under the small-size category, the 48.3% outweighs a similar combined 





cluster 1, large firms are clustered too in cluster 3; and that all clusters have presence in the 
medium- and small-size categories. However, the combined percentage above separates cluster 
1 from clusters 2 and 3. 
 
Noticeable too in Table 2.10 is that firms in this cluster are more likely to be in other sectors 
than manufacturing and retail. They post a higher percentage (55%) in other sector categories 
but only 26% in manufacturing and 18.8% in retail. The lower percentage in manufacturing for 
a cluster where foreign-owned firms are likely to be grouped contradicts findings from earlier 
studies on Uganda. One such a case is Obwona (1998: 18) in which over 70% of foreign direct 
investment is found to be destined for manufacturing. Indeed cluster 2 firms post a 27.2% likely 
presence in manufacturing yet it’s a cluster likely to have more domestically-owned firms.  
 
The percentage of cluster 1 firms that fall in larger category (>=100 workers) is higher 
compared to firms in cluster 2 (1.1%) and cluster 3 (2.3%). This result is, to some extent, 
consistent with the mean values (Table 2.11) of actual employment of cluster 1(41.77) that are 
higher than those of cluster 2 (15.66) and cluster 3 (22.21). Table 2.9 also shows that cluster 1 
is likely to have firms with higher levels of productivity. This likelihood is indicated by labour 
productivity of 17.15 and material used per worker at 15.77. Indeed, in Table A3 in the 
appendices, it is noticeable that firms in cluster 1 have comparatively higher values of real 
output. 
  
Elsewhere, although firms do not generally prioritise expenditure on R&D, firms in this cluster 
post a higher percentage at 39.7% compared to 35.1% and 27.9% for cluster 2 and 3 
respectively. This result suggests that foreign-owned firms are more likely to spend on R&D 
than their locally owned counterparts. This result is in agreement with the literature; and 
provides justification for the argument that foreign-owned firms are better at new product 
development than domestic firms. This is probably due to the characteristic of export 
orientation that requires frequent improvements to keep up with international markets’ 
standards. Indeed, cluster 1 posts higher mean and median values (Table 2.9) for absolute 
exports (21.06 & 21.74 respectively) compared to cluster 2 (18.59 &17.16 respectively) and 
cluster 3 (18.01&17.96 respectively). In Table 2B in appendices we see clusters’ actual exports. 
 
Similarly, cluster 1 has higher mean/median values for capital intensity (14.95/15.32) 





specifically cluster 2 in terms of; management experience, worker_educ, and exports. These 
differences are significant as indicated by the respective p-values in Table 2A in the 
appendices. This result is in agreement with the popular argument in literature that foreign-
owned firms are likely to be export oriented (Erdal & Göçer, 2015b; Kimura & Kiyota, 2006), 
a feature that links them to use of more skilled (more highly educated on average) workers 
(Matsuyama, 2007 as quoted by (Brambilla, Lederman & Porto, 2012: 3406), and experienced 
management compared to domestically owned firms. These results are specifically, in 
agreement with Moss and Ramachandran (2004: 3) in their study on foreign direct investment 
in East Africa. Results on worker_educ, however, contradict some earlier studies on foreign 
direct investment in Uganda, especially regarding managerial workers who were found to be 
wanting in terms of education (Barthel et al., 2008; Obwona, 1998: 21).  
 
The features associated with cluster 1 in the combined data set’s results, to a great extent, mirror 
those associated with clusters 1 and 2 in 2006 and 2013 respectively. Tables 2H and 2I in the 
appendices contain clustering results based on 2006 and 2013 sub data sets. The two clusters, 
results show, have fdi stake averagely at 93.42% and 94.23% respectively. Moreover, the 
median of fdi stake of 100% suggests that these clusters are more likely to include some firms 
that are completely foreign. Although with slight variations, these clusters in their respective 
sub data sets (and hence tables) have higher mean and median values on most variables 
compared to those cluster where foreign-owned firms are less likely to be grouped. The slight 
differences visible in Tables 2H and 2I are attributed to differences in sample sizes. 
 
Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 CNData:  Largely small- and medium-sized, moderately skill- and 
 Capital-intensive firms  
These clusters form respectively 13.4% and 72% of the overall data set. These clusters further 
have mean fdi_stake of less than 1% each according to Table 2.9. This low fdi stake is 
suggestive of clusters in which foreign-owned firms are less likely to be found, but domestic 
firms. In Table 2.9, cluster 2 firms employ on average 15.7 workers (log employment also is 
2.28) and have a median value of actual employment of 9 workers. This result is suggestive of 
a cluster in which largely small firms are grouped. In Table 2.10, this cluster has 76.2% under 
the small size category and this result resonates well with the histogram caption in Figure 2.12. 
The 1.1% result on large firm size category corroborates what we see in figure 2.12 for this 
cluster. Comparatively cluster 3 has a 22.21 value on actual employment (log employment is 





sized but also medium sized firms. In Table 2.10, this cluster has 83.1% under small size 
category and 14.6% for medium sized firms. These two clusters have relatively similar firms 
regarding size. Most of their firms are mainly small and medium sized although cluster 3 tends 
to have more comparative presence in the large size category. Figure 2.9 contains a histogram 
for the three clusters and all firm size categories. The illustration confirms the relative cluster 
comparisons alluded to above. Cluster 1 with predominantly foreign-owned firms has firms in 
all the three categories, but mainly in the large and medium. The largest number of firms in 
cluster 3 are small in size. 
A notable characteristic that separates these cluster 2 and cluster 3 more evidently is that of 
worker_educ. On average, whereas the log of worker education stands at 1.1 for cluster 2, for 
cluster 3 it is at 2.53. Table A2 in the appendix also indicates that between cluster 2 and cluster 
3, the p-value on education is the most different from the rest. This observation tends to suggest 
that firms in cluster 3 are more likely to be skill intensive than those in cluster 2. However, 
intriguingly, cluster 2 seems more exporting (18.59) in absolute terms than cluster 3 (18.01), 
although this difference is not statistically significant as per the p-value in Table A2. 
Cluster 3 also differs from cluster 2 in terms of firms’ management experience as par Table 
2.9. Additionally, Table 2.10 shows this cluster having higher values in favour of R&D 
expenditure and likelihood of providing formal training to firm employees. 72% of firms in 
cluster 3 are likely to spend on R&D compared to 64.9% firms in cluster 2. Also 67.2% firms 
are more likely to offer formal training to their workers compared to 58.9% in cluster 2. Firms 
in cluster 2 are mainly in retail and other sector categories with less presence in manufacturing 
(14.4%) compared to both cluster 1 (26.2%) and cluster 2 (27.2%). R&D is mainly a priority 
for firms that are anchored in the manufacturing sector where product development is critical 
so as to maintain market share as opposed to firms in retail whose main activity is distribution 
and sale of what has been produced. These results imply that most domestic firms in Uganda 
are not research intensive and hence far below the technology frontier. They are usually either 
small or medium enterprises as confirmed in figure 2.9. This automatically feeds into their 







Figure 2. 9: Histograms of firm size by cluster based on overall data  
 
In this chapter, cluster analysis makes use of Euclidean distance measures. Whereas use of this 
measure is admittedly popular and acceptable, it is susceptible to one natural problem that may 
be associated with variables used and hence distort results. This problem is “variable 
collinearity”. While the problem of multicollinearity is easy to see in regression analyses by 
looking at unreasonable beta coefficients in the results output, it is challenging in cluster 
analysis where betas and dependent variables don’t exist. When some variables used in 
clustering are highly collinear, they don’t add much new information to the description of the 
clusters. Collinearity causes information reduction and leads to cluster descriptions that aren’t 





high, low, and moderate values on different variables (Sambandam, 2003: 19). But existence 
of high collinearity or correlation among variables (or some) in the data, makes mixed-value 
clusters extremely hard to achieve.  
 
Several methodological solutions have been developed to mitigate the problems associated 
with multicollinearity of variables in cluster analysis. One method that probably is applicable 
to this thesis is that of adopting the Mahalanobis distance measure other than Euclidean 
distance measure. Mahalanobis distance measure is not affected by variable collinearity 
(Pacáková & Poláčková, 2013: 54). But calculation of such distances involving many variables 
can be intricate and iteratively time intense (Sambandam, 2003: 20). Another easy method 
involves eliminating some of the correlated variables from the data before analysis. But this 
elimination is premised on the condition that the retained variables are practically useful and 
have high actionability potential, which might be difficult to ensure (Sambandam, 2003: 22). 
 
One other popular technique one can use to surmount the correlation problems above is 
reduction of the dimension of the data so as to generate “principal variables” that are 
uncorrelated. This is popularly performed via either Principal Component Analysis (PCA) or 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) for numeric or non-numeric variables 
respectively16. PCA/MCA involves a transformation process that leads to a reduction of the 
dimension of the data to a lower one with principal variables that are uncorrelated (Pacáková 
& Poláčková, 2013: 54). This analytical transformation is done while at the same time 
maximizing the magnitude of information recovered from the initial space. But PCA/MCA and 
other methods like diametrical clustering are either numerically or non-numerically leaning, 
and may not be suitable for data that is mixed (Chavent, Kuentz, Liquet & Saracco, 2011). 
 
A relatively novel technique that is neither numerically leaning nor otherwise is the ClustOfVar 
approach. In order to generate cluster descriptions that are desirable or to at least provide a 
validation test to the clustering results, we, in this chapter, employ the ClustOfVar technique 
(other than PCA/MCA) in generating uncorrelated principal variables. These principal 
variables, which are also popularly called synthetic variables, are later used to re-cluster the 
 
 
16 PCA/MCA is a data analysis tool that is used to reduce the dimensionality (number of variables) of a large 
number of interrelated variables while retaining as much of the information (variation) as possible. PCA is mainly 





firms to see if similar cluster solutions are generated. Choice of this technique is informed by 
the challenges of PCA/MCA and other techniques aforementioned. ClustOfVar is a relatively 
novel technique with ability to surmount most of the challenges mentioned earlier. For instance, 
it works with a mixture of numerical and non-numerical variables and can as well work for a 
set exclusively containing numerical or non-numerical variables. Moreover, it allows for 
missing data, which are replaced by means of numerical variables and by zeroes for qualitative 
variables in the indicator matrix (Chavent et al., 2011). Survey data usually has missing values. 
I therefore performed another related analysis involving clustering variables for the sole 
purpose of validating earlier results obtained from hierarchical clustering of firms. The 
associated procedures and results are presented next; 
  
2.6.3 Clustering of the Variables-  
Clustering of variables is a way to arrange variables into homogeneous clusters (groups of 
variables) that are strongly related to each other and thus bring similar information (Chavent et 
al., 2011). If correlation amongst variables has insignificant effect on clustering results, then 
re-clustering using the clustered/variable groupings (principal variables) should yield similar 
number of firm clusters.  
In this chapter, the ClustOfVar technique utilises the hierarchical clustering algorithm, which 
is based on PCAMIX, a principal component method for a mixture of numerical and non-
numerical variables. The aim of the clustering algorithm is to maximise a homogeneity 
criterion. Homogeneity of a cluster is measured by the extent to which variables constituting 
such a cluster are linked to a central quantitative synthetic variable. Chavent et al. (2011) 
propose measuring this link using the squared Pearson correlation for numerical variables and 
the correlation ratio for qualitative variables. 
The hierarchical algorithm can be defined in the following steps; 
Let {x1, x2, ……., xp1} be a set of p1 quantitative variables and {z1, z2, ...….., zp2} a set of p2 
qualitative variables. And let X and Z be respectively the corresponding quantitative and 
qualitative matrices of dimension n x p where n is the number of observational units. The steps 
of the algorithm are;   
Step 1: Start with P = p1 + p2 partitions. This means that in the first step, each variable 





Step 2: Merge the two clusters that have the smallest dissimilarity (maximum similarity) 
between them. Given clusters K1 and K2, this dissimilarity condition is given by 
 
                                          (K1, K2) = H(K1) + H(K2) – H(K1 U K2)                                             (2.9) 
 
The homogeneity (H) of cluster Ck is defined by Chavent et al. (2011) as below; 







k                                   (2.10) 
Where r2 is the squared Pearson correlation and η2 is the correlation ratio and yk is the cluster’s 
central synthetic quantitative variable, a variable most linked to all variables in the cluster. yk 
represents the first principal component of the PCAMIX applied to the standardised variables 
of Ck. Therefore, the first term of (2.10) measures the link between quantitative variables in Ck 
and yk while the second term measures the link between the qualitative variables in Ck and yk. 
Cluster homogeneity is at a maximum when all the quantitative variables are correlated or anti-
correlated to yk and when the correlations ratios of all qualitative variables are equal to 1. λ1
k 
is the first eigenvalue of PCAMIX applied to the k cluster Ck of a partition say Pk from the 
algorithm. The algorithm therefore tends to merge the two clusters that result into the smallest 
decrease in H. 
Step 3: The process should be stopped once all the variables are merged into one single cluster. 
Just as the optimal number of clusters was determined when clustering firms, a similar step is 
performed in variable clustering. The ClustOfVar R package, however, provides the option of 
bootstrapping to help both in determining optimal cluster numbers and evaluating the stability 
of the partitions of variables (Chavent et al., 2011). As earlier mentioned, once these variable 
clusters are generated and the scores of each group obtained in form of what is referred to as 
synthetic variables, I cluster the firms again based on these now few uncorrelated principle 
variables and compare results. The groupings of these variables are also presented and briefly 
discussed. The results of this stage of analysis are presented next, beginning with test evidence 
of variable collinearity. 
Table 2.11 shows correlation results, based on overall data set, for the variables used in the 
clustering of firms. In order, from 1 to 9, these abbreviated variables are; log employment, 
fdi_stake, log labour productivity, log wage, log management experience, log capital intensity, 






Table 2. 11: Correlation matrix for variables used in clustering firms in overall data set  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. empt 1.00         
2.fdi_stake 0.27 1.00        
3.prdvty 0.17 0.26 1.00       
4.wage 0.04 0.14 0.55 1.00      
5.mgt exp 0.19 0.10 0.04 0.02 1.00     
6.k-int 0.22 0.22 0.46 0.43 0.14 1.00    
7.mat/work 0.10 0.21 0.71 0.66 -0.06 0.42 1.00   
8.educ 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.01 1.00  
9.exports -0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.14 -0.15 -0.22 -0.37 1.00 
Source: Author’s own illustration based on World Bank Enterprise Data 06/13 for Uganda 
Although majority of the correlation coefficients are within the recommended (<0.5) level, 
some are either above or too near that threshold. Specifically, labour productivity is correlated 
with wage, capital intensity, and material per worker at respectively 0.55, 0.46, and 0.71 levels. 
The wage variable is highly correlated with capital intensity and material per worker at 0.43 
and 0.66 respectively while the correlation coefficient between capital intensity and material 
per worker, 0.42, is too close to the threshold. Figure 2D in the appendices provides a visual 
illustration of these correlations. The plot in this figure mirrors largely the matrix. In Table 2C 
in the appendices, p-values of some of these correlations indicate statistical significance. This 
significance of variable collinearities, justifies the need for variable clustering to examine if 
our results are not spurious.  
Therefore, using the ClustOfVar package in the R repository developed by Chavent et al. 
(2011), the ClustOfVar algorithm helps us to identify groups of variables that exhibit maximum 
similarity, providing the principal components that are used later to re-cluster firms. This re-
clustering helps us to confirm whether variable collinearity effects were dismal. Figure 2.10 
illustrate a cluster dendrogram, stability of partition plot, and a box plot for the overall data set. 
The appendices illustrate the same for 2006 and 2013, in figures 2J and 2K respectively. These 
are combined to determine the optimal number of clusters of the variables.  
In Figure 2.10, the stability plot is the plot of the mean (over B = 1320 bootstrap samples) of 





dispersion of these indices over the B = 1320 bootstrap replications for partition suggests either 
3, 4, 6 or 7 clusters. The box plot actually projects all solutions as possible. However, the 
dendrogram projects a 4-cluster solution to be less feasible than the rest. For consistency, the 




Figure 2. 10: Stability plot, box plot and dendrogram for overall data variable clusters  
Additionally, the dendrogram in Figure 2.10 reflects the matrix results. For instance, among all 
variables, employment posts the highest correlation with fdi_stake at 0.27 and from the 
dendrogram, employment is closer (clustered) to fdi_stake than any other variable.  This result 
is suggestive of a likely closeness between foreign-ownership and firm size variables. Exports 





same. The matrix shows that labour productivity is more correlated with material per worker 
at 0.71 than with wage, at 0.55 level, an aspect also echoed by the dendrogram in Figure 2.13.  
 
In the appendices, based on 2006 sub data set results, figure 2.J shows the stability of the 
partitions plot for the mean (over B = 500 bootstrapped samples) of the adjusted Rand indices. 
It suggests 3, 4 or 5 clusters. The box plot illustrating the dispersion of these indices over the 
B = 500 bootstrap replications for partition suggests either 3 or 4 clusters. A close inspection 
of the dendrogram highlights 4 clusters being more feasible than 3 clusters. In Figure 2.K, 
based on the 2013 sub data set results, the stability plot is the plot of the mean (over B = 700 
bootstrap samples) of the adjusted Rand indices. It suggests 3 (to a lesser extent) 4, 6, or 7 
clusters. A closer look at the box plot illustrating the dispersion of these indices over the B = 
700 bootstrap replications for partitions suggests either 3, 4, 6 or 7 clusters. The box plot 
actually projects 3 clusters to a much similar extent like the 4, 6 and 7 solutions. The 
dendrogram on the other hand, feasibly reveals 3, 6, or 7 clusters than 4 cluster solution.  
 
Table 2.12 shows the composition of the clusters of variables for each cluster solution on the 
three sets of data, together with the factor loadings. For each cluster, the squared loadings of 
each variable with the synthetic variable central to the cluster is noteworthy. The synthetic 
variable is the first principal component of PCAMIX. These squared loadings correspond to 
the squared correlation ratio for the variables, with the synthetic variable. It should be recalled 
that the clustering was performed using only numeric variables otherwise the squared loadings 
would also correspond to the correlation ratio for non-numeric variables in some cases. For 
example, the squared correlation between the variable “ln_employment” and the central 
synthetic variable of cluster 1 for 2006, 2013 and combined data is 0.64, 0.56, and 0.59 
respectively. The correlation ratio for “ln_wage” in cluster 2 for all data sets is 0.68, 0.62, and 






Table 2. 12: Synthetic variable cluster composition for respective data sets  
                  2006                                               2013                               Combined Data 
 Clusters              squared loading        Clusters      squared loading   Clusters   squared loading 
Cluster1                                             Cluster1                                 Cluster 1 
ln_employment            0.6357         ln_employment     0.5649     ln_employment       0.5860 
ln_mgt_exp                  0.6357         fdi_stake               0.4985     fdi_stake                  0.4707 
Cluster2                                           ln_mgt_exp           0.2820     ln_mgt_exp              0.3105 
ln_lbr_prdvty               0.8724            Cluster2                                Cluster 2 
ln_material-perworker 0.7739       ln_lbr_prdvty          0.5428     ln_lbr_prdvty           0.6087 
ln_wage                        0.6796      material_perworker 0.4564   ln_capital_intensity   0.2686 
Cluster3                                         ln_wage                   0.6221   material_perworker   0.6132 
fdi_stake                       1.0000          Cluster 3                            ln_wage                     0.5773 
Cluster 4                                       ln_capital_intensity  0.3513        Cluster 3 
ln_capital_intensity      1.0000       ln_worker_educ      0.3406    ln_worker_educ       0.5557 
                                                       ln_exports                0.5296   ln_exports                 0.5557 
Source: Author’s own computations based on World Bank Enterprise Survey 06/13 panel 
 Focusing on the clusters of overall data set, Table 2.12 results show that variable clustering 
echoes the dendrogram and the correlation matrix. For instance, cluster one houses 
employment, management experience and fdi stake. These variables are tightly set apart on the 
dendrogram too. Variables in cluster 2 are visibly separated from the rest as per the dendrogram 
and indeed are clustered alone while worker_educ and exports join up to form the third cluster.  
 
Specific inspection of cluster 1 (synthetic variable 1) for 2013 and combined data proposes a 
variable that brings information on ownership and human capital features of the firms. Cluster 
2 (synthetic variable 2) for 2013 and combined data is suggestive of a synthetic variable that 
communicates production technology, efficiency and remuneration. Finally, cluster 3 
(synthetic variable 3) tends to suggest a variable concerned with human capital skills and 
market orientation of firms. The clustering of variables is consistent between 2013 and 
combined data with only capital intensity clustered in different clusters for the two data sets.  
 
The algorithm yields scores of each firm on the three synthetic variables (cluster of variables). 
These scores are then used to re-cluster the firms, doing this for both the 2013 and overall data 
sets. For consistency, a similar methodological procedure is utilised in re-clustering. The 
dendrograms in Figure 2.11, show that the data sets and associated re-clustering yield three 










Figure 2. 11: Hierarchical clustering of firms using synthetic variables  
  
This sub-section of variable clustering confirms the presence of multicollinearity amongst the 
variables used in clustering. Consequently, a dimension reduction procedure is performed on 
the data so as to generate uncorrelated principal variables. Using these variables to re-cluster 
the firms yields similar cluster solutions as before. Getting similar cluster solutions shows that 
despite the presence of multicollinearity, its assumed effects are not significant enough to 
invalidate the clustering results. This implies that the clusters generated and the associated 
descriptions are rich enough to support generation of valid and useful conclusions about the 
hypothesized systematic differences between foreign and domestically-owned firms in 





associated with foreign ownership or with other factors that have been found to be correlated 
with ownership status. Insights into this association were earlier provided by regression 
analysis. Furtherance of this understanding can be achieved by investigating the relative 
importance of the numerous factors in the segmentation of firms, especially the variable on 
ownership status. I accomplish this endeavour by performing a Classification and Regression 
Tree (CART) analysis. The results of this analysis and the procedures followed are discussed 
in the section that follows. 
 
2.6.4 Classification and Regression Tree Analysis (CART) 
Overall, it is evident that this agglomerative hierarchical method of segmenting Ugandan firms 
tends to group these firms based on a variety of variables; ownership status (foreign/local), 
worker_educ, employment, and other variables. It is, however, not clear which of the variables 
play a relatively big role in firm segmentation although ownership seems to have a strong 
influence based on the results generated so far. This is another hypothetical thought that elicits 
my interest in investigating the relative importance of the variables in firm segmentation and 
specifically confirming whether a firm’s ownership status leads the way ahead of other 
variables. In this attempt, we perform a CART analysis on the data. 
 
CART is a classification method that uses historical data to construct what literature refers to 
as decision trees, which are then used to classify new data (Timofeev & Hardle, 2004). It 
consists of four basic steps; the first is  tree building using recursive splitting of nodes, the 
second is stopping the tree building process when a “maximal” tree has been built, third step is 
tree “pruning”, and lastly optimal tree selection (Lewis, 2000). In its simplest form, we let 𝑡𝑝 
be a parent node and 𝑡𝑙and 𝑡𝑟 respectively left and right child nodes of parent node 𝑡𝑝. Consider 
the learning sample with variable matrix X with M number of variables 𝑥?̇? and N observations. 
Let class vector Y consist of N observations with total amount of K classes. The maximum tree 
will be constructed based on a splitting rule that maximises homogeneity of the child nodes. 
This homogeneity is defined by an impurity function. The splitting rule is based on a Gini Index 
whose algorithm solves the maximisation problem below; 
 
𝑥𝑗 ≤ 𝑥𝑗

















Using the overall data set, we develop regression trees and the most important variables are 
identified. We use rpart, an R package that generates comprehensive results of CART, 
including variable importance based on percentage contribution in the firm segmentation. We 
further use the “rpart.plot” package to generate an illustrative CART tree for visual inspection 
of how firm segmentation is done. Using the rpart package, we standardise the variables first 
and then run CART regression model of the formula; 
 as.factor (Cluster) ~ ln_employment + ln_lbr_prdvty + fdi_stake + ln_capital_intensity + ln
_material_perworker + ln_mgt_exp + ln_wage + ln_worker_educ + ln_exports_absolute 
  
In this formulation, the dependent variable, cluster, is a categorical variable taken by the R 
package as a factor. In Table 2.13 we see the relative variable importance in segmenting firms 
based on overall data set. 
 
Table 2. 13: Variable importance in firm segmentation  
Variables absolute contribution percentage 
fdi_stake 285.52 75.0 
ln_worker_educ 49.89 13.0 
ln_mgt_exp 14.63 4.0 
ln_wage 9.37 2.0 
ln_lbr_prdvty 8.28 2.0 
ln_material_perworker 5.02 1.0 
ln_employment 4.50 1.0 
ln_capital_intensity 1.63 1.0 
ln_exports 0.00 0.00 
Source: Author’s own computations based on World Bank Enterprise Survey data 06/13 panel 
 
Noticeably, ownership status (fdi_stake) posts the highest absolute and percentage level of 
importance in segmenting firms. Besides this variable, worker_educ is revealed as importantly 
distinct from other variables in classifying firms in the data. Together with fdi stake, these two 
variables account for 88% contribution in segmenting firms. This result echoes earlier results, 
notably statistical significance that indicated the lowest p-value for the mean difference 
between clusters in terms of worker_educ. The next variable, which is twice as important as 





contributions. It is sufficient to note that the export variable is not important in classifying firms 
in the data. This finding is further intriguing because available literature tends to show that 
foreign-owned firms are more export-oriented than domestically-owned firms, which would 






These results are visually shown in Figure 2.12 with overall data CART tree: 
 






Earlier studies, mostly conducted in the developed world have established that differences 
indeed exist between foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms on a number of 
performance indicators. Some of these studies such as Moss and Ramachandran (2004) and 
Obwona (1998), have been conducted in SSA, specifically the East African region. Most of 
these earlier studies were based on discriminant functional analytical methods where prior 
assumptions especially on data distribution dictate the course of investigations. This chapter, 
with machine learning techniques, uses a relatively novel method, cluster analysis, where the 
data is allowed to determine the course of investigation to a greater extent. In essence, it 
provides an equivalent of a robustness check test to earlier findings from other studies on 
foreign-owned firms’ performance characteristics in relation to domestically-owned 
investments.  
In the second analytical stage, standard hierarchical clustering was applied to group the firms 
using a number of performance and characteristic variables. These variables included: 
employment, capital_intensity, wages, worker_educ, firm exports, management experience, 
labour productivity, material use per worker, and ownership status. The analysis grouped firms 
into largely foreign and domestically-owned. Descriptive statistical analyses of firm clusters 
revealed that the cluster with largely foreign-owned firms tended to perform relatively better 
when compared to the cluster with predominantly domestically-owned firms. This was in terms 
of average real values on the selected performance and characteristic variables mentioned 
above.  Besides finding significant differences between foreign-owned and domestically-
owned firms, the later are also found to differ amongst themselves on some indicators, notably 
workers’ education. These results, besides being comparable to findings of available empirical 
studies, they provide evidence to the inadequately attended to question of; whether observed 
differences are simply due to comparisons between sub groups of firms or not. Based on these 
results it can be concluded that foreign-owned firms systematically differ from domestically-
owned investments hence the observed performance premiums in favour of foreign-owned 
firms. These observed differences are not simply a reflection of comparisons between sub 
groups of firms.  By implication then, the observed dismal economic performance outcomes in 
Uganda amidst increasing inflows of foreign investments could be emanating from other 





that flow into the country meet the characteristic and performance standards that have been 
associated with them in the available literature.  
Additionally, the chapter establishes foreign ownership’s importance in segmenting firms 
alongside the selected performance indicators in Uganda. It does not, however, solely account 
for the segmentation. Indeed, after employing ClustOfVar algorithm to cluster variables into 
groups, findings showed that indeed foreign ownership stake was correlated with a bunch of 
other variables but more with employment and management experience in firms. Moreover, 
results from CART analysis equally revealed that ownership status (fdi-stake), worker_educ, 
and mgt exp were the most outstanding variables in terms of relative importance. Specifically, 
foreign ownership was more than twice as important as the other variables in influencing the 
formation of groups of firms. Therefore, in relation to one of the components of the empirical 
question at hand i.e. whether the observed differences are due to ownership status or not, we 
can prudently conclude that whereas this might be true, it is only to an extent, with other 
correlated factors at play. This makes it essential therefore that further investigations are 
undertaken to disentangle the extents to which the observed systematic performance 
differences can be ascribed to ownership and other correlated factors. This is an empirical issue 
attended to in the later chapters of this thesis.  
Overall, results in this chapter agree with some empirical components of earlier findings where 
foreign-owned firms are found to differ from domestic firms in host economies (these 
differences are also confirmed in Table 2E in appendices, by regression results using clusters 
as regressands on selected variables). Indeed some studies like  Falk and Wolfmayr (2010), 
Helpman et al. (2004), and Melitz (2002) have found that productivity and management know-
how of firms contribute to a natural selection of firms that engage in foreign investment.  
This exploratory multivariate analysis of data does not provide predictive mechanisms but 
paves the way for them. By classifying firms into groups that can easily be studied relative to 
each other, discriminant predictive methods can be employed to study the groups further. Such 
causal mechanisms are explored further in the chapters that follow, particularly in chapter 4, in 
which I address the key question regarding the causal effect of foreign ownership on firm-level 
performance.  
One limitation of this analysis is related to data, with missing values being the most visible of 
all. Due to the low number of firm observations (1325), credible imputations were done to 





Additionally, the study used the World Bank Enterprise Survey of 2006/2013, making results 
subject to economic changes in Uganda over the years. However, in the next few years, a new 
survey is expected. It would be useful for new research to employ similar techniques on new 
survey data and possibly other data sets, to generate new results. This new research will 







Foreign Ownership and Private Firm Enterprises in Developing Countries 
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I employed the method of hierarchical cluster analysis to investigate 
firm-level characteristics of both foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms in Uganda. I 
specifically investigated whether foreign-owned firms systematically differ from domestically-
owned firms along numerous performance dimensions. Using country-specific data for 
Uganda, I found that indeed foreign-owned firms are likely to systematically differ from 
domestically-owned firms. Findings indicated that actually observed performance differences 
between the two types of firms may not be related to just comparisons between sub-groups of 
firms but these firms differ systematically in terms of structural and performance 
characteristics. Foreign ownership is found to be a key variable in segmenting firms, but it is 
also correlated with numerous other variables. These results are to some extent similar to 
findings from earlier empirical studies. Some earlier empirical studies like (Goswami & Kanta, 
2012; Tambunlertchai, 2009; Ullah, Shah & Khan, 2014) have also provided evidence in 
support of these firm-level features that tend to distinguish the two types of firms and are more 
likely to be associated with the observed performance differences. Many of these empirical 
studies and their findings have also been country specific.  
One of the implications of country-specific studies is that findings may not easily be applicable 
to other relatively similar economies. For instance, unlike the findings of other empirical 
studies like the ones mentioned above, I did not find similar heterogeneities among foreign-
owned firms in Uganda i.e. the algorithm did not optimally cluster foreign-owned firms into 
numerous feasible clusters with significant differences. This slight difference in findings of 
chapter 2 and other earlier studies may probably be due to, among other reasons, the narrower 
and country-specific data set utilised in Chapter 2. And therefore, this could be a pointer to 
uncertainty regarding the applicability of my country specific findings in relatively similar 
economies, especially in SSA. Moreover, foreign direct investments constitute a global 





economic phenomenon is investigated.17 It is unclear therefore, although very important for 
empirical investigations, whether findings in Chapter 2 are a country-specific phenomenon or 
they could be generalised across similarly developing economies, especially in SSA. Given 
that the focus of this thesis is SSA, then in terms of empirical literature furtherance, this chapter 
investigates a similar empirical question from a multi-country perspective. To add nuance to 
the anticipated findings, further analysis is provided from the perspective of group 
classification of economies, based on World Bank/IMF benchmarks i.e. low-income versus 
lower middle-income economies. The availability of a broader data set   covering 19 countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) provided this opportunity. And for matters of consistency, I 
replicate the same methodology utilised in chapter 2. 
The cardinal objective was to establish how common or unique country-specific findings from 
Chapter 2 are, within a multi-country context, specifically among economies in SSA, the region 
of focus in this thesis. In relation to the cardinal objective, I additionally aimed to establish 
whether foreign-owned firms also exhibit heterogeneities among themselves at firm level, as 
available empirical literature asserts. In so doing, this chapter avails evidence that supports or 
dispel the hypothetical argument that findings from Uganda are robust, as expected, across 
relatively similar economies in the developing world, especially SSA. This chapter and its 
findings, not only gives nuance to previous results but also lends supportive consistency in 
terms of applicability from one economy to another, at a time when the African continent is 
envisioning the possibility of a single economic block. In addition, this chapter provides a solid 
base for the generation of testable hypotheses.  
In this chapter, as in Chapter 2, cluster analysis of characteristics of firms in SSA indicates a 
group of firms that are predominantly domestically-owned and are more likely to differ from 
other groups of firms on a number of performance dimensions. Relative to other groups, firms 
in this cluster are generally likely; to be small or medium in size, to exhibit relatively lower 
labour productivity, to be associated with lower mean wages, to exhibit relatively low levels 
of incremental investments, and to export part of their output. However, key to this cluster 
formation is the fact that firms in this group are quite similar hence their being clustered 
together irrespective of country of origin or whether clustering is performed on income groups 
of economies classified using World Bank yardsticks. This suggests that differential features 
 
 





of domestically-owned and foreign-owned firms in SSA are generally the same; and, further, 
that findings obtained from Chapter 2 based on Uganda are not peculiar and can be generalised 
to other economies, especially in SSA and other developing economies. This key result was 
consistently visible when I clustered the data in the following ways: firstly, the entire data set; 
secondly, the four individual countries with the largest number of sampled firms, excluding 
Uganda; and thirdly, even when I clustered lower-income and lower-middle-income economies 
separately. 
 
Additionally, after separation of the cluster composed of largely domestically-owned firms, 
firms that exhibited foreign ownership were optimally grouped into four different clusters. 
These clusters tended to differ from each other on several dimensions, yielding the common 
phenomenon of intra-firm heterogeneity among foreign-owned firms. Such heterogeneity is 
visible between Clusters 2 and 3, as well as between Clusters 3 and 4, for mean wages, mean 
employment, capital intensity, exports, labour productivity, worker training and average 
material use per employee. The phenomenon of firm-level heterogeneity is common in the 
scholarly findings of several studies on foreign direct investments in which different methods 
of analysis have been applied. 
  
In this chapter, clustering results tend to suggest that heterogeneities amongst clusters of 
foreign-owned firms are more likely to be visible in terms of foreign ownership intensity and 
export intensity, as opposed to country of location or classification in terms of low-income and 
lower middle-income categories. The cluster that is more likely composed of exclusively 
foreign-owned firms, is less export intensive when compared to two clusters that are unlikely 
to constitute exclusively foreign-owned firms. These two clusters were not significantly 
different from each other except in terms of foreign ownership intensity. The result of firm-
level heterogeneity among clusters of foreign-owned firms was also consistent when I clustered 
both the entire data set and the four individual countries with the largest number of sampled 
firms excluding Uganda; and even when I clustered lower-income and lower middle-income 
economies separately. This consistency confirms that findings for Uganda, discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, were not exceptional.  
 
The classification and regression tree analysis indicated that ownership status, exportation, 





important variables that sort firms into particular clusters. The remainder of this chapter is laid 
out as follows: 
• Section 3.2 presents empirical literature on private investments in SSA; 
• Section 3.3 presents the data description;  
• Section 3.4 presents the methods of analysis and results; 
• Section 3.5 contains a qualitative analysis of case studies of foreign-owned firms in 
selected countries in SSA; and 
• Section 3.6 presents the study conclusions. 
3.2 Stylized facts and empirical literature on foreign and locally-owned investments 
in SSA 
Since the 1990s, the inflow of foreign direct investments in Africa has been on the rise although 
with a declining global share. In 2016, global flows of foreign direct investments reduced by 
about 2% to USD 1.75 trillion. Investment in developing countries declined even more – by 14 
% – and flows to least developed countries (LDCs) and structurally weak economies have 
remained volatile and low (UNCTAD, 2017). The majority of economies in SSA and in Africa 
in general are categorically developing economies; with some definitely being structurally 
weak and suffering of the decline and volatilities in foreign direct investment flows.  
Recent trends show a diminishing African share of global foreign direct investments. For 
instance, between 2014 and 2016, Africa’s foreign direct investment inflows declined from 
USD 71bn to USD 59bn (UNCTAD, 2017). In SSA, sluggish commodity prices have reduced 
economic prospects and investor interest in the sub region. One of the leading foreign direct 
investment recipients on the continent, Angola, registered declines,  as did the large economies 
of South Africa and Nigeria (UNCTAD, 2017). Moderate increases were registered in East 
Africa, with an increase in inflows going to Ethiopia. However, strong inter- and intra-regional 
trade agreements are expected to lead to more foreign direct investment inflows in SSA and 
into Africa in general in the near future. 
Regionally, West Africa has been taking the lead in the recent past, driven mainly by natural 
resource discovery in countries like Ghana and Ivory Coast (UNCTAD, 2014). According to 
UNCTAD (2017), this success has been the result of fiscal consolidation and self-imposed 
reductions in government investment spending in Ghana. In Ivory Coast, foreign direct 
investment inflows rose by 17 % to USD 675 million, reflective of supportive public 





regional distribution of foreign direct investment inflows in Africa is shown. The illustration 
shows that, besides Southern Africa (which is driven by the giant economy of South Africa), 
the West African region and the North have, on average, been leading the rest of Africa, with 
the central region performing marginally. With reference to SSA, the Western region leads, 
followed by the Central and East African regions. East Africa has witnessed more inflows than 
Central Africa, a point that is clearly highlighted by the graphical illustrations. In Panel B, the 
trends in foreign direct investment inflows for the countries in the data set are shown. The 
series shows the averages for the group including Uganda (Group+Ug), for the group excluding 
Uganda (Group-Ug), and for Uganda alone between 1990 and 2018. It is noticeable that the 
trends for Uganda’s inflows and the mean for the rest of the countries are similar over the years. 
This relative similarity further justifies the extension of my Chapter 2 analysis to investigate 
whether findings in Uganda might hold for relatively similar economies in the region, or 
whether it is a country case phenomenon. 
More than any other factor, natural resources are a key factor that attract significant inward 
foreign direct investment, as illustrated by offshore gas and oil exploration in Mozambique and 
Ghana, mineral wealth in the DRC, and copper and cobalt in the Congo. Elsewhere, 
infrastructure and manufacturing has driven foreign direct investments in countries like 
Ethiopia. Among the peculiar case studies is Rwanda, whose major attraction for foreign direct 
investments has been rigorous economic reforms and institutional quality (Chen, Geiger & Fu, 
2015). Chen et al.’s conclusions are supported by earlier case study results on SSA by (Basu 
& Krishna Srinivasan, 2002). 
In SSA, foreign direct investments are more prevalent in the manufacturing sector than in other 
sectors like services, although the latter is slowly increasing. Recent evidence shows that 
manufacturing foreign direct investment in SSA is 9%, higher than the global average of 7.5% 
and the developing countries’ average of 8.1% (Chen et al., 2015). The agricultural sector has 
the lowest foreign direct investment inflows, with available data showing that agricultural 
foreign direct investment is very small when compared with domestic agricultural investment. 
A review of case studies on SSA indicates that, on average, less than 5% of foreign direct 
investment goes to agriculture (Gerlach & Liu, 2010: 8). 
Foreign direct investment in manufacturing in SSA continues to see some diversification in 
terms of source and new partners coming on board, especially China, Brazil and India. 





Rwanda registering more foreign investments in information and communications technology 
(ICT) and financial services in the last decade. 
 
Source: Author’s own illustration based on UNCTAD, FDI-MNE Information System18  
 
Source: Author’s own illustration based on UNCTAD, FDI-MNE Information System 
Figure 3. 1: African foreign investment inflows, by sub-region, and Uganda in comparison 
to other SSA countries (US $millions) 
Besides the stylized facts discussed above, some scholarly investigations about private 
investments in SSA have been conducted although these still remain few probably due to data 
 
 























Panel A: FDI inflows in Africa by sub-region 2009-2016










































































































































limitations. Some of these studies attempt to answer the very empirical questions posed in this 
thesis although utilizing conventional methods. Empirical firm-level literature on SSA includes 
studies investigating the features of both foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms. 
One of the focus areas of such studies has been the salient differences between foreign-owned 
and domestically-owned firms. Empirical findings on characteristic differences between 
foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms in SSA have indicated that the former are 
relatively better performers than the latter, and that they consequently differ systematically 
along various variable dimensions. Coniglio et al. (2015) employ OLS and MM estimation 
methods to estimate a CES production function for a sample of 6497 firms in SSA. Their 
findings indicate that foreign-owned firms for instance pay higher (16.9%) wages on average 
than domestically-owned firms do, ceteris paribus. Utilising the same data set as Coniglio et 
al,  Blanas et al.’s  (2017: 17)  empirical findings reveal that foreign-owned firms pay a mean 
wage that is 31.9% higher than the mean wage paid by domestically-owned firms. These results 
are in line with empirical findings based on economies elsewhere, such as the findings of 
Demurger and Fournier (2005) in China. This wage premium has been found to be a 
disincentive for cross-firm labour mobility, which ultimately impedes knowledge diffusion 
from occurring between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms19. The wage premium 
has been attributed to a number of factors in the literature. It may be explained by unobservable 
worker characteristics, such as higher ability or greater motivation (Javorcik, 2015), or by the 
tendencies of foreign-owned firms to operate in high-wage sectors and high-wage  locations 
(Moran, Alfaro & Javorcik, 2007: 28). This explanation is comparable to Almeida’s cherry-
picking argument. In some host economies, the concentration of foreign direct investments in 
high wage sectors may be a consequence of regulatory frameworks in place. In Ethiopia, for 
instance, several sectors are not open to foreign direct investment; however, the majority of 
these sectors are those that feature low performance characteristics like low wages. Examples 
are restaurants, retail and coffee exportation. This indirectly implies that most foreign direct 
investments in Ethiopia end up in sectors with wage premiums. This further implies that ceteris 
paribus, findings in chapter 2 of this thesis may not hold for an economy like Ethiopia since 
the observed performance premiums in favour of foreign-owned firms may be due to such firms 
being anchored in sectors that were already characterised by high; wages, output, capital/labour 
ratios, productivity, technology levels, among other performance outcomes. 
 
 





SSA firm-level empirical literature further indicates that foreign-owned firms are different 
from domestically-owned firms in terms of size and skill intensity (Coniglio et al., 2015: 1256). 
This means foreign-owned firms in SSA tend to employ more workers or create more jobs 
compared to domestically-owned firms. The conclusion regarding size by Coniglio et al, 
echoes findings by Chen et al (2015) who equally established that manufacturing foreign direct 
investments in SSA are associated with more employment creation (hence firm size) than in 
any other sector, providing evidence from case study countries like Tanzania and Uganda in 
2011 and 2012 respectively. Moreover, employment in foreign-owned firms tends to be more 
stable and secure than the employment offered by domestically-owned firms in SSA (Blanas 
et al., 2017). Employment instability in domestically-owned firms might be due to low survival 
rates among such firms due to their low levels of resilience to most shocks. Higher job security 
and stability in foreign-owned firms might be attributed to the need by such investments to 
ensure that their foreign affiliates undertake critical operations (such as the production of 
intermediates and final output for supply to foreign markets) in line with the demands of parent 
firm headquarters, probably to maintain brand parity. It may also point to better human resource 
management practices associated with foreign-owned firms since they tend to employ skilled 
managers, as Chapter 2 results indicated. 
Foreign and domestically-owned firms in SSA have also been found to be different in terms of 
export intensity, capital intensity, and labour productivity, with domestically-owned firms 
found to be less intensive along most dimensions. Njikam (2018) investigates the linkage 
between export-market destination and firm performance in SSA. Besides finding superior 
characteristics of exporters relative to non-exporters, his preliminary findings indicated that 
foreign ownership is key in enhancing the propensity to export, hence it is not surprising that 
foreign-owned firms are found to be more export-intensive than domestically-owned firms. 
Rankin et al. (2005: 14) find a similar result, being the significance of foreign ownership on 
exporting, in their analysis of firms in Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, and South Africa.    
Additionally, empirical firm-level literature shows that rising levels of capital intensity are 
associated with increases in age and foreign ownership of enterprises in SSA (Njikam, 2018: 
10). The association between capital intensity and age might be attributed to risk management 
practises implying that initially foreign investors would not want to commit enormous 
resources in a foreign country before getting well acquainted with the practical economic 
environment. Relatedly, regarding ownership stake, it could be that with time as foreign 





economic environment, they acquire more stake which most likely comes with more 
investment levels in terms of assets. 
In the same study, increases in firm size and foreign ownership are found to be associated with 
improvements in the labour productivity of SSA enterprises (Njikam, 2018: 11). Foreign-
owned firms are both export- and capital-intensive, probably due to the demands emanating 
from international market standards. In addition, these two features are usually complemented 
by high levels of skill intensity, as exporting firms usually face international competition with 
dimensions that are different from domestic markets. 
Almost universally, empirical findings have found that foreign ownership is associated with 
higher wages, higher productivity, and increased wage inequality due to increases in skill 
premium between domestically-owned firms and foreign-owned firms (Hale & Mingzhi Xu, 
2016: 2). Majority of the studies, however, remain focused on the developed world as indicated 
in chapter 2 with little investigations in SSA. In our current context, the few studies that have 
focused on SSA have majorly been case studies with only few analyses based SSA as a whole 
hence the generalizability gap of country-specific studies still remains. 
Foreign-owned firms in SSA have been found to not only systematically differ from 
domestically-owned firms but are also heterogeneous amongst themselves. Besides finding 
differences between foreign and domestically-owned firms, the empirical analysis of Coniglio 
et al (2015) reveals firm-level heterogeneities among foreign-owned firms in SSA. Substantial 
differences are found between foreign investors from developed and developing economies in 
terms of both skill intensity and wage premiums. Chinese firms have for instance been found 
to employ more workers (mostly blue-collar) workers) and to pay lower wages for both skilled 
and unskilled workers when compared to both domestic firms (-23.7%) and other foreign 
investors (-49.8%) (Coniglio et al., 2015: 1260). These results partly concur with the empirical 
findings of a case study analysis of Chinese foreign direct investments in SSA by (Kaplinsky 
& Morris, 2009). Though an important firm-level feature in most empirical studies which have 
actually guided policies aimed at incentivising foreign investment inflows, findings in chapter 
2 do not reveal such heterogeneities probably due to reasons earlier explained. On another note, 
heterogeneities among foreign investments may have varying implications in terms of 
anticipated effects not only on locally owned firms but also the general host economy as well. 
Therefore, the dismal economic outcomes observed amidst increased inflows of foreign 





under consideration. For instance, are they export oriented (hence more export intensive than 
local firms) or domestic oriented (hence the dismal export performance that is observed)?   
As if to confirm the above implications, empirical studies have also found foreign direct 
investments to be heterogeneous in their impact on host economies and on domestically-owned 
firms.  Pfeiffer, Görg & Perez-Villar (2014) utilise the World Bank Enterprise Survey data sets 
to analyse the horizontal productivity effects of foreign-owned investments from industrialised 
and developing economies in 10 SSA countries. Their findings indicate that the productivity 
effects of foreign direct investments are heterogeneous, hugely driven by the income levels of 
host economies and the absorptive capacities of locally-owned firms. South-to-South foreign 
direct investments20 are found to be slightly more advantageous than North-to-South21 foreign 
direct investments (Pfeiffer et al., 2014: 26).  
Concisely, empirical findings on private firm enterprises in SSA clearly suggest that foreign-
owned firms are different from domestically-owned firms in terms of firm-level characteristics. 
Foreign-owned firms in SSA tend to be associated with relatively superior performance 
outcomes. Besides these differences, intra-firm heterogeneity has also been empirically 
investigated and confirmed in SSA among foreign-owned firms. Most of the scholarly 
investigations, as expected, have employed conventional econometric methods to investigate 
the above differences. Analyses using these methods are based on well set prior assumptions, 
especially regarding distribution. There has been less or completely no application of 
alternative methods like cluster analysis that does not impose assumptions on data used but lets 
the data itself classify firms. This chapter employs this relatively novel method on a broader 
firm-level data set covering a sizeable number of economies in SSA to investigate the 
systematic differences alluded to in the literature. The ultimate aim is to confirm earlier 
empirical findings using alternative methods of analysis and establish applicability of findings 
in the previous chapter to SSA.  
3.3 The Data 
This chapter utilises the Africa Investment Survey (AIS) data, 2010, collected by the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The data consists of over 6000 firms, 
which were all surveyed in 2010 in the various countries. During data collection, face-to-face 
 
 
20 Foreign investment inflows from developing economies to fellow developing economies. 





interviews were conducted with top-level managers of foreign-owned and domestically-owned 
firms. This is akin to how the ES data used in the previous chapter is collected. AIS 2010 
covered 19 countries in SSA: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. These countries jointly accounted for 42% of the total GDP of 
SSA, making the data set a fair representation of SSA. The AIS data collection process is based 
on a rigorous survey methodology for strategic sampling and interview techniques, making it 
an authoritative data set for scholarly research and for analyses of foreign and domestic 
investment in Africa.  
Similar to the World Bank Enterprise Survey data used in chapter 2, sampling followed 
stratified sampling on three dimensions i.e. sector, size and ownership and the primary 
sampling unit of the AIS was also the firm. Stratified sampling as earlier noted in the previous 
chapter, has numerous merits notably the fact that it increases the likelihood of precise 
estimates. The AIS survey covers domestic and foreign owned firms in manufacturing and 
service sectors just like the ES data utilised in Chapter 2. The manufacturing sector covers sub-
sectors like agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying (including oil & gas), 
construction, electricity, gas and water supply, and all other types of manufacturing in metal 
and non-metal, plastics and rubber. The service sector includes sub-sectors like; wholesale and 
retail, hotels and restaurants, transportation and storage, tourism, IT and telecommunication, 
insurance and banking, real estate, consultancy, and education and health, among others.  
The survey covers various variables at firm level, but categorically ranging from investor 
characteristics like organizational structure, share structure, interactions with other firms and 
market orientation. Also covered is financial information of firms like output and production 
factors, such as labour, capital, energy, intermediate goods, wages and aspects regarding 
international trade. These are, to a large extent, the variables also covered by the ES data.   I 
selected only those variables deemed relevant for my study analysis. A brief descriptive 
summary of the data set follows. 
In Figure 3.2, Panel A, the distribution of firms for the 19 countries in the sample is shown. 
This reveals that Uganda has the highest number (813) of sampled firms, followed by Kenya 
(614), Nigeria (596), Ethiopia (569) and Tanzania (459) each having over 450 firms in the 
sample. The huge sample composition of Ugandan firms lends more credence to the cardinal 





fewer than 200 firms sampled each. With the exception of Lesotho, they are low-income 
economies, which may explain the low numbers of firms. This is also a likely indicator of the 
smaller size of their private sector.  
On Panel B, the distribution of firms by sector and ownership status in two regional World 
Bank income groupings is shown. The following can be noted: Uganda has an almost-balanced 
representation in all; the lower income group excluding Uganda (Lower income-ugx) posts 
higher figures in both manufacturing and service compared to the lower middle-income group; 
and the same is so for both foreign and domestic firms. This is due to the small number of 
lower middle-income economies in the sample. Overall, there are more domestically-owned 
firms than foreign-owned firms, irrespective of groupings and sector. In all the groupings, there 
are more firms in manufacturing than in the service sector. On Panel C, the net inflows of 
foreign direct investments, measured as a percentage of GDP for each country in the sample in 
2009 is shown. Madagascar posts the highest values, followed closely by Ghana, Mozambique 













Source: Author’s illustration based on AIS-UNIDO data 2010 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on AIS-UNIDO data 2010 
Figure 3. 2: Distribution of firms by country, regional income grouping by sector and fdi 
stocks by country 
3.3.1 Variable selection, measurement, and transformation 
Theoretically, this analysis was guided by the ownership advantages theory and Dunning’s 
eclectic theory, which were well detailed in chapter 2 of this thesis. This was because most of 
the variables that are used in the analysis are those covered by these two theories in their 
explanation of the foreign investment firm in a typical host economy environment. Therefore, 
selection of variables used in the analysis was largely guided by these two theories. However, 
earlier studies on Uganda,  such as Obwona (1998), and Wilson and Cacho (2007), studies on 
firms in other economies like Naughtin and Rankin (2016) who employ similar methods also 
guided my selection variables. Many scholars, in their analysis of firms in other economies on 

































Panel A: Total number firms by country in the survey
No of firms






























Panel B: Sectoral distribution of firms based on income  group classification of 
countries





(2013), and Naughtin and Rankin (2016) on firms in the South African economy, along with 
Forte and Santos’s (2015) cluster analysis of foreign direct investment in Latin America are 
some examples using these variables. Moreover, some scholars propose that, in clustering, 
common sense also plays a role. I selected a mixture of variables, being those thought to be 
associated with firm performance. I also selected some that are purely characteristic in nature, 
for example, exportation, capital intensity, and ownership status. These variables, including 
their labels and how they are measured, are presented in Table 3.1. However, I also generated 
other variables as and when deemed necessary during the analysis. 
 
Table 3. 1: Variable Description  
Variable name Variable label Variable Measurement 
Employment lnemployment log (№ of employees) 
Labour productivity lnlbr_prdvty log (real firm output/№ of employees) 
Foreign ownership stake fdi_stake % of foreign owned firm shares 
Capital intensity lncapital_intensity log (NBV machinery/№ of employees) 
Material per worker lnmaterial_perworker log (real material value/№ of employees) 
Wage lnwage log (labour cost/№ of employees) 
Firm exports lnexports log (real firm exports) 
Firm output lnsales log (real firm sales) 
Employee training lnemployee_training log (employee training) 
Research investment lnR&D log (research investment) 
Initial investment lninIv log (initial investment) 
New investment lnnewIv log (new investment) 
Source: Author’s own representation based on AIS, 2010 data set 
 
Given that variables measured in monetary terms were captured in respective countries’ local 
currencies, I converted all monetary variables to US dollars using each country’s foreign 
exchange rate as at 31 December 200922. Additionally, I performed a log transformation on the 
variables in order to remove any inherent skewness and to make patterns in the data more 
interpretable. After this transformation, I generated descriptive statistics. Variables that were 
 
 






selected for clustering further underwent a linear transformation. These variables were 
standardised so that all had a mean value of 0 and a variance of 1. This standardisation was 
performed because data usually consists of variables which are measured using different scales, 
and this usually makes comparison challenging. Also, centering variables is well-suited to 
cluster analysis. As previously, in this chapter I defined a foreign-owned firm as one with a 
minimum of 10% ownership shares belonging to individuals or parties of nationalities other 
than the country in question. I dealt with missing values in the same way as applied in Chapter 
2. 
3.3.2 Creation and Use of Indicator Variables  
In order to understand whether the conclusions reached in Chapter 2 were country (Uganda) 
specific or a phenomenon in SSA (and probably similar for developing economies elsewhere), 
I created some indicator variables and used them in the description and further analysis of 
clusters. Based on the World Bank classification of economies, I created a variable indicating 
whether a country was a low-income economy or lower middle-income economy. This was 
because all the countries in the survey belonged to one of these two classifications. I also 
created a variable that indicated a specific country, running from 1 to 19.  This helped me to 
identify whether Ugandan firms were uniquely clustered or not. The expectation was that, if 
Ugandan firms were unique from the rest in SSA or even other relatively similar economies 
elsewhere, the algorithm should have clustered them together, taking into account the 
performance variables used in the segmentation process. By implication, the subsequent CART 
analysis should have broken the cluster(s) away from the rest. 
3.4 Study Analysis, Methods and Results 
In my endeavour to further understand the characteristics of foreign and domestic firms; and 
whether the observed systematic differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned 
firms across various dimensions, as documented in Chapter 2, were exclusive to Ugandan firms 
or were a SSA (or developing economies’ or groupings within) phenomenon, I conducted two 
stages of analysis.  
The first stage involved descriptive statistics using means and medians. I generated statistics 
for the whole SSA data set, for Uganda, and for the two income groupings based on World 
Bank classification. Within these groupings, I separately generated statistics for foreign and 
domestic firms. This preliminary descriptive statistical analysis helped me to: (i) compare 





regarding properties of the distributions of study variables, for instance, the property of 
distributional normality.  
I also ran a regression using firms’ ownership status (fdi stake) as the regressor and selected 
variables as regressands and controls. Some of the regressors used include labour productivity, 
capital intensity, employment, exports and wage. Using firm ownership status as a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firm was foreign-owned and 0 otherwise, I obtained insights into how foreign 
ownership is likely to be associated with aspects such as firm size, productivity and wages in 
SSA. The regression results also helped me to shed light on preliminary differences between 
foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms. For a specific firm i in the sample, I estimated 
a simple regression model based on the specification in (3.0): 
                 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜓𝑓𝑑𝑖 + 𝜉𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                             (3.0) 
Where 𝑙𝑛 𝑦𝑖  denotes the regressand of interest for instance employment, 𝛾𝑖  is the intercept, and 
𝑓𝑑𝑖 is a dummy, which is equal 1 if the firm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise. 𝜓 is the 
coefficient of interest and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables of interest, for example, sector or 
country of location, and 𝜀𝑖  is the disturbance term. I estimated these regressions using an R 
package, robust, found in the CRAN repository. The subsection that follows presents the results 
of descriptive statistics and regression. 
 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Results  
In Figure 3.3 Panel A, the distribution of firms by country for both foreign-owned and 
domestically-owned firms is shown. Here, it is noted that Uganda has the highest number of 
foreign-owned firms, followed by Kenya. Uganda having the highest number of firms in the 
sample is good for comparative purposes with results in the previous chapter. Niger, Burundi, 
Burkina Faso, and Malawi have the least number of foreign-owned firms in the sample. In all 
the countries in the sample, as probably expected, domestically-owned firms are more than 
foreign-owned firms in each country.  
In Panel B, the stocks of foreign direct investment per country in the survey in 2009 are shown. 
According to OECD (2018)23, foreign direct investment stocks measure the total level of direct 
investment at a given point in time, usually the end of a quarter or of a year. The outward 








to, enterprises in foreign economies. The inward foreign direct investment stock is the value of 
foreign investors' equity in, and net loans to, enterprises resident in the reporting economy. 
Foreign direct investment stocks are measured in USD and are shown as a share of GDP24. It 
is noticeable that Madagascar had the highest stocks of foreign direct investment in 2009, 
(albeit with lower numbers of sampled firms) followed by Ghana, Cape Verde, Mozambique 
and Mali. A close look at Uganda in Panel B reveals that its foreign direct investment stock 
was among the lowest even when though it had a balance of domestically-owned firms and 


















Source: Author’s illustration based on AIS-UNIDO data 2010 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data extracted from the World Bank data sets25 
Figure 3. 3: Foreign direct investment stocks and distribution of foreign & local firms by 
country  
 
In terms of sectoral distribution, foreign-owned firms tend to be more concentrated in 
manufacturing over service sectors. The reverse, however, may not hold for domestically-
owned firms in most countries. In Figure 3.4 Panel A, the distribution of firms in the 






































































































Panel B: FDI stocks by country in SSA 2009





sector are shown. From Panel A, it is shown that there are 234 Kenyan foreign-owned firms; 
however, there are only 25 in Panel B. The same results are shown for, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zambia. However, Uganda presents a mixed distribution.   
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on AIS-UNIDO data 2010 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on AIS-UNIDO data 2010 
Figure 3. 4: Distribution of firms by sector and ownership status in sampled countries 
 
Overall, the sectoral composition of foreign-owned firms reveals that most are concentrated in 
heavy industries, while domestically-owned firms are mainly found in light manufacturing and 







































































































belief that foreign direct investment has the efficacy to stimulate structural transformation of 
economies of developing countries through creating employment in modern sectors. However, 
if foreign direct investment is directed to ICT and financial services, job creation and thus 
anticipated transformation may not be realised. The case study of Rwanda, where average 
growth of employment is still low amidst increasing foreign direct investments (Chen et al., 
2015: 33), is an example of this. 
In Table 3.2, the regression results of some selected performance variables and characteristics 
of firms against foreign ownership and some control variables are shown. For each response 
variable or characteristic, I first used fdi_dummy as a lone regressor; and, in the alternative 
estimations, I controlled for the sector, the income group classification of economies, and on 
whether the firm was exporting or not. I specifically controlled for whether the firm was in the 
service or manufacturing sector (sector), whether the firm was in a low-income or lower 
middle-income country (country_class), and whether the firm was exporting or not 
(export_dummy). Model estimations are shown as M1 to M8, with each regressand 
corresponding to two models; one with only fdi_dummy, and the second with the three control 
variables. The results show that foreign ownership is significantly and positively correlated 
with mean wages, firm size as mirrored by the employment variable, labour productivity and 
capital intensity. These results hold even after controlling for sector, exportation, and the 
income group of the economies in the sample. The regression coefficients, which indicate such 
association, are all positive and significant at least at 1% level. For instance, in models M1, 
M3, M5, and M7, foreign-owned firms tend to pay more wages, employ more, exhibit more 
labour productivity, and are more capital intensive by respectively 15.1%, 56.7%, 25.7% and 
20.7%, when compared to domestically-owned firms. In summary, these are the likely average 
differences between foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms along the 
abovementioned dimensions. The coefficients remain significant even after controlling for 
sector, export status and income group. Additionally, the fdi_dummy coefficient remains 
positive and significant even when I controlled for the specific country of location of the 
firms26. This implies that foreign-owned investments or firms are likely to pay, on average, 
higher wages; to employ more workers (hence being larger in size); exhibit higher labour 
productivity; and be more capital-intensive than the locally owned firms. They are equally 
 
 





likely to be more export intensive. An empirical causal relationship between foreign ownership 
and exporting is popular in current literature, for instance in Rankin et al. (2005: 13). 
The association between foreign ownership and key firm-level variables as indicated by the 
regression results above, shows that foreign-owned firms are likely to be different from 
domestically-owned investments. They, however, do not indicate whatsoever, whether foreign-
owned firms also differ among themselves. The need to fill these gaps led me to the next stage 






Table 3. 2: Linear regression results of firm performance variables and foreign ownership 
Variable log wage log employment log labor_productivity log capital intensity 

























































Observations 4078 3798 6400 5774 3066 2880 3089 2900 
R2 0.002 0.069 0.038 0.143 0.003 0.053 0.002 0.048 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, 
           Values in parenthesis are standard errors 






In the appendices, Table 3A1 shows further descriptive statistics. These statistics show 
significant differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms. The p-values 
associated with t-tests on group means for the variables confirm how the two types of firms 
differ significantly. Overall mean and median values for all variables are nearly similar. This 
approximate similarity is suggestive of a symmetric distribution exhibited by the variables. In 
Table 3A2, also in the appendix, descriptive statistics for foreign and domestic firms grouped 
for Uganda; low-income countries excluding Uganda; and lower middle-income countries, are 
shown. Each grouping has a column for foreign (F) and domestic (D) firms. Noticeable in the 
results are visible differences between mean and median real values for Uganda and the other 
two groups.  Mean values for Ugandan firms are lower even when over 12% of the firms in the 
data are sampled from Uganda. Additionally, firms in lower middle-income economies posted 
higher mean values than both low-income economies and Uganda. This may be due to 
differences in firms’ attributes in the two categories of economies, with firms in slightly 
wealthier economies performing better. Finally, differences between foreign-owned firms and 
domestically-owned firms for the three groups are also evident, with foreign-owned firms 
having higher values than domestically-owned firms. 
The first stage of analysis provided insights similar to the key result in Chapter 2. However, 
these descriptive statistics did not reliably confirm whether differences between foreign and 
domestic firms were attributable to comparisons between different sub-groups (for example 
between large firms where foreign direct investment is more prevalent and small firms) or to 
systematic differences across various dimensions between foreign and domestic firms. In 
particular, they did not answer whether the results 
(i) were unique for Uganda, as Chapter 2 findings suggested; or 
(ii) showed features that characterised private firms in SSA and developing economies, 
and hence were not specific to Uganda only; or 
(iii) were applicable to other country groupings such as the World Bank classification of 
economies, for instance, low-income economies compared to lower middle-income 
economies. 
I further investigated the above questions in the second stage of this study’s analysis.  
 
3.4.2 Standard Hierarchical Clustering of SSA firms 
Clustering is the second stage of analysis in this chapter. Methodologically, and unlike in 





variables. Using the hot deck imputation method, as described in Chapter 2, I addressed missing 
values. Next, I standardised these variables to a mean and variance of 0 and 1 respectively, 
since they were measured on different scales. After this transformation, I undertook a Cluster 
Tendency Assessment (CTA) using the Hopkin’s statistic to establish if the data set was 
clusterable. It is not credible to subject a data set without naturally inherent clusters to any kind 
of partitioning (Banerjee & Davé, 2004). The Hopkin’s statistic and the five steps it entails are 
as described in Chapter 2. After confirming the clusterability of the SSA dataset, I investigated 
whether the variables were free from extreme levels of collinearity. 
As noted in Chapter 2, even if the data used contains naturally inherent structures, when 
variables used in clustering are highly collinear, there is a likelihood that results from the 
clustering process might be of less quality or sometimes spurious. Collinearity among variables 
is highly likely when clustering is based on Euclidean distance measures. In this study, I 
employed Gower’s distance measure as the first mitigation measure against any likely 
spuriousness arising from collinearity of clustering variables. Secondly, I tested the quality of 
the results by clustering variables to generate principal components (synthetic variables), which 
I used to re-cluster firms and confirm whether clustering results exhibited consistency at firm 
level. Unlike in regression analysis where unreasonable beta coefficients can, for instance, 
intimate the presence of the problem of variable collinearity, in clustering this is difficult due 
to the absence of betas and dependent variables. In order to detect the presence or otherwise of 
high variable collinearity, I generated a correlation matrix for the variables that had been 
selected for use in the clustering. This matrix helped to shed light on the probable presence of 
extreme collinearity; and hence justifying mitigation actions to be taken or otherwise. 
After confirmation of clusterability of the data using the H statistic and ascertaining whether 
clustering variables were free from high levels of collinearity, I employed confidently 
hierarchical clustering methods using agglomerative techniques. This was because of the many 
advantages associated with these techniques, for instance  the flexibility in terms of granularity 
levels and the versatility (Abbas, 2008). I used Gower’s general similarity coefficient, which 
is specified in equation 2.4, to estimate the distances between firms. Based on these distances, 
the similarity between firms was achieved, this forming the basis for hierarchically clustering 
these firms. The agglomerative method begins with each firm as an individual cluster, then 
later links the most similar firms into a new cluster. The process continues until one cluster is 
achieved. Several linkage methods are used in cluster analysis. Many scholars (Everitt et al., 





strengths and weaknesses. In this chapter, I linked the firms using Ward’s minimum variance 
method, a linkage method which minimises the sum of squares to form clusters.  
In this study, three methods were used to guide in determining the optimal number of clusters 
to analyse. These are the dendrogram, the silhouette method27 and the CH index. The 
dendrogram is a graphical illustration of how clusters of firms are formed; and by cutting it at 
a relatively larger distance, an analyst can visually determine the desired number of clusters. 
Horizontal lines drawn at specific distances on the Y axis of dendrograms indicate the cutting 
points, where every vertical branch of the dendrogram crossed by the horizontal line indicates 
a cluster. The number of such crossings give the analyst visual insights into the optimal number 
of clusters. Elsewhere, the R software enables the analyst to use boxes to indicate such clusters 
for visual inspection. 
The silhouette width is an index associated with Rousseeuw (1987). It is a composite index that 
reflects the compactness and separation of clusters. For a given firm i, its silhouette width Sw 
is specified in (3.1): 
 
          sw =
λ(i)−ϕ(i)
max{ϕ(i),λ(i)}
                                                                                                       (3.1) 
 
where 𝜙(𝑖) is the mean distance of firm i to other firms in the same cluster, 𝜆(𝑖) is the mean 
distance of firm i to firms in its nearest neighbour cluster. The mean of Sw across all firms 
shows the overall quality of the clustering result. A larger averaged silhouette width (ASW) 
shows a superior overall quality of the clustering result. In summary, an ASW of 0.71–1.0 
indicates that a strong structure has been found, while an ASW of 0.51–0.70 indicates that a 
reasonable structure has been found. An ASW of 0.26–0.50, however, shows that the structure 
is weak and that it could be artificial, with a recommendation that additional methods of 
analysis should be explored. An ASW of less than 0.25 shows that no substantial structure has 
been found and that cluster analysis techniques are inapplicable. As detailed in Chapter 2, the 
third method guide, the CH index, developed by Calinski and Harabasz (1974), is based on a 
variance ratio criterion as specified in equation 2.9.  
 
 





Once the clusters had been generated, I comprehensively analysed them using descriptive 
statistics along the various variable dimensions. The analysis was based on the first sample 
moment and its focus was on:  
(i) The comparison of cluster mean values to the overall mean values of the entire 
sample along performance dimensions;  
(ii) The comparison of individual cluster mean values relative to other clusters in the 
sample for both performance and characteristic variables selected for analysis; and 
(iii) The statistical testing on the means of variables between individual clusters to 
confirm statistical significance of inherent differences if any. In this endeavour, I 
used student T- tests.  
In executing the three methods described above, this study focused attention on the indicator 
variables used earlier, namely country, low-income in comparison to lower middle-income 
economies, sector dimensions and any classifications elements deemed important in 
understanding firm-level features in SSA. Additionally, keen interest was given to how clusters 
with foreign-owned firms were likely to compare with those clusters with domestically-owned 
firms and those clusters with fellow foreign-owned firms, if any. These specific elements of 
analysis, coupled with the last stage of analysis (CART) were expected to answer the two 
cardinal objectives in the affirmative. After applying the above clustering process, the results 
that follow were generated. 
The analysis at this stage began with a statistical assessment of the clustering tendency on the 
dataset using the Hopkin’s statistic (H). The H statistic measures the likelihood that a given 
dataset is generated by a uniform data distribution. It is based on five key steps as detailed in 
Chapter 2. Using factorextra28, a Hopkins test statistic of 0.003 was generated, as indicated in 
Table 3D in the appendices. This statistic is well below 0.5; and on this basis, the null 
hypothesis that my data was uniformly distributed and therefore did not contain meaningful 
clusters was rejected.  
In Table 3.3, the correlation matrix for SSA is shown. It is evident that majority of the variables 
in the data are highly correlated. For instance, lnlbr_prdvty is highly and significantly 
correlated with almost all variables except fdi_stake. Given these correlation results, I 
 
 
28 An r package for assessing clustering tendency and for determining optimal cluster numbers using silhouette, 





concluded that my clustering variables did suffer from extreme collinearity problems, which 
warranted mitigating actions. Therefore, in this chapter, I also undertook a validation test for 
the reliability of the clustering results. Methods similar to those employed in the previous 
chapter, i.e. clustering the variables themselves, so as to generate principal components, were 
adopted. These principal components were later used to re-cluster firms to establish whether a 
similar quality cluster solution (5 clusters) could be achieved. Through this re-clustering 
process an analyst is able to confirm whether firm clusters earlier generated are consistent and 
reliable. 
Table 3. 3: Correlation Matrix for SSA Data Set 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. lnemployment 1.00 .191 .141 .095 .072 .483 .489 .352 .590 .163 
2. lnlbr_prdvty  1.00 .731 .917 .782 .742 .651 .643 .889 .009 
3. lncapital_intensity   1.00 .639 .572 .537 .519 .510 .636 .004 
4. lnmaterial/worker    1.00 .673 .620 .666 .508 .801 -.000 
5. lnwage     1.00 .577 .445 .587 .673 .010 
6. lnexports      1.00 .529 .638 .874 .076 
7. lnresearch_investment       1.00 .693 .745 .032 
8. lnemployee_training        1.00 .732 .001 
9. lnsales         1.00 .139 
10.fdi_stake          1.00 
Source: Author’s own results based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
The rejection of the null hypothesis based on the H statistic paved the way for the clustering 
process using hierarchical agglomerative techniques. Using Gower’s distance measure, a 
distance matrix for the firms was generated and thereafter, these firms were linked using 
Ward’s “ward.D2” linkage method. This yielded a large number of clusters, given that over 
6000 firms constituted the sample. It is challenging to attempt any analysis of all the clusters; 
hence the need to decide on the optimal number of clusters to analyse. In deciding on the 
optimal number of clusters to analyse, I was guided by three methods namely; the dendrogram, 
silhouette method, and the CH index. 
In Figure 3.5, a visual inspection of the SSA dendrogram suggests between two and five 





ASW, which is close to 1.0, is associated with a two-cluster solution. According to the 
silhouette method, an ASW of 1.0 is the highest mark of clustering excellence. The result in 
Figure 3.6 seems to suggest that the excellent clustering quality is that one, which yields foreign 
and domestic firms into two distinct clusters in this case. However, the choice of a two-cluster 
solution, despite its associated excellent cluster quality, may yield only the clear-cut separation 
between foreign and locally owned firms. Given the objectives of this chapter, the two-cluster 
solution makes it challenging to:  
(i) Understand whether there is a likelihood of Ugandan firms being grouped in a 
specific cluster. Yet this would have been confirmation for the cardinal objective of 
this chapter. I could only confirm that findings in the previous chapter were peculiar 
to Uganda if and only if the findings in this chapter indicated that Ugandan firms 
were more likely to be clustered uniquely in a specific cluster or clusters.  
(ii) Gain insights into the probable inherent heterogeneity between firms, and whether 
such heterogeneity was more likely to exist between foreign-owned firms, between 
domestically owned firms or both. Heterogeneity among foreign-owned firms is a 
firm-level characteristic common in scholarly findings of most available studies that 
have employed different methodologies (other than cluster analysis) in analysing 
foreign direct investment characteristics. It is therefore enriching, in scholarly 
terms, to establish whether any form of heterogeneity could also be revealed via 
clustering methods.  
Any cluster solution above two clusters is, however, associated with a drastic decline in cluster 
quality. In a three-cluster solution, for instance, there is a noticeable sharp reduction in ASW, 
from almost 1.0 to below 0.75. Nevertheless, according to the standard measure mentioned 
earlier, an ASW of 0.5 or above indicates a reasonable quality of clusters that permits good 
analysis. It is evident from the silhouette plot in Figure 3.6, that any number of clusters from 
three and above are associated with an ASW of close to 0.6. On this basis, when I ran the CH 
index as my last test to determine the optimal cluster number, I set the minimum and maximum 
cluster-solution between three and five clusters respectively. As seen in Table 3D in the 
appendices, the CH index suggested a five-cluster solution, which I then used as the basis of 







Figure 3. 5: SSA Cluster Dendrogram 
 
 
Figure 3. 6: Silhouette Plot for SSA 
I decided to cut the dendrogram at a five-cluster solution and to undertake a descriptive 
statistical analysis of this. Table 3.4 shows the real mean values for each of the five clusters 
based on the nine variables used in clustering and other variables not used in clustering but 
deemed informative. These variables are shown as wage (lnw), foreign ownership stake 
(fdistk), employment (lnempt), capital intensity (lncapint), sales (lnsales), labour productivity 





investment (lninIv), and new investment (lnnewIv). For each cluster, Table 3.4 further shows 
the percentage contribution from Uganda (Ug), low-income countries excluding Uganda (LY) 
and lower middle-income countries (LM). Additionally, shown is the percentage contribution 
per cluster of both foreign (F) and domestic (D) firms, and also the total number of firms for 
each cluster in the last column. In the very last row, the mean values for the whole SSA dataset 
are shown. In this chapter’s analysis, I compare values for each cluster to those of the whole 











Table 3. 4: Real mean values and country/group percentage composition for SSA clusters  
                                                       Variables                                                                                      Uganda & group % composition/cluster 
Cluster        lnw    fdistk  lnempt  lncapint  lnsales lnlbrpvty  lnmat   lntrn  lnexp   lninIv   lnnewIv  Ug      LY    LM       F       D         Total 
Mean 
Cluster 1    2.62     0.01     3.83       3.17        7.37      3.92      3.56    3.41    7.12    6.06     5.95      50.7    65.2   69.7     0.1   99.95        4184 
                             
Cluster 2    3.07     80.3     4.58       3.76       9.05       4.60      4.18    4.09    8.17    0.79     6.98        3.6     5.3      4.0     13.5    0.0           313 
                           
Cluster 3    2.59     99.9     4.29       3.08       8.27       3.87      3.45    3.32    7.65    1.15     6.00       41.8    22.3   18.5    67.1   0.0          1552 
                  
Cluster 4    3.10     41.7     4.62       3.93       9.31       4.83      4.24    4.09     8.39   0.87     7.24        3.9     7.1      7.8     19.2   0.0           444 
            
Cluster 5    1.79     45.5     4.10       3.06       17.9       13.0      3.63       -        4.94   6.36     2.99        0.0     0.1      0.0       0.1   0.05            4 
 
SSA           2.67     30.6    4.03        3.24       7.83       4.02      3.61     3.49     7.55   5.44     6.11      12.5    65.4    22.1    35.6   64.4       6497  










Cluster 1- 64.4% of the sample (domestic, medium, lowly productive and moderately capital-
intensive firms) 
Cluster 1 is largely composed of domestic firms (99.5% of all domestic firms in the data set) 
with only two (0.1%) of all foreign-owned firms in the data set grouped in this cluster. Results 
in Table 3.4 show, for this cluster, a mean value of fdi-stake of 0.01%, which is below the SSA 
average of 30.6% in the last row. These largely domestically-owned firms post real mean 
values on majority variables, which are either below or equal to SSA averages. For instance, 
they are likely to exhibit lower levels of labour productivity as shown by the cluster’s mean 
value of 3.92, which is below the SSA average of 4.02. They also show low levels of 
employment. They are also likely to be moderately capital-intensive and medium-sized, as 
indicated by results on Table 3.4. Available literature shows that these are some of the central 
characteristics exhibited by domestically-owned firms, especially in developing economies. 
For instance, a case study of Ethiopia, where most of the significant employment opportunities 
in manufacturing are attributed to non-local firms, corroborates these findings (Chen et al., 
2015: 36). 
Comparatively, except along the variable that measures the initial investment level of the firm, 
(labelled ‘lninIv’), Cluster 1, relative to other clusters, is associated with lower real mean values 
on all variables. Clusters 2, 3, and 4 are composed of only foreign-owned firms, with mean fdi-
stake above the SSA average. In Table 3C in the appendices, the p-values associated with test 
statistics on differences between the mean values of the clusters are shown. These results 
indicate that differences between the largely domestically-owned firms in Cluster 1 and the 
foreign-owned firms in the rest of the clusters are statistically significant. These results echo 
those in Chapter 2, and provide further evidence reinforcing earlier study findings on firm-
level characteristics of both foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms in developing 
economies. Using regression analysis, Coniglio et al. (2015: 1249) finds similar results 
between domestic and foreign-owned firms in sales, labour productivity, export intensity, 
capital intensity, and mean wages. Elsewhere, Foster-McGregor, Isaksson and Kaulich (2013) 
use first-order stochastic dominance methods and quintile regressions to investigate the effect 
of foreign ownership on labour market outcomes in SSA. Their findings also suggest that 
foreign-owned firms pay between 9.3% and 20.9% higher wages than domestic firms when 
taking into account mean wages of all employees (Foster-McGregor et al., 2013: 12). 
Additional findings on employment show that foreign-owned firms employ between 10% and 





correspondingly found to be between the same range, with foreign-owned firms employing 
between 8% and 10% more white-collar workers (Foster-McGregor et al., 2013: 19). 
The systematic differences between Cluster 1 (largely domestically-owned firms) and Clusters 
2,3 and 4 (largely foreign-owned firms) were also revealed consistently when, in a bid to 
perform robustness checks on the results, I additionally applied the clustering algorithm on: 
• Firms from four individual economies with large numbers of sampled firms but excluding 
Uganda; 
• Firms from low-income economies and lower middle-income economies separately; and  
• Firms using all other variables except firm ownership status (fdi_stake). 
The clustering results for these three segments of analysis are comparable to findings from the 
main results. On Tables 3F1 to 3I2, shown in the appendices, it is evident that results from the 
four individual country analyses are relatively similar to the main clustering results. In each 
country analysed, Cluster 1 is composed mainly of domestically-owned firms. Firms in this 
cluster are more likely to be different from the rest of the clusters along most variables, the 
only exception being some outlying clusters. Specifically, firms in cluster 1 for each country 
are predominantly domestic and the average values for the cluster along the selected 
performance variables are lower than those of other clusters that contain largely foreign-owned 
firms. These country-specific results also confirm findings from chapter 1 which were based 
on Uganda. 
On Tables 3J1 and 3K1 in the appendices, clustering results for low-income economies and 
lower middle-income economies respectively are shown. In both tables, Cluster 1, which is 
composed of mainly domestically-owned firms, is associated with real mean values that are 
either lower or equal to those of the overall group averages which are shown in the last rows 
of the tables. When compared to the rest of the clusters that are composed of largely foreign-
owned firms, cluster 1, in both tables, posts lower mean values on all performance variables. 
Statistical tests on the differences of group averages between cluster 1 and the rest of the 
clusters indicate that the observed differences are statistically significant. The p-values that 
confirm this result are indicated in Tables 3J2 and 3K2 in the appendices for respectively, low-
income and lower middle-income economies. This implies that even with country groupings 
based on national income status, foreign-owned firms are likely to be clustered away from 
groups consisting of largely domestic firms. And the associated average performances are 





In the third segment, I eliminate ownership stake (fdi-stake) from the list of clustering variables 
and re-cluster firms again using the overall data set. The aim was to confirm whether even 
without this characteristic variable, the algorithm can ably cluster away most domestically-
owned firms in a particular cluster. Once the clusters are revealed, I compute their average fdi-
stake to identify which clusters constitute largely domestically-owned firms and those clusters 
that constitute predominantly foreign-owned firms. Then the average real values for each 
cluster along the selected performance indicators are computed and compared with those of 
other clusters and the averages for the whole group. In Table 3L1 in the appendices, results for 
the four major clusters of SSA without ownership status as a clustering variable are shown. 
The algorithm separates away Cluster 1 with a mean fdi stake of 29%, which is still lower than 
the SSA average of 30.6%. A fdi stake of 29% shows that firms in this cluster are largely 
domestic and the few foreign-owned that might be in this cluster are largely similar to 
domestically-owned firms, which is not surprising. Indeed, in this cluster, majority (66%) of 
the firms are domestically-owned.  This cluster systematically differs from the other three 
clusters (who’s mean fdi stake is above SSA average) along all performance variables. Firms 
in this cluster have, on average, lower real mean values for all variables when compared to 
firms in the rest of the clusters. Table 3L2, in the appendices shows p-values that reveal 
statistically significant differences between the real mean values of cluster 1 and the rest of the 
other clusters along the selected performance indicators. Put in another way, these results 
indicate that clusters with largely domestically-owned firms or with lower mean foreign 
ownership are likely to differ systematically from those clusters with higher levels of fdi stake 
on average. This result is reflective of the main results obtained when the algorithm was applied 
on all firms with ownership status as a clustering variable. This is also an indicator of 
robustness of our findings   
At all four levels of analysis, the clustering algorithm consistently yields clusters of firms, 
which, when analysed, indicate systematic differences in performance along selected variables 
between largely domestically-owned firms in one cluster and largely foreign-owned firms in 
other clusters. This consistently echoes previous findings in Chapter 2 where a narrow, country-
specific data set was used. These results prove that observed performance differences between 
foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms are not simply a reflection of comparisons 
between sub-groups of firms, a feature that holds for SSA as well. It therefore implies that the 
dismal economic performance observed amidst increased foreign investment inflows in SSA 





A key implication of the clustering results without the fdi-stake variable is that the ownership 
characteristic (fdi_stake) tends to influence segmentation more than other variables. However, 
even without this variable, largely domestically-owned firms are clustered together (66%), 
which is significant enough to lend credence to our initial results. The importance of this 
variable in firm segmentation is investigated later in the chapter using CART and for a similar 
justification detailed in chapter 2 earlier.  
 A further essential result to note is that all domestically-owned firms from Uganda are 
clustered in cluster 1, as are other domestically-owned firms from both low-income and lower 
middle-income economies. This implies that domestically-owned firms from Uganda and other 
economies in SSA are relatively homogenous in terms of firm-level characteristics, which 
systematically tends to separate them from foreign-owned firms. Otherwise, Ugandan firms 
and firms from any other economy in the sample would have been uniquely separated and 
hence clustered away by the algorithm. In Table 3.4, we notice from the (last six) columns for 
percentage composition for Uganda and the two World Bank groupings, that in Cluster 1, 
50.7%, 65.2% and 69.7% are firms from Uganda, low-income countries excluding Uganda, 
and lower middle-income countries respectively. This composition further confirms this 
study’s earlier hypothesis that domestically-owned firms in Uganda are unlikely to be unique 
in any way from those in other relatively similar developing economies. This result partly 
answers the fundamental question of this chapter i.e. whether the findings in Chapter 2 about 
Uganda are unique or quite generalizable to other relatively similar economies in SSA and 
around the world. The other implication here could be that the slight differences observed in 
chapter 2 results could be related to data, especially its narrowness.  
3.3.3 Intra-foreign-owned firms’ classification 
The clustering algorithm in this chapter does not only reveal a separation (clustering away) of 
domestically-owned firms (Cluster 1) from foreign-owned enterprises, as discussed above. The 
algorithm also yields three other clusters, which are composed of foreign-owned firms only 29. 
As noted earlier, the three clusters of foreign-owned firms do not only differ from Cluster 1 but 
also exhibit significant differences between themselves. This is what I alluded to as the 
phenomenon of intra-foreign-owned firms’ heterogeneity earlier in one of the study objectives. 
These differences therefore demonstrate firm-level heterogeneity, a commonplace 
 
 





characteristic associated with foreign direct investments in most scholarly studies that have 
employed different methodologies and have analysed different data sets. These heterogeneous 
clusters of foreign-owned firms are presented and discussed below. 
Cluster 2 (4.8%) and Cluster 3 (23.8%) – highly and all foreign, large size/capital intensive 
firms  
These two clusters provide the first segment of the intra-foreign-owned firms classification 
yielded by the clustering algorithm. They both contain only foreign-owned firms but are 
significantly different from each other on all the variables under consideration, including fdi-
stake. This is an indicator of firm-level heterogeneity among foreign-owned firms, which is a 
commonplace empirical finding in numerous studies that use other methodologies for analysis. 
On Table 3C in the appendices, the p-values associated with statistical tests on the comparisons 
of real mean values for all the variables between these two clusters are shown. The p-values 
confirm that these two clusters are significantly different (1% level) from each other on all the 
variables. Significant differences amongst foreign-owned firms might have implications for 
performance outcomes as well. It is possible that different foreign investments are associated 
with varying magnitudes of performance and therefore effects on host economies. This finding 
provides evidence in support of the second objective of this chapter. This evidence is further 
supported when firms are clustered based on a set of variables excluding foreign ownership. 
As revealed by results in Tables 3L1 and 3L2 in the appendices, Clusters 2, 3 and 4 are 
composed of largely foreign-owned firms (with a mean fdi stake above the SSA average) and 
do indeed differ from one another significantly along the variables considered. 
Unexpectedly, in Table 3.4, we notice that Cluster 2 (with a lower fdi-stake on average) is 
associated with higher real mean values than Cluster 3 (with a higher fdi-stake) on all variables. 
Yet ideally the expectation is that the more foreign-ownership stake there is in a firm, the more 
the expected performance, ceteris paribus.  Cluster 3 has firms that are more likely to be entirely 
foreign in ownership and as such they are expected to be associated with relatively higher 
performance values. This cluster has a mean and a median fdi_stake of 99.9% and 100%, 
respectively, unlike Cluster 2 which has a mean fdi-stake of 80.3%. The entirely foreign-owned 
firms are likely to be a result of the complete takeover of domestic firms by foreign investors; 
or of new investments started in a specific economy. The latter case may be associated with 
what is popularly referred to as Greenfield investments. The case for firms in Cluster 2 could 
probably be more associated with mergers and acquisitions (M&As), in which a foreign 





project. If these two modes of foreign investment entry are taken as likely possibilities, then 
the sort of performance contradiction above can be attributed to the ‘cherry-picking ’argument 
associated with Almeida (2007). Foreign investors that usually choose M&As as their entry 
mode (this being the likely choice we are assuming for firms in Cluster 3 and, most probably, 
Cluster 4), usually target or cherry-pick those domestic firms that are already performing well. 
Such performance is usually in labour productivity, wage premiums, and skilled human capital 
(Georgopoulos & Preusse, 2009: 592; Hale & Mingzhi Xu, 2016: 5).  
This rather surprising result can also be attributed to economic policies that spell out the legal 
ownership requirements for foreign direct investments in some of the countries in the data set. 
Whereas there is no limitation on foreign equity for any firm in Mozambique, for instance, the 
reverse is true for Ethiopia. There are several sectors where ownership can only be via a joint 
venture with domestic investors, with the latter having to own not less than a 27% stake 
(UNCTAD-I&PR, 2002:27). Moreover, the capital requirements for joint ventures are lower 
when compared to wholly foreign-owned investments, making joint ventures (M&As) more 
attractive and more likely than greenfield investments, irrespective of how economically strong 
the intending foreign direct investor might be. Highly productive foreign direct investments 
are therefore likely to enter the market through M&As as opposed to Greenfields due to 
regulations in place, hence the likelihood of M&As (Cluster 2) outperforming Greenfields.  
In Zambia, British investors Tate & Lyle, originally started the leading foreign-owned firm in 
sugar production, Zambia Sugar Plc., in 1960. However, the government’s nationalisation 
program dictated that 51% shares be sold to government in 1972, transforming it into a joint 
venture. The Ghana Oil Palm Company in Ghana is another leading foreign owned investment 
in the palm oil industry whose current ownership structure is attributed to government 
liberalisation policies of the 1990s (Sutton & Kpentey, 2012: 37). In Ethiopia, regulatory 
restrictions are even more stringent, as shown by the following quotation: 
“… although the foreign direct investment regulatory framework in Ethiopia is 
more open now than during the 1980s, it is still highly restrictive compared to many 
other developing countries, including those in the region” (UNCTAD-I&PR, 
2002:27). 
Apart from cherry-picking and regulatory explanations, it is also a fact that some leading 
foreign-owned firms in SSA economies are more inclined to serve domestic markets. These 





to serving international markets30. In Zambia, one of the leading foreign-owned investments, 
Hybrid Poultry Farm (Zambia) Ltd, only exports 1–2% of its output (Sutton and Langmead, 
2013: 46). Safintra Zambia Ltd, a South African foreign-owned firm in the building materials 
sub-sector, does not export its output at all. In Ghana, Takoradi Flour Mills, a leading foreign-
owned investment in agro-processing, sells all its output domestically (Sutton & Kpentey, 
2012: 57). Elsewhere, Coast Millers Ltd., a foreign owned firm in agro-processing in Tanzania 
and a key player in the industry, only exports 30% of its output (Sutton & Olomi, 2012: 71). 
In addition, the surprising result can also be related to the kind of sectors where most foreign 
direct investments might be found, especially entirely foreign-owned firms. Ghana in West 
Africa has witnessed high foreign direct investment inflows in mining and oil exploration, with 
the Global Investment Report 2018 predicting continued foreign direct investment inflows to 
Ghana. This prediction is based on massive investments by firms like Italy’s Eni group in gas 
projects. Ghana has most of its foreign-owned firms in Cluster 3. Most firms in extractive 
sectors, such as mining, do not employ large numbers of workers, tend to use less materials, 
and provide low wages. It may therefore not be accidental that such firms, even when they are 
entirely-foreign-owned, are associated with lower values along the performance dimensions 
analysed in this study. In southern Africa, the economy of Zambia presents another case 
analogous to Ghana. The most flourishing sector in Zambia is mining, which is mainly 
extractive, with the country's traditional exports of copper and cobalt accounting for over 70% 
of export earnings. Whereas many foreign-owned investments are found in this sector, 
irrespective of type, firms are likely to exhibit lower employment levels. The sector only 
employs 2% of the Zambian population. In 2014, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
the extractive sector only contributed 11% of employment but accounted for 95% of the 
country’s exports (Transparence & Les, 2015). In Malawi, the sector contributed only 0.18% 
of employment in 2016 (Neumann & Kumwenda, 2017). The sub-section on case study firms 
in some of the countries in the data set lends credence to this claim, having cases in Ghana, 
Mozambique and Kenya, which has the largest number of firms in Cluster 4.  
The relative differences between Clusters 2 and 3, (which confirm the hypothesised 
heterogeneity), together with the surprising result of firms in Cluster 2 (with less foreign 
ownership intensity) revealing superior performance outcomes relative to those in Cluster 3, 
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are consistent across the three levels of this study’s analysis. In the four-individual country-
level analyses, diversity between clusters with foreign-owned firms is visible for all countries. 
In the appendices, results in Tables 3G1&3G2, 3H1&3H2, and 3I1&3I2 indicate that Clusters 
2&3, 2&4, and 4&5 for Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania respectively exhibit  firm-level 
heterogeneity among foreign-owned firms, as well as that clusters with less fdi-stake have 
higher values along those dimensions where differences exist between the clusters. At the third 
level of analysis, where the algorithm clusters separately firms from low-income and lower 
middle-income economies, diversity amongst foreign-owned firms is still consistently visible 
in both categories of economies. In Table 3J1 and Table 3J2 in the Appendix, Cluster 2 and 
Cluster 3 systematically differed. Also, Cluster 2, with lower fdi_stake, posted higher mean 
values on all the performance dimensions, further attesting to the sort of performance 
contradiction noted earlier. A similar picture was mirrored by results in Table 3K1 and Table 
3K2 for lower middle-income economies for about half of the variables under consideration. 
The consistency in heterogeneity and the surprising result is reflective of findings from other 
empirical studies that apply different methodologies in both SSA and elsewhere. In relation to 
heterogeneity, utilizing the World Bank Enterprise Survey data, Pfeiffer et al. (2014) also finds 
firm-level heterogeneity in terms of horizontal productivity effects amongst emerging and 
traditional foreign direct investments in SSA. Elsewhere, Coniglio et al. (2015)  estimate a 
CES production function using MM and OLS methods. In their analysis of wages and 
employment, they find significant dissimilarities between foreign-owned investments from 
developed economies (North) and those from the South (developing economies) in skill 
intensity and wages31. Coniglio et al. (2015) also find Chinese-owned firms employing more 
workers (indicator of firm size) than foreign-owned firms from other countries, a further 
confirmation of diversity within foreign-owned investments. In the same vein, in a study of 
Greek firms by Georgopoulos & Preusse (2009), econometric results indicate that acquisitions 
exhibit specific signs of excellence over greenfield investments in terms of market share, firm 
size, capital intensity and product differentiation. This alternative scholarly evidence supports 
this study’s clustering results regarding the significant differences existing between foreign-
owned investments, the sort of performance contradiction that was found pervading foreign-
owned investments; and it answers the second objective of this chapter positively i.e. whether 
 
 






heterogeneity does exist at firm level as previous study findings established, and whether it is 
more likely among foreign-owned  investments, domestically-owned firms or both. 
In Table 3B in the Appendix, considering that Cluster 1 is composed almost entirely of 
domestically-owned firms, it is noticeable that, out of 435 foreign-owned firms in the lower 
middle countries, 61% were in Cluster 3 and 13% in Cluster 2. It is also visible that, out of the 
401 foreign-owned firms in Uganda, 7.2% were in Cluster 2, and 84.8% in Cluster 3. Lastly, it 
can be noticed that out of about 1475 foreign-owned firms in low-income countries, excluding 
Uganda, 15.4% were in Cluster 2, 64% were in Cluster 3, 20% were in Cluster 4 and only 0.1% 
were in Cluster 5. Cluster 3 has the largest number of foreign-owned firms. Uganda and the 
other two economy groupings, being low-income and lower middle-income economies, had 
respectively the largest percentage of foreign-owned firms in this cluster. This implies that 
foreign-owned investments in Uganda and elsewhere in SSA tend to exhibit homogeneous 
characteristics as reflected along the variables under consideration. From the same perspective, 
it is clear that domestically-owned firms are featured by similar firm-level characteristics in 
Uganda and elsewhere in SSA.  If this were not the case, the Ugandan firms or other country-
specific firms would have been clustered differently. This supports the assertion that, 
irrespective of whether the algorithm is applied to firms from Uganda, to low-income 
economies, or to lower middle-income economies, intra-foreign-owned firms’ differences are 
likely to be consistently exhibited by firms owned by foreign investors; and they are more 
likely to be a cross-cutting firm-level feature across SSA and probably developing economies. 
In summary, the result is not peculiar to any country, including Uganda. This result supports, 
from the perspective of foreign direct investments, this study’s earlier hypothesis that Ugandan 
firms may not be unique, and that the earlier results of Chapter 2 are likely to hold elsewhere 
in relatively similar economies.  
Cluster 4 (6.8%) - moderately foreign, large size/capital intensive firms 
With reference to Table 3.4, It is evident that firms in Cluster 4 are also foreign-owned but with 
a mean fdi-stake of 41.7%. These firms are equally likely to be export oriented on average and 
more likely to be M&As in terms of foreign-ownership categorization if this study’s earlier 
assumption was to be invoked. Although by this study’s operational definition, firms in this 
cluster qualify to be categorised as foreign-owned, they are inherently more domestic in nature 
than foreign-owned firms in other clusters. Despite this domestic leaning feature, firms in 
Cluster 4 post mean real values, which are above the SSA averages for all the variables 





firm level, irrespective of the intensity of such a stake. Table 3.4 illustrates that more foreign-
owned firms’ heterogeneity is prevalent between Clusters 3 and 4, relative to what we see 
between Clusters 2 and 3. These two clusters are significantly different from each other on all 
variables considered in the analysis. Once again, except on the initial investment variable, 
Cluster 4 with less fdi-stake still posts higher mean values than Cluster 3, which is more likely 
to consist of firms that are completely foreign and hence likely to be greenfield investments. 
This result echoes the surprising result discussed earlier, although some available literature32 
tends to support the hypothesis that more foreign-ownership intensity is associated with higher 
levels of firm performance. However, I attribute this sort of performance contradiction to 
probable cherry-picking tendencies as earlier discussed. 
Employee training, a proxy for labour skill intensity, had results for firms in Cluster 4 and 
Cluster 3 partly mirroring the findings of Coniglio et al (2015). These scholars, estimate a CES 
production function using both MM and OLS and find that the presence of a local partnership 
in a foreign-owned firm is associated with a more-skilled worker force (Coniglio et al., 2015: 
1256). Firms in Cluster 4 have more local partnerships33 than those in Cluster 3. These firms 
are therefore likely to offer employee training, something that ultimately enhances the firm’s 
skill intensity for the workforce. Moreover, formal employee training in foreign-owned 
investments in SSA  is still low just as in local firms (Chen et al., 2015). These results are 
demonstrated in Table 3.2 Clusters 1, 2, 3 and 4; and in the p-values in Table 3C in the 
Appendix, confirming the statistical significance of the differences. The correlation matrix in 
Table 3.2 also indicates zero correlation between ownership and training. 
Overall, taking all clusters together, it is noted that firms in Clusters 2, 3 and 4, being the 
clusters with foreign-owned firms, are more likely to be export-oriented, capital-intensive and 
have higher levels of labour productivity. This trinity of firm-level characteristics among 
foreign-owned investments in host economies has  been confirmed by previous empirical 
findings in studies such as Wagner (2005), Rankin et al. (2005), Greenaway and Kneller 
(2007), Bouras & Raggad (2015) and Christos et al. (2016). I mostly found similar evidence in 
Chapter 2, implying that the findings of this chapter support the hypothesis regarding the 
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absence of peculiarities between Uganda and the SSA case and, more generally, developing 
economies. 
3.3.4 Further validation checks on the results  
Apart from using Gower’s distance measure to mitigate the effect of extreme variable 
collinearity on this study’s results, I performed a clustering of variables process. This yielded 
principal clusters of variables which I used to test whether similar cluster solutions could be 
achieved. I investigated this by using the silhouette plot based on the new synthetic variables. 
Using the ClustOfvar techniques, I generated four clusters of synthetic variables. The first 
cluster consisted of six variables, being capital intensity, wage, material per worker, exports, 
labour productivity and sales. The second and third cluster respectively consisted of fdi stake 
and research investment, while the fourth cluster consisted of employment and training. 
In Figure 3.7, graphical illustrations of the cluster dendrogram for the variables (Panel A), the 
stability plot for the partitions (Panel B) and the silhouette plot (Panel C) for the firms clustered 
based on the synthetic variables, are shown. In Panel A, from left to the right, abbreviated 
variables are capital intensity, wage, material per worker, exports, labour productivity, sales, 
fdi stake, research investment, training and employment. Sales are more highly correlated with 
productivity (see Table 3.2) and are equally linked together in Panel A. Wages are more linked 
to labour productivity, but in Panel A are paired with material per worker after productivity is 
clustered with sales. There is a close link between the cluster dendrogram and the correlation 
matrix in Table 3.2. Looking at Panel A, many clusters of variables can be seen; although fdi, 
in particular, constitutes its own cluster once the cluster numbers exceed two. In Panel B, one 
sees the stability plot, with the first highest peak at 4 clusters, just before the break at 5 clusters. 
The higher the peak, the better the structure; however, in this study’s case, I ignore any 
structures after the break as any cluster number beyond five yields more single variable 
clusters, whereas my aim was to reduce redundancy.  
I utilised the four synthetic variables generated by the variable clustering process to cluster the 
SSA firms again, using the Euclidean distance measure but still linking the firms using Ward’s 
method. In Figure 3.7 Panel C, the silhouette plot of the resulting clustering process is shown. 
The ASW in this case is far lower than 0.5; however, it should be recalled that, in this case, 
ASW was measured based on log-transformed variables. The highest ASW was attainable with 
two clusters at slightly above 0.3. A 5-cluster solution, which mirrors this study’s earlier results 





when compared to earlier results. This superiority is because the ASW in this case is based on 
logged hybrid variables. This confirms the validity of the clustering results earlier discussed. 



























3.3.5 Conclusions from the Clustering Results 
In the previous sub-section, I conducted a cluster analysis of firms in SSA. The analysis yielded 
results similar to findings in Chapter 2 but on a much broader data set and for a multi-country 
scope. The analysis revealed not only systematic differences between foreign-owned and 
domestically-owned firms but also intra-foreign-owned firms’ heterogeneity. This empirical 
finding is common in earlier studies on foreign investments which utilised different methods 
of analysis and data sets, often across geographic regions. The element of firm-level 
heterogeneity between foreign-owned firms was not an explicit result in Chapter 2, probably 
due to the size of the data set. This heterogeneity is more likely between groups of foreign-
owned firms that exhibit significant variations in the intensity of foreign ownership and 
exportation. It could be that these two variables are the leading influencers in the segmentation 
process of firms in the data.  
Most importantly, the results in the previous sub-section confirm that such systematic 
differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms are unlikely to be unique to 
a country case (for instance, Uganda), but rather a firm-level feature that is likely to characterise 
foreign-owned and domestically-owned enterprises elsewhere. Additionally, results also reveal 
that firm-level heterogeneity is a feature that characterises foreign-owned investments. As 
other empirical studies have confirmed, the likelihood of firms with less than 100% foreign 
ownership performing better than their counterparts who are completely foreign is high. This 
is consistent at the three levels of cluster analysis. A key explanation for the rather contradictory 
performance differences between partly foreign and fully foreign owned firms as described in 
this chapter is the probable cherry-picking pattern but other explanations are available in the 
literature. 
The percentage difference in sector composition is on average higher in clusters with foreign-
owned firms, with the manufacturing sector contributing a larger percentage than the service 
sector. Cluster 1, with 99.95% domestic firms, has the lowest percentage difference of 11.6%; 
and Cluster 4 has the highest percentage difference at 33.4%. This suggests that foreign-owned 
firms are more likely to be found in the manufacturing sector than the service sector, and that 
there are fewer domestic firms in manufacturing in SSA. This can be attributed to a myriad of 
factors, with technological inadequacy, human capital and resource constraints contributing to 
this. This further reaffirms the hypothetical belief regarding the ability of foreign direct 
investments to contribute to the much-needed structural transformation in developing 





case in Rwanda where in 2013, foreign direct investments were 41% in the ICT sector, 20% in 
the financial and 19% in manufacturing (Chen et al., 2015). 
Most importantly also, the clustering algorithm consistently yielded results with similar 
evidence at three different levels: at SSA-level, for certain specific-country clustering, and for 
separate clustering based on low-income and lower middle-income economies. This shows that 
this study’s results are robust. The composition of various clusters, both at the first and at the 
third level of analysis, attested to the fact that firms in Uganda were not unique to other firms 
in relatively similar economies. The algorithm yielded clusters that indicated homogeneity 
between firms, irrespective of country of location or of whether the country was a low-income 
economy or lower middle-income economy. Therefore, findings in Chapter 2 regarding the 
salient differences between foreign and domestically-owned firms were not specific to Uganda 
but applicable to similar economies elsewhere.  
The clustering results, however, did not show anything regarding the relative importance 
(segmentation power) of foreign ownership stake and other variables in firms’ segmentation, 
or about the consequent formation of clusters. Findings on variable importance in segmenting 
firms form part of the results in Chapter 2, where a country-specific analysis was undertaken. 
I therefore investigated this element of variable importance to ensure consistency in fulfilling 
Chapter 3’s cardinal objective. In this endeavour, I employed a CART analysis technique. 
3.3.6 Classification and Regression Tree Analysis (CART) of SSA firms’ segmentation 
In the previous sub-section, results suggested that, along the selected key performance and 
characteristic variables, the agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm segments firms 
into two clusters at the penultimate stage. It is shown in the cluster dendrogram and the 
silhouette plot, in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 respectively. Additionally, a close inspection of 
the dendrogram showed that before the penultimate segmentation, multiple clustering at the 
third and other preceding stages occurred, appearing visually more concentrated on the right 
than on the left. The penultimate segmentation probably yielded the predominantly domestic 
firms’ cluster, while foreign-owned firms were further grouped into different clusters in the 
rest of the stages.  
Understanding further the variables that hugely informed this clustering process and the 
consequent cluster formation was part of my keen study interest. This would shed light on 
whether ownership status (fdi-stake) plays a significant role in firm classification. 





provides preliminary explanation as to whether or not, the observed systematic differences are 
significantly associated with foreign ownership itself, which exact extent and effect I later 
investigate in chapter 4 of this thesis.  This would further illustrate whether the findings of 
Chapter 2, which attached relative importance to foreign ownership and other variables, are 
robust for the SSA case. This would support my earlier assertion that findings in Chapter 2 
were not peculiar to Uganda but applicable elsewhere by providing additional supportive 
evidence to this chapter’s first cardinal objective. Succinctly, I tried to understand which 
variables had the largest influence on how the algorithm grouped the firms in the data set. The 
visual inspection of the dendrogram only enabled me to speculate on how the clusters were 
formed, not the key variables that informed the process or the influence of each variable. It is 
for this reason that I executed a CART analysis on the SSA data. Classification and Regression 
Tree Analysis, CART, is a simple yet powerful analytic tool that helps determine the most 
“important” (based on explanatory power) variables in a particular dataset, and can aid 
researchers craft an effective explanatory model. Using a splitting rule based on a Gini Index, 
the algorithm solved the maximization problem specified in equation 2.11. While CART is 
infrequently applied in the economics field, this analytical tool and its conceptual fabric is 
firmly entrenched in health research, for the most part in epidemiological and clinical settings. 
I developed regression trees and the most important variables (variables that hugely influence 
the clustering at various stages) were identified. I used rpart, an R package, which generated 
comprehensive results of CART, including variable importance (VIMP) based on percentage 
contribution, or explanatory power, in the segmentation of firms. VIMP of variable 𝑋𝑣 is a 
measure of the increase, or reduction, in prediction, or misclassification, errors on the data set 
if 𝑋 were not available. A large VIMP indicates a variable with classification or predictive 
ability, while a zero or negative VIMP shows non-predictive variables (Ishwaran et al., 
2008:11). Using the rpart.plot package, I produced an illustrative CART tree for visual 
inspection of how firms were segmented. The CART regression model is specified as: 
 as.factor (groups) ~ employment + lbr_prdvty + fdi_stake + capital_intensity + material_pe
rworker +sales+ wage + employee_training + research_investment + exports 
  
In this formulation, the dependent variable groups is the cluster, a categorical variable taken by 







Table 3. 5: Variable importance in segmentation of firms in SSA 
Variables Absolute contribution Percentage 
fdi_stake 6983.02 92.0 
Exports 358.41 5.0 
employment 158.87 2.0 
Sales 67.14 1.0 
material per worker 29.67 0.0 
employee training 16.18 0.0 
labour productivity 11.62 0.0 
research investment 2.6 0.0 
Source: Author’s own results based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
With reference to Table 3.5, it is noticeable that fdi_stake had the highest absolute level of 
importance in segmenting SSA firms. This variable accounted for over 90% of the 
segmentation process of firms and for the resulting formation of firm clusters. Exportation, 
employment and sales followed closely, respectively contributing 5%, 2% and 1% to the 
segmentation process of firms in the data set. The rest of the variables, although with visible 
absolute contribution, are associated with 0.0% contribution to the clustering process. In Figure 
3.7, a pruned tree-like visual illustration of the CART results is shown. 
 






In Figure 3.8, in the top box, we see 100% composition of the data set and the total number of 
firms (n = 6497) which are segmented based on the variables selected for analysis. The “yes” 
and “no” options correspond to the left and right branches, respectively, at each segmentation 
stage. By reading from the top34, we notice that at the first, top level of segmentation, firms are 
segmented based on their foreign ownership intensity (fdi_stake variable). At this stage, 4184 
or 64% of the firms were clustered away on the left. These firms were very homogenous along 
the majority of variables but were hugely similar because their fdi_stake was less than 7%. The 
two foreign-owned firms clustered in this group are more likely similar to domestically-owned 
firms along the rest of the variables than other foreign-owned firms are. The mean fdi-stake of 
these two firms is 15%, below the SSA mean value of 30.6%, only one of them exports, neither 
invested in employee training or R&D, and they were also less capital intensive; all of which 
are features of most domestic firms.  
It is shown that after the top-most segmentation, Cluster 1 was further segmented, based on 
labour productivity. However, even this second segmentation is negligible when considering 
the fact that the variable, which accounted for the split at the node, was rated at a VIMP of 
0.0%. Indeed, after this split, only 8 firms (0%) are clustered away to the right. This is an 
indicator of their (domestically-owned firms) homogeneity at that stage relative to the foreign-
owned firms on the right-hand-side (RHS) of the tree. Segmentation of firms on the RHS at the 
second stage was still based on foreign ownership intensity, with those having a minimum of 
62% fdi-stake segmented to the left and those below 62% clustered to the right. Firms with fdi-
stake of at least 62% but less than 96% were clustered to the left at the next stage while the 
totally foreign, likely Greenfields investments with fdi-stake more than 96%, were clustered 
away to the right forming a cluster of 1542 (24%) firms. Those firms with less than 62% fdi-
stake were later segmented based on lower foreign ownership intensity, employment, 
exportation potential, sales and other variables to yield further clusters. Some of these variables 
may not appear on the CART tree diagram due to pruning to reduce the size of the tree. 
Significant to note is that exportation is not an important classification variable between foreign 
and domestically-owned firms, but it is within foreign-owned firms. This finding may be 
attributed to the fact that some foreign investors target markets in host economies, making them 
 
 





foreign domestic-oriented firms, while others target regional markets as well as the local 
markets in host economies. Available empirical literature on foreign direct investments 
suggests that most foreign direct investments in SSA, especially in manufacturing, are majorly 
market-seeking (Chen et al., 2015; Henley, Kratzsch, Külür & Tandogan, 2008: 13). 
In this CART analysis sub-section, more insights are shown regarding how the clustering 
process segmented firms. Above all, I established the relative importance of variables in the 
process of segmenting firms in SSA. I therefore provided more evidence regarding the 
hypothesis that firm ownership status (being foreign or local) has the greatest separation role 
in firm clustering. I also showed that exportation is more of a separating variable between 
foreign-owned firms themselves than between domestically-owned firms and foreign-owned 
firms. These results echo the finding of Chapter 2 where a smaller country-specific data set 
was analysed.  
The quantitative analyses in the previous two sections (cluster and CART analyses) provide 
further evidence on the factors that are likely to be associated with foreign investments, as well 
as on how these factors systematically distinguish foreign-owned firms from domestically-
owned firms. Specifically, findings so far reveal that even in the SSA case, observed 
performance differences between foreign and domestic firms are likely to be due to ownership 
status and not mere subgroups/sectors where these firms are anchored. These findings tend to 
imply that variations in firm-level performance are likely to be associated, to a recognizable 
extent, with the structure of firm ownership. Ownership is more of a structural characteristic 
variable and findings so far may not tell whether the observed differences are solely (or to 
which extent) attributable to ownership status. As opposed to the current multivariate 
exploratory investigation, this calls for causal analysis, a key inquiry endeavoured in chapter 4 
of this thesis. Also, noticeable so far is that some implications derived from findings of cluster 
analysis, especially on intra-firm differences among foreign-owned firms, are premised on how 
foreign ownership might have resulted. This context, other than being assumed based on the 
level of foreign-ownership stake on average in a particular cluster, is not reliably confirmed by 
my analysis. By implication then, unless otherwise, results and associated conclusions 
especially on firm-level heterogeneities, are unnecessarily subject to circumspect interpretation 
and application. On these grounds, I attempt to add credence to this chapter’s findings and 
inherent implications by undertaking a qualitative case study analysis of carefully selected 
foreign-owned firms in SSA. These cases, selected from countries that form part of the data set 





SSA, how performance usually evolves over time after foreign investors gaining stakes in local 
firms or after setting up new plants in case of Greenfield investments. The thought was that 
having contextualized how ownership does come into existence, how performance of such 
firms has evolved overtime, and possible challenges faced, the observed varying average 
performance and effects of firms will be easier to envisage. This lends more credence to my 
findings and conclusions. In the next section, this analysis follows;   
3.4 Case Study Analyses 
In this analysis, I selected case studies representative of all key sub-regions of SSA. Cases of 
firms that were originally domestically owned but later acquired by foreigners were historically 
traced. The aim was to answer questions related to; how foreign ownership emerged and what 
kind (merger, acquisition, or greenfield), circumstances that led to kind of ownership, and how 
performance evolved especially after; acquisition, merging or first-time establishment of the 
firms in question?  In a further step, these firms were integrated in my clustering algorithm to 
confirm whether they would be clustered in the expected groups. Apart from Lafarge Cement, 
all the analysed firms were grouped as expected. Following is a case-by-case analysis. 
3.4.1 Ghana Rubber Estates Limited (GREL) 
GREL is a natural rubber-producing firm in Ghana. It is 60% foreign owned and 40% locally 
owned. GREL’s ownership mix qualifies it as a foreign-owned firm but with partial foreign 
ownership. This enterprise is therefore similar to the majority of firms analysed in the cluster 
analysis section. The similarity was further confirmed when, using firm-specific data for 
GREL35 in 2010, I ran the algorithm again, resulting in the firm being grouped in the fourth 
cluster. In Ghana, the firm accounts for close to 95% of the total natural rubber produced 
(Sutton & Kpentey, 2012). GREL’s position in the sub-sector and its similarity to firms studied 
in cluster analysis make it a suitable case study to examine. Moreover, GREL’s output is largely 
exported both within and outside Africa, giving the firm a good feature (export status) that is 
associated with most foreign-owned firms in the literature.  
The current GREL was a culmination of government’s nationalisation policy and consequent 
take-over of a small (923 hectares) private plantation established by R.T Briscoe. Briscoe was 
a Ghanaian entrepreneur. The private plantation was established in 1957 at Dixcove. Under the 
 
 





nationalization policy, the private plantation was transformed first into the Agricultural 
Development Corporation (ADC) and later (in 1962) into a State Firms Corporation (SFC). 
This process turned the formerly private firm into a purely state-owned enterprise. However, 
financial constraints, emerged, forcing the government of Ghana to look for a capable financier. 
Firestone Tyre Company of the USA took on this role. This led in 1967 to the formation of 
GREL as a joint venture firm owned by the state and Firestone.  
In 1990, Firestone sold its shares to the government (Sutton & Kpentey, 2012). This transaction 
once again transformed the enterprise into a purely state-owned enterprise. During this period, 
the enterprise entered a period of drastic decline, and plantations were almost abandoned. The 
Ghanaian state, however, agreed to a financing agreement with Agence Francaise de 
Development. The agreement ushered in proper management and culminated into the 
rehabilitation of the rubber plantations. The agency was also meant to construct a new rubber 
processing plant at Apimenim36. However, starting from the late 1980s, Ghana embarked on a 
divesture program for some of the state-owned enterprises. Consequently, in 1997, after GREL 
had been rehabilitated, it was privatised, with majority of the stake (60%) sold to Société 
Internationale de Plantations d’Hévéas (SIPH), a French-based company. The state retained 
25% and a Ghanaian firm, Newgen Company Limited, took over the remaining 15%.  
The government’s action prior to 1967 and its policy shift prior to 1997 opened the way for 
participation in the ownership and management of the enterprise by foreign investors. In the 
first phase, Firestone gained ownership of part of the enterprise, while in the latter phase, 
majority ownership was sold to SIPH. In both cases, foreign ownership was associated with 
performance benefits for the enterprise. During Firestone’s ownership reign, GREL inherited 
about 39 000 hectares of plantation. However, from 1988, planting of additional hectares of 
rubber was embarked upon to boost output. And although Firestone had left by 1996, 4 000 
additional hectares of rubber plantation were in place  (Sutton & Kpentey, 2012). Foreign 
acquisition of the enterprise by SIPH further improved its performance. Through collaboration 
with Michelin, SIPH accessed vital technical assistance for the firm. Additionally, this 
collaboration expanded the market for the firm’s output. Michelin is the largest purchaser of 
the enterprise’s output since rubber is a key input in Michelin’s tyre manufacturing activities. 
Improvement in the enterprise’s performance was also exhibited in terms of employment, 
 
 





revenue and output. According to available literature, this improvement, which has been 
manifest ever since partial acquisition by SIPH, continued over recent years. For instance, in 
terms of output growth, GREL’s own and purchased rubber production rose from below 15 
000 tons in 1997 to over 50 000 tons by the first quarter of 2017 (Sicom, 2017a,b). This is 
relatedly confirmed by the enterprise’s growth in revenue from below US$ 10 million in late 
1990s to annual turnover of US$ 41.2 million in 2010 according to (Sutton & Kpentey, 2012). 
By the first quarter of 2017, the firm’s sales reached 54 000 tons, yielding a turnover of €94.7 
million (Sicom, 2017a).  
In an attempt to probe what has accounted for GREL’s performance since the takeover of its 
partial stake by SIPH, several factors can be singled out. These factors can be categorised as 
firm-specific factors, factors related to domestic economic policy in Ghana and natural factors, 
given that GREL is anchored in the agro-industrial subsector. However, firm-specific factors 
are most pertinent to our study. 
In terms of firm-specific factors, the majority owner of GREL, SIPH, is one of the largest firms 
in production and marketing of natural rubber globally, and is a leading firm in Africa. SIPH’s 
global size and leadership in Africa is manifested in its turnover and international presence. 
For instance, SIPH group had a turnover of €422.3 million in 2011 (Vignes, 2012: 11).  Besides 
the group’s business in France and Ghana, SIPH has other affiliates in other African countries, 
namely Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Nigeria. This gives the group reliable economic potency to 
leverage in order to ensure smooth operations in its affiliates like GREL. Foreign-owned firms 
have been known to be technologically superior compared to domestically-owned firms in host 
economies. Acquisition by SIPH provided GREL with the vital technical expertise that forms 
the foundation of any manufacturing firm in any sector. Currently, Michelin provides this 
technical prowess. 
SIPH sells most of its output internationally, with Michelin as the largest buyer. This 
characteristic accords GREL export status, a position that typifies many foreign-owned 
investments. As a largely export-intensive firm, GREL’s performance can thus be linked to its 
export status. Exportation is aided even further by the nature of GREL’s product. Rubber is 
one of the most commonly used goods in almost every industry. Its use ranges from tyre 
manufacturing to aviation, education, sports, health and engineering, all of which ensures ever-
rising demand globally. For instance, global consumption of natural rubber increased by 5.2% 





Producing Countries (ANRPC) report for 2018. Rising global demand is a factor that favours 
export-oriented firms like GREL that serve global markets. Numerous empirical findings in 
studies such as (Njikam, 2018: 7) confirm that exporting firms post higher levels of 
performance. Some of these empirical studies37 have specifically been conducted on Ghanaian 
firms. Cluster results in the previous section also tend to suggest the same.  
Besides firm-level characteristics, the probable role of natural climatic conditions and physical 
resources cannot be ignored regarding the enterprise’s performance. This is because the key 
input in the firm’s production processes is agricultural in nature, and climatic conditions and 
other related natural events therefore play a key role. Barthel et al. (2008) analyse the 
characteristics and determinants of foreign direct investments in Ghana. Among their empirical 
findings is the significance of natural and physical resources in attracting foreign investment 
in Ghana. From the policy perspective, liberal market policies by Ghana coupled with political 
stability over the years has enabled private sector growth and first-rate performance of firms 
like GREL. 
 3.4.2 Lafarge Cément Zambia (LCZ) Plc 
LCZ is a cement-producing firm in Zambia. It is 84.5% owned by LafargeHolcim group of 
France. Its partial foreign ownership status is a reflection of many of the firms in the data set 
used in cluster analysis for this dissertation. Additionally, LCZ is anchored in one of the major 
sectors of the Zambian economy, being the mining and extractive sector. Relative to GREL’s 
rubber, the product produced by LCZ cannot easily be exported given its bulk nature. This 
makes LCZ an instance of a partially-foreign-owned firm that is likely to be less export-
intensive but that probably has other features of foreign investments common in the literature. 
We use actual data on selected variables for this firm38 and feed them in the algorithm. The 
algorithm clusters this firm away from the rest, forming a single-element cluster. This probably 
is indicative of this firm’s uniqueness. LCZ’s ownership mix, sector type and likely export 
status are some of the elements that make it an appropriate case to examine in the context of 
this study. 
The current LCZ was originally a state-owned firm called Chilanga Cement established in 1949 
(Sutton and Langmead, 2013). The chief aim of establishing Chilanga Cement Factory was to 
 
 
37 See Abor (2011): ‘Does export status and export intensity increase firm performance?’ 





supply cement for the construction of the Kariba Dam wall. Cement production commenced in 
1951.After nearly two decades, a second plant was constructed at Ndola in 1969. By 1970, 
deficiencies in the country’s strategy of state ownership of enterprises and direct involvement 
in economic activities had begun to emerge. These deficiencies were worsened by the 1973 oil 
crisis. This led to a re-thinking of the state-ownership strategy, paving way for 
denationalisation of state-owned enterprises. As a result, Chilaga Cement firm was 
denationalised in 1994, with the majority stake acquired by the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation (CDC). This policy action ushered in the first foreign ownership entity in the 
Chilanga’s ownership mix. CDC formed the Pan African Cement (PAC) in early 2001, which 
had ownership stakes of 50.1% in Chilanga Cement, 75.2% of Portland cement in Malawi and 
58% of Tanzania’s Mbeya Cement respectively (Sutton and Langmead, 2013). CDC acquired 
the above ownership stakes as part of the divesture programs for state-owned enterprises of 
each respective governments. In 2001, Lafarge Group acquired PAC from CDC, and in 2007 
changed the name of the Zambian firm (Chilanga) to LCZ. Lafarge Group currently owns 
84.5% stake in the firm. 
Foreign acquisition of Chilanga Cement was and continues to be associated with improvements 
in the enterprise’s productive capacity and general performance. This was very evident with 
the takeover by Lafarge. Improvements in the enterprise’s performance manifested in areas of 
product development, employment growth, enhancement of production capacity, increased 
sales (and hence turnover), and corporate social responsibility (CSR).  In 2003, LCZ launched 
the firm’s flagship general-purpose cement brand, Mphamvu. This was followed by 
establishment of another plant, Chilanga2 Factory, at an investment outlay of US$ 120 million 
in 2008 in order to meet growing domestic demand for cement. As a result, the firm’s 
productive capacity increased to a magnitude of 1 300 000 metric tons of cement per year 
(Sutton and Langmead, 2013). 
Between 2010 and 2014, LCZ undertook further product development, launching over three 
new products. These included: Powerplus to cater for heavy construction needs; Supaset, a fast-
setting cement to cater for concrete product industrialists and block architects; RoadCem for 
road construction; and WallCrete for masonry uses39. These various products underscored 








productivity changes experienced by the enterprise after foreign acquisition by Lafarge. 
Moreover, in the same period, a new aggregates plant was commissioned at Mapepe, further 
enhancing the productive capacity of the enterprise. 
 Reflecting the findings of most studies on foreign-owned investments, LCZ prioritised 
research and development expenditure. This probably explains the firm’s success in product 
development highlighted above. In 2014, LCZ commissioned its first concrete products 
laboratory in Zambia shortly before launching PowerCrete cement, specifically for use in the 
mining industry. In the area of CSR, in 2015, the firm established Lafarge Foundation Zambia, 
and Lafarge Zambia Plc officially became a member of LafargeHolcim Group. These 
milestones in the life of the enterprise attest to the effect that foreign acquisition probably had 
on its performance. Figure LCZ1 shows trends in selected performance indicators of LCZ. We 
illustrate trends in five performance indicators three years before Lafarge’s acquisition and 
sixteen years after the acquisition. In the figure, employment is measured in hundreds of 
workers, output and sales of cement are in thousands of tons, capital investment captured by 
the value of equipment, plant and machinery is measured in billions of Zambian Kwacha.  
 
Source: Author’s own illustration based on Lafarge Cement Zambia Plc annual reports 
Figure 3. 9: Trends in some performance variables for LCZ, 1998 - 2017 
In Figure 3.9, it is evident that for at least three years prior to Lafarge’s acquisition of the 
enterprise, sales and output were on a declining trend and capital levels were nearly constant. 
After 2001, we notice a rise in the selected indicators, with capital investment picking up late 

















Trends in selected performance indicators of LCZ before and  after foreign 
takeover





missing data, employment shows an increasing trend from 2004 but begins to decline in 2008 
until it stabilises in 2016. However, capital continues to rise over the years as output increases 
too. This is suggestive of the firm’s inclination to capital-intensive production technology, a 
key feature of foreign-owned firms revealed in cluster analysis and most empirical studies. In 
summary, it is clear that the enterprise witnessed a period of improvement after acquisition by 
Lafarge.  
The case of LCZ and its stellar performance can be associated with both firm-specific features 
and enabling features of the host economy. In the former, pertinent features are mainly those 
of the acquiring foreign firm, Lafarge. In terms of firm-specific features, Lafarge Group is the 
world’s largest manufacturer of cement and roofings, second largest producer of aggregates 
and concrete products, and third largest in global production of gypsum. Firm size has 
empirically been proven to be linked to performance. In 2002, Lafarge Group’s sales amounted 
to €14.6 billion and the Group has presence in over 70 countries globally (Geho, 2018).  
Given its global position, the group has vast experience in the cement industry. Lafarge’s 
takeover of Pan African cement (PAC) from the Commonwealth development corporation 
(CDC) represented the Group’s vast expansion in the developing world, and SSA in particular 
in recent years. This expansion can be attributed to the Group’s intent to fulfil its broader 
strategy, which is both informed by the Group’s economic forecasts of the SSA’s market and 
pivoted on the following: ‘…a focus on countries with empowered local markets, which are 
profit and loss accountable by 2022’.40  
The statement below indicates the experience of the acquiring firm in the industry, its 
management capacity in terms of strategy formulation and forecast, besides its economic 
potency:  
“The four countries that constituted PAC, had by 2000, a combined cement 
consumption of 2.5 million tonnes, which had experienced significant growth in the 
last five years and was forecasted to develop at an average of 4% over the next five 
years”. (Lafarge press release, 2000) 
Economic potency does not only allow foreign-owned firms such as Lafarge to undertake 
required investments but also positions such firms better as far as access to investment finance 
 
 





from lending institutions and at favourable rates is concerned. Domestically-owned firms are 
usually financially constrained. This easy and favourable access to finance is equally echoed 
by Aliber’s theory in this thesis’ subsection of theoretical background in chapter 2. 
Evidence in literature shows that Chilanga was initially performing averagely well as indicated 
by that successive addition of kilns in 1956, 1957 and 1969. Additionally, a new plant was 
constructed at Ndola with another kiln added in 1974 (Sutton and Langmead, 2013). Despite 
these milestones, several setbacks later undermined its performance and disrupted 
sustainability. Such setbacks included management and financial flaws associated with state 
ownership of parastatals. These were coupled with the oil crisis noted earlier. In Figure LCZ1, 
the variables indicate diminishing trends three years before 2001. Such flaws and shocks could 
easily be side-stepped through foreign investment firms like Lafarge, given their superiority in 
terms of finance, management and technology.  
Also, firm-specific to Lafarge is the capital-intensity attribute that is vital to any enterprise’s 
performance in a sector that is more extractive. Cement production is capital-intensive; and in 
this partly-foreign owned venture, the acquiring firm, Lafarge Holcim Group, is a global leader 
in the cement industry with the latest technology and plenty of capital equipment and 
investment funding. In Figure LCZ1, we notice that after Lafarge’s take-over, the value of 
capital outlay takes on an increasing trend, indicative of improved investment in the enterprise. 
As expected, similar movement in output and sales accompanies this trend.  
Away from firm-specific enablers of LCZ’s performance, features of the host economy are 
worth mentioning. Growth in domestic demand for cement from both the government and the 
private sector make Zambia an attractive destination for foreign direct investments targeting 
such a sub-sector. This is more so for firms focused mainly on meeting the commonplace 
domestic demand for cement. Regarding government demand, even the most recent new 
entrants in Zambia’s cement market, notably, Central African Cement Ltd, Dangote Cement 
Industries Ltd, Sinoma Mpande Limestone Ltd and WEYE Construction Materials, among 
others, have hugely been enticed by both the pending and ongoing infrastructural developments 
by the Zambian government. Indeed, available evidence from literature has it that: 
“The recent expansion of Zambia's cement industry is partly fuelled by 
expectations of an infrastructure boom. In order to diversify the economy, 
government is keen on developing key infrastructure such as the Kazungula Bridge 





also in the middle of a national irrigation project to establish three hydroelectric 
dams at Mwomboshi, Chisamba district, Lusitu, in the south, and at Kafulafuta in 
the Copperbelt”  CemNet.com, (Insights, 2018) 
Besides government, private sector demand is also worth mentioning. Private sector demand 
is indicated by several salient features of the Zambian domestic economy, which make it an 
attractive destination for foreign direct investment. With a mixed economy and liberal policies 
towards private and foreign direct investment, Zambia continues to be a hub of foreign 
investments. Foreign direct investments are destined mainly for the mining sector but also enter 
the non-mining sector since the economy is liberalised. Zambia is also endowed with natural 
resources of numerous kinds that form a bedrock for various industrial types. These industries 
provide and maintain a viable domestic market via inter-firm trade linkages. According to 
Zambia Vision 2030 (2006: 10), the main industries include construction, transport, mining, 
manufacturing and agriculture, all of which flourish partly due to natural resource endowments 
of the country but are also likely to use cement as an input for their businesses. 
Specific examination of cement production reveals that it is in the non-mining sector of 
Zambia. Available literature suggests five factors that are largely responsible for increased 
foreign investments especially in the non-mining sector of Zambia. According to Phiri (2011), 
these are urbanization, political stability, growth of real GDP, exchange rate depreciation and 
infrastructural development.  
Growth in real GDP is a measure of the size of the domestic market, a key consideration for 
foreign-owned firms that target domestic sales as opposed to exportation. In the case of cement, 
its bulky nature, which makes transportation difficult, makes it logical that production is 
located in close proximity to the final users. It is also relatively ‘simple’ to produce, not 
requiring inputs that are too sophisticated (although bulky) or rare, and has a straightforward 
production process. If it wants to access a specific market, it thus makes sense for a foreign 
firm to be present in that market rather than exporting to it41. Moreover, besides enjoying a 
mean rate of 5% of GDP growth since 2005, Zambia’s urbanization development has also been 
positive, a factor that has been found to attract foreign direct investments mostly of the non-
 
 
41 This probably explains why as the Zambian cement market promises to grow, new FDIs have opted to locate 





mining type. In Zambia, Phiri (2011: 42) finds that a 1% increase in the degree of urbanization 
results in 8.5 % rise in foreign direct investment inflows in the non-mining sector.  
A notable attendant correlate of urbanization in developing economies is housing shortage, 
which is also typical of Zambia. Zambia is faced with a critical shortage of housing and an 
enormous housing backlog currently estimated at about one million units (Zambia 
Government, 2006: 23). Urbanization growth coupled with housing shortages ensures domestic 
market availability for cement-producing firms like Lafarge to flourish. However, the role 
played by growth in domestic demand in enabling firms like LCZ to perform exceptionally 
well may not be peculiar to the Zambian economy. It might be reflective of the production and 
consumption dynamics that generally characterise the global cement industry. 
“…globally, many of the producing nations utilize their cement for internal 
consumption within the growing local market and export markets tend to be 
regional in cement trade, but with significant variance in country concentration 
relative to local production”  (Selim & Salem, 2010: 3)    
       
Such global dynamics probably also influence the locational decisions of cement producing 
firms like Lafarge. With forecasted growth in regional demand as noted earlier, expansion in 
SSA is probably what made economic sense and informed the locational decision of Lafarge. 
3.4.3 Maragra Acúcar SARL (MAS) 
MAS is a sugar-producing firm in Mozambique. It is 76% foreign-owned by Illovo Sugar 
Group, which is headquartered in South Africa. MAS’s ownership status provides another 
study case that is at least comparable to firms in Cluster 3 of the previous sub-section. This 
firm, however, provides a case of a foreign-owned investment that is different in terms of 
origin. Foreign ownership acquisition in this case is by a foreign investing firm from a similarly 
developing economy (South-to-South foreign direct investment) as opposed to the previous 
cases where investors originated from the developed economies i.e. North to South foreign 
direct investments. The choice gives chance to explore heterogeneities if any. Besides, MAS 
is an enterprise dealing in a product, which is relatively technologically less intensive, and 
relative to cement, can easily be exported. 
MAS was originally known as Maragra Marracuene Açucar; and was founded by the 
Portuguese Petiz family in 1968. Sugar production, however, started in 1970. Initially the firm 





At the eve of the country’s independence, however, the firm was nationalised. Just as in other 
SSA economies where nationalisation policies were embraced, such as Ghana, Uganda and 
Zambia, flaws in public sector enterprises’ management started to emerge. In the case of 
Maragra Marracuene Açucar, these flaws led to total termination of sugar production 
operations at the firm in 1984. In the late 1980s, Mozambique adopted liberal reform policies, 
probably to tackle the nightmare of public sector enterprise management and resuscitate the 
economy. In 1992, Maragra Marracuene Açucar was denationalised and re-acquired by the 
original owners. In order to revive the firm’s production operations, the original owners sold 
50% of the stake to Illovo Sugar Limited (ISL). This was later followed by a rebranding and 
consequent birth of the current Maragra Açúcar SARL in 1997.  
Just as in the previous case studies, foreign acquisition was associated with significant benefits 
to the acquired enterprise. In the case of MAS, an expansion programme that catapulted the 
enterprise’s productive capacity and general performance followed acquisition of part of the 
stake in the firm by Illovo. The programme undertaken in 1999 entailed expansion of cane 
plantation acreage to a magnitude of  4000 hectares and building of a new factory worth US$55 
million (Sutton, 2014: 82). However, a flooding disaster that destroyed the entire plantation a 
year later prompted ISL to invest an additional US$ 15 million. This enabled the re-
establishment of the plantations in 2001 with extra acreage which totalled 6 300 hectares 
(Sutton, 2014: 83). This investment expansion attests to the resilience of foreign-owned 
investments to both financial and non-financial shocks alluded to earlier. This investment 
programme translated into increased output by the enterprise in terms of both cane and sugar. 
In 2001, the firm processed 139 000 tons of cane and outputted 16 000 tons of sugar. In the 
following year, the firm produced 412 000 tons of cane and 50 000 tons of sugar respectively 
in 2002 (Sutton, 2014: 84). In terms of sugar production, the firm registered an over 200% 
increase. Within only two years, the firm had surpassed the previous record (44 100 tons) of 
sugar produced by the original enterprise before acquisition by Illovo. In figure 3.10, we notice 
that after rebuilding the infrastructure, sugar production at the firm took on a positive trend, 







Source: Author’s illustration based on figures from ISL integrated annual reports 
Figure 3. 10: Annual production of sugar by MAS, 2001–2016 
 
The performance of MAS illustrated in Figure 3.10, and which improved almost exponentially 
after Illovo’s acquisition, can be associated with several factors. Just as in the previous cases, 
such factors may range from natural factors, like climatic conditions that favour cane growing 
in Mozambique, economic policy, and market conditions, along with firm-specific features 
enhanced by Illovo Sugar group’s strengths above all. As an agro-based enterprise, the 
availability of favourable climatic conditions for cane growing in Mozambique was favourable. 
A review of ISL reports over the past fifteen years reveals the role played by climatic conditions 
in cane yields and, consequently, tonnage of sugar produced. Deviation between tonnage of 
cane and sugar produced is accounted for by the sucrose levels in the cane. The sucrose levels 
in the cane are in turn contingent on the climatic and weather conditions that characterise a 
particular season. 
In terms of market and economic policy conditions, Mozambique’s openness crucially affected 
the exportation capacity of firms like MAS and consequently its productivity. Coupled with 
bilateral and multilateral international trade agreements with the EU, US, COMESA and SADC 
countries, Mozambique provides prospective foreign investments with a wide international 
market. Under such enabling conditions, export-oriented firms like MAS have a good chance 
of flourishing. 
However, natural and market conditions discussed above are not limited to either foreign or 




























or suffer natural gains or disasters and the economic conditions in the country, then firm-
specific characteristics can be viewed as partly explaining productive premiums of one firm, 
like MAS or a group of firms (foreign-owned firms for instance) over others, especially in the 
same industry, or even across industries. This is truer when comparing firms that have foreign 
ownership vis-à-vis domestically-owned firms as previous results tend to suggest. In the case 
of MAS, ISL, the acquiring firm is globally, a leading, low-cost sugar producer. It is also a 
noteworthy producer of high-value downstream products. The group has extensive operations 
in South Africa and operates a beet sugar factory in the US (Illovo Sugar ltd, 2002: 2). Since it 
can leverage successes elsewhere including the US, the group’s economic and technical 
potency easily overcomes any impediments to production, marketing and related aspects in its 
affiliates. To some extent MAS’ performance improvement after foreign acquisition shows 
how foreign-owned firms generally have similar superiority features vis-à-vis domestically-
owned firms, irrespective of the origin of the foreign investment. 
 
3.4.4 Kamal Steel Limited (KSL) 
 
KSL is a steel manufacturing firm in Tanzania. This enterprise is entirely owned by Gagan 
Gupta, an Indian investor. Its ownership nature differs from the earlier case studies, which are 
partially foreign-owned. This distinction makes KSL another suitable case study for 
examination as an enterprise comparable to firms in Cluster 4.  
 
Gagan Gupta set up KSL in 2004, with full production commencing in 2005. Gupta was an 
Indian tourist who had come to spend a family vacation in Tanzania and decided to set up the 
firm after a meeting with a Mr Salgar, which took the form of a detailed enquiry about the steel 
industry in Tanzania. The resulting enterprise, which turned out to be a horizontal foreign-
owned investment, was a typical reflection of innovative entrepreneurship mind and skills of 
Gupta:  
“It was my first trip to Africa. Then as a businessperson, I became interested in 
steel because we are involved with steel in India. I went to some individuals who 





the prices were like. I spotted a large gap between the raw material and the finished 
product”42 
 
Besides entrepreneurial instincts, Gupta had prior hands-on experience in steel production. He 
started as a steel stockholder in the Agra area in India under the name Kamal Enterprises in 
1993. In 1997, he decided to join India’s manufacturing sector, setting up a steel furnace to 
produce steel from recycled scrap (Sutton & Olomi, 2012). In the 1990s, Kamal Enterprises 
became the first firm in India to manufacture steel from sponge iron. By the time Gupta started 
his Tanzanian venture, Kamal Enterprises was a deep-rooted steel producer in India (Sutton & 
Olomi, 2012). 
  
Probably in affirmation of foreign investments’ features, KSL grew rapidly after it commenced 
production in 2005. In 2007, KSL launched its second steel mill and, a year later, an air 
separation plant was set up, which enabled the firm to produce its own oxygen for use in 
production processes. By 2012, the firm was already under the process of setting up a new 
greenfield operation, which was to catapult its production twenty-fold, from  40 000 metric 
tons yearly to 700 000 metric tons at a magnitude of US$200 million (Sutton & Olomi, 2012). 
In 2016, the firm diversified by launching a TZ Shillings 10 billion factory for refining furnace 
oil in Zinga-Kerege. This is litmus to the growth of the firm over the years since its inception. 
The firm has also diversified into production of industrial and medical gases and power 
generation since its establishment in Tanzania. KSL currently employs over 1 000 workers and, 
by 2012, it had an annual turnover of US$10 million. 
 
Unlike in the previous cases, the rapid growth and performance of KSL can be attributed to 
firm-specific features and economic conditions in Tanzania only. It is worth noting Gupta’s 
prior experience in the steel industry. As indicated earlier, Gupta was a well-established player 
in the steel industry of India before setting up KSL in Tanzania. From a management 
perspective, this experience must have given the firm a competitive advantage over local rivals 









Two host-economy features can be cited as probable contributors to KSL’s exponential growth 
and performance: (i) the growing domestic market and rapid infrastructural development that 
create demand for firms like KSL and (ii) proximity to the Indian Ocean, which makes access 
to the rest of the world easy for exportation. 
 
Throughout the four case studies, it is noticeable that:  
(i) At least two types of foreign investments typify sub-Saharan Africa;  
(ii) Most partially foreign-owned firms have a similar history of ownership dynamics; 
and findings do not agree with the cherry-picking effect. This is, however, not to 
dispel my earlier conclusions. This is because of the fact that almost all selected 
cases were formerly state-owned enterprises which were marred by public 
mismanagement in most SSA economies shortly after independence. This is what 
makes acquisition to be more amenable to negative selection bias. 
(iii) Acquisition of part of the stake by foreign investors in the originally domestically-
owned enterprises improved the performance of the acquired enterprises.  
 
Additionally, at least three categories of factors may be said to account for the improved 
performance of acquired firms. These are; favourable host country economic policies, natural 
factors, and firm-level strength of acquiring foreign-owned firms.  Above all, all the four case 
study firms are quite comparable to firms in clusters two, three and four in the previous sub-
section. The clusters in question are characterised by higher levels of foreign ownership stakes, 
with Clusters 2 and 3 having some firms that are fully foreign-owned. These clusters are further 
composed of large firms, which are also capital-intensive, just as are the selected case studies. 
 
GREL and MAS (Illovo) are two firms that reflect natural resource-seeking foreign 
investments, while LCZ and KSL tend to mirror domestic, market-seeking foreign investments. 
With the exception of KSL, all the cases studied are partially foreign-owned firms that were 
formerly either privately owned by local entrepreneurs or state-owned. The latter ownership 
was fuelled by nationalisation policies in host countries. GREL, LCZ, and MAS exhibited 
stellar performance after foreign take-over: they are capital-intensive, large firms that are 
export-oriented (except LCZ) and highly productive. Their jump in performance and 
characteristics exhibited attest to these cases’ comparability to firms in the previous sub-
section. Furthermore, their characteristics empirically mirror the results and assertions of 





limping (before foreign acquisition) due to domestic management failures. The improvement 
in performance by LCZ and MAS in the early years of foreign acquisition is an empirical 
demonstration of foreign investments’ superiority over locally-owned enterprises, a key 
hypothesis we alluded to in our cluster results.  
 
Besides the natural factors and domestic economic policy reforms that probably favoured the 
performance of the cases examined above, it is worth mentioning key firm-level features of the 
foreign firms that acquired the then-limping local private- or state-owned enterprise. Lafarge, 
Illovo, and SIPH were all superior in their respective fields at the time of their acquisitions. 
They exhibited all the superior firm-level features, of which results are seen to be the key 
performance dimension along which foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms tend 
to differ systematically, according to the cluster analysis results discussed here. The superior 
features of these acquiring foreign firms, such as modern technologies, financial strength, and 
skilled manpower, which might have been transferred to the local subsidiaries, provided one 
mechanism through which such firms may have achieved improvements in performance. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have again confirmed in the preliminary stages of analysis that foreign-
owned investment firms and domestically-owned firms tend to systematically differ on a 
number of performance indicators using a multi-country broader data set. This is similar to 
findings not only in Chapter 2 but also to empirical findings of other studies conducted mostly 
in the developed world. Not only have most of these other studies been based on discriminant 
functional analytical methods where prior assumptions are made, mainly on the distribution of 
the data used, but, most importantly, the majority are country specific, like the analysis in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
In the second analytical stage, standard hierarchical clustering which was applied to group 
firms revealed intra-foreign-owned firms’ classification, hugely driven by foreign ownership 
and export intensity. Statistical analysis of the clusters formed by the algorithm confirmed that 
groups with foreign-owned firms are associated with higher mean values than both the cluster 
with domestically-owned firms and the average for the whole data set. This confirms the 
systematic differences between the two types of enterprises as revealed at the first analytical 
stage. The similarity of this finding to those in Chapter 2 allows us to assert that previous 





phenomenon across foreign and domestically owned enterprises in SSA, and above all, it is 
basically firm-level features that matter (not country, economic group etc) in separating foreign 
and domestically owned investments.  
 
The grouping of two foreign-owned firms in Cluster 1, a predominantly domestic firm cluster, 
is confirmation of the ability of our chosen clustering methodology in identifying firms based 
on the extent of their homogeneity as measured along the selected dimensions. The majority of 
these dimensions are performance-based, while some are more characteristic in nature. The 
ability of the clustering method is further supported by the composition of the outlier Cluster 
5, with both domestic and foreign-owned firms, which are in all likelihood similar on the 
variable dimensions where data is available for the four outlying firms that constitute such a 
cluster. This implies that the choice of the method used was credible, given the empirical 
question that the chapter endeavoured to answer. 
The relative importance of exportation in firm segmentation as revealed by the CART analysis 
at lower levels (not indicated at the tree diagram), tends to support the assertion that most 
foreign-owned investments are export oriented. As other studies have revealed findings 
indicated that foreign-owned firms export more on average compared to domestically-owned 
firms.  Although some target either domestic markets, which usually crowds out domestic 
investments, most foreign-owned firms go for regional markets near host economies or 
international markets for export interests. Indeed, available empirical evidence confirms that 
foreign investments from the Asian sub-continent, especially Chinese firms, are attracted by 
bilateral trade agreements that SSA economies have with the Western world, notably AGOA 
and EBA (Henley et al., 2008: 13). Such trade relations are exploited by foreign-owned 
investments to access export markets at favourable conditions, since SSA economies are 
constrained in meeting the demand in the export market opportunities created by the 
agreements. No wonder, although there are overlaps in terms of aim, such as market, resource 
and efficiency seeking, manufacturing foreign investments in SSA are majorly market-seeking, 
with key determinants being market size and potential (Chen et al., 2015: v). Nevertheless, 
market-seeking foreign investments are more likely to be integrated in the domestic economy 
and assist local suppliers than other forms of foreign direct investments (Farole & Winkler, 
2013).  
Overall, results in this chapter agree with both findings in the previous chapter and findings 





chapter, is the confirmation that these differences are prevalent amongst foreign-owned and 
domestically-owned firms across SSA, and not unique to Uganda alone. Foreign ownership 
and exportation play a significant role in segmentation. As noted in the previous chapter, this 
exploratory multivariate analysis of data does not provide predictive mechanisms or establish 
causal effects of foreign ownership on performance, but paves the way for the same. By 
classifying firms into groups that can easily be studied relative to each other, discriminant 
predictive methods can be employed to further study the groups. Such causal mechanisms are 
further explored in the next chapter where the causal effect of foreign ownership on firm-level 
performance is investigated using sophisticated econometric methods and panel data. 
 
One of the limitations of this analysis is related to data, the most visible of all being missing 
values just as in the previous chapter. The credible imputations performed have lessened the 
effect of missing data. Additionally, the study utilises UNIDO’s AIS 2010 survey data. The 
fact that these data were collected many years ago means that study results are subject to 
changes in the economic environment in SSA over the years. This implies that these study 
results ought to be viewed with caution but also that further research ought to be conducted 
using more recent data if it is available, if these analyses are to inform better policy formulation 






















Foreign Acquisition and Firm Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
“Evidence from Ghana” 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters 2 and 3, this thesis provided evidence on probable43 and considerable 
performance and characteristic premiums in favour of foreign-owned investments. This 
evidence was revealed in terms of several variables including but not limited to; labour 
productivity, employment, wages, capital intensity, output, and management experience. 
Additionally, this evidence is provided from both a specific country perspective and a multi-
country scenario in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. These findings so far point to, among other 
aspects, likely systematic differences and hence observed average performance premiums 
between foreign and domestically-owned firms in Uganda and SSA. Nonetheless, in the 
available empirical literature, it is a prevalent finding regarding ownership structure and firm 
performance, that firms with foreign ownership tend to perform relatively better than those 
with purely domestic ownership in typical host economies. In the empirical literature, this has 
been partly attributed to our previous evidence i.e. the systematic differences between foreign-
owned and domestically-owned firms (Matthias & Javorcik, 2009: 45). What is until now 
inadequately known, however, especially in SSA, is whether the observed performance 
premiums and hence systematic differences between the two types of firms, are causally 
attributable to firms’ ownership status (and to which extent) or the link is merely correlative as 
scholars like Navaretti et.al (2004) have claimed. It is clear in the evidence provided in the 
previous chapters that although foreign ownership is very important in segmenting the two 
types of firms into numerous clusters, it is also correlated with other variables. Moreover, 
whereas the observed systematic differences and associated performance premiums might be 
less surprising for Greenfield investments when compared to domestically-owned firms, 
foreign ownership arising out of acquisition of formerly domestically-owned firms highlight 
an empirical question regarding the extent to which the resulting performance may be ascribed 
 
 
43 In the previous chapters, I employ exploratory methods, whose results are largely descriptive and not 





to foreign acquisition itself. Whether foreign investors acquire firms that are high-performing 
in the first place (as chapter 3 findings tend to suggest) or whether foreign acquisition in itself 
positively and significantly affects the performance of acquired firms (and hence the observed 
premiums) is a subject that has been inadequately attended to by the previous chapters’ 
analyses. It is the key empirical question, as indicated in chapter 1, which this chapter attempts 
to address. And given that part of the motivation was the scarcity of empirical investigations 
focusing on developing economies especially SSA, this chapter attends to this key issue by 
examining the effect of foreign acquisition of formerly domestically-owned firms on firm-level 
performance, providing such evidence from Ghana, a developing economy in SSA. 
The issue of foreign-ownership premium has been widely studied, especially over the past 
decade. Studies have provided evidence on the effect of foreign acquisition on several firm 
performance outcomes. Some of the available studies in the empirical literature are; Benfratello 
and Sembenelli (2006), Aydin, Sayim & Yalaman (2007), Girma and Gorg (2007a), Huttunen 
(2007), Chari, Chen & Dominguez (2009), Matthias and Javorcik (2009), Guadalupe, Kuzmina 
& Thomas (2012),  Fabling and Sanderson (2014), Weche Geluebcke (2015), Bentivogli and 
Mirenda (2016), and Shrivastav and Kalsie (2018). Most of these empirical studies confirm the 
existence of a positive effect of foreign ownership on for instance; wages, productivity, and 
R&D. Nevertheless, several other studies provide differing findings, indicating that a mixed 
picture of foreign-ownership effect on firm performance exists. For instance, whereas  most of 
the abovementioned empirical studies find a positive and significant effect, Benfratello and 
Sembenelli (2006), using firms in Italy and UK, find that foreign acquisition does not generally 
lead to improved performance of acquired firms. Navaretti, Cooper & Venables (2004) stress 
that much of the available empirical evidence supports existence of a non-causal link but of a 
statistical association between foreign ownership and outcomes like productivity. This 
association is reflective of the evidence this thesis provides so far in chapters 2 and 3. Navaretti 
et al (2004) further state that in much of the causal studies undertaken, performance differences 
between foreign and domestically-owned firms, along variables like productivity, are less than 
in earlier estimations, and are frequently insignificant. Among firms in New Zealand, Fabling 
and Sanderson (2014) find positive effects of foreign acquisition on wages and output but no 
effects on productivity and capital intensity. In Germany, Weche Geluebcke (2015) finds a 
negative impact of foreign acquisition on employment and no productivity impact of the same 
on acquired firms. It is therefore clear that empirical findings still show little consensus 





Besides the inconclusive findings in empirical literature so far highlighted, the majority of the 
studies have been conducted in the developed world or in developing economies such as in 
Asia and Latin America. Such analyses have hardly ever been based on economies in Africa, 
probably due to data limitations, among other impediments. Yet the continent has witnessed – 
(and continues to witness) – a surge in inflows of foreign direct investments in the last decade44. 
Elsewhere, majority studies have mainly focused on the link between foreign-ownership and 
productivity, neglecting analysis of other equally important aspects of firm performance like 
output growth, capital and skill intensity (Matthias & Javorcik, 2009). These are aspects of 
greater importance in developing economies like Ghana’s and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as a 
whole, where inadequate domestic capital and higher levels of graduate unemployment, along 
with other socioeconomic problems, are witnessed. Up to this point, it is clear that it is not only 
the inadequacy of analyses in chapters 2 and 3, which justifies further inquiry, but also other 
aspects namely; inconclusiveness of available findings, biased focus on the developed world 
and limited scope on performance outcomes analysed so far by earlier studies.  
Using a twelve-year-long panel data set on manufacturing firms, this chapter provides further 
empirical evidence on the causal link between foreign acquisition and firm performance. It 
provides this evidence from a developing economy in SSA, being Ghana, focusing on not only 
the usual outcomes of employment, productivity and wages but also on other crucial outcomes, 
like output, and skill and capital intensity. The analysis also looks, equally, at how capital levels 
are affected, despite this not being a direct firm-performance outcome. 
This study aims to contribute to the growing literature on foreign ownership and firm 
performance in a number of ways. Firstly, the available data set enables an examination of the 
magnitude and direction of causal effects of foreign ownership on performance. In this 
endeavour, I have employed both traditional regression methods and matching methods with 
difference-in-differences estimation techniques, to address possible effects of inherent firm-
level heterogeneity and bias due to selectivity on unobservables. Secondly, unlike many 
previous studies, this study does not focus only on productivity and wages, but also on other 
outcomes of firm operations, such as employment, output growth, capital, and skill intensity. 
These other outcomes can, potentially, be influenced by foreign acquisition. We also examine 
the effect of acquisition on one of the scarcest resources at firm level in the developing world: 
 
 





capital. Finally, the study also provides evidence on the effects of foreign acquisition in the 
long run. The effects of foreign acquisition on outcomes like employment and wages may be 
delayed by costs associated with hiring and firing  (Huttunen, 2007: 1). Equally, effects on 
outcomes like productivity and gross output may be delayed by within-plant structural or 
organisational changes. We cater for such delays in our analysis by examining the effects of 
foreign acquisition in numerous periods after acquisition in our robustness checks on initial 
results.  
Besides the availability of data, Ghana’s suitability for this case study is cemented by many 
other reasons. Ghana is one of the developing economies in SSA that shifted from a 
development strategy in which the government led the country’s economic activities to one in 
which the private sector is at the helm. Due to the World Bank’s conditionalities of the late 
1980s and the failure of public sector economic management by post-colonial administration, 
Ghana put in place a divesture programme that saw the sale of government stake in state-owned 
enterprises (SoEs). Although launched before 1990, the divesture process was not successfully 
implemented until several measures were taken by government. These measures were 
implemented seriously in the first quarter of 1994 (Adda, 1996: 6), three years after the 
Regional Program for Enterprise Development (RPED)  survey had started. Moreover, the 
process started with the sale of the least attractive SoEs, with those that attracted the highest 
number of investors being sold in the late 1990s (Potter, 2015: 6). This lends credence to my 
determination that the first acquired firms came into existence around 1994, as will be seen 
later. Foreign investors were highly encouraged to bid on SoE assets; and many enterprises 
were bought by foreigners (Potter, 2015: 8). This confirms that these policy changes 
exogenously shifted ownership of some firms from government or local parties to foreign 
investors.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 4.2, I discuss briefly the theoretical 
guidelines to the study and review the existing empirical literature on foreign acquisition and 
firm performance. Section 4.3 describes the empirical strategy and results from regression 
analysis, while Section 4.4 specifically details the matching methods and associated empirical 





4.2 Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
4.2.1 Theoretical basis 
Analysis in this chapter is guided by two mutually reinforcing theoretical formulations 
concerning foreign ownership and firm performance. It is sufficient to recall that foreign 
ownership in this chapter is limited to ownership arising out of acquisition of a formerly 
domestically owned firm. 
The first theoretical perspective is linked to the general hypothesis of ownership advantages45 
for foreign-owned firms over domestically-owned firms (Dunning, 1980; Hymer, 1960; 
Makoni, 2015).These advantages give foreign-owned firms a competitive edge over 
domestically-owned firms in host economies. These proprietary assets usually take the form of 
new technologies or patents, managerial expertise, superior access to capital, and product 
differentiation, among others. Once these are transferred to the subsidiary (acquired) firms, a 
foreign ownership premium (FOP) is generated, manifested in augmented performance of the 
subsidiary46. This hypothesis implies that the most productive firms within a specific industry 
or sector, are those that are more likely to engage in foreign investment through either setting 
up new plants or acquiring domestically-owned firms (Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2016: 2)47. In 
this study, testing this theoretical perspective requires the identification of the effect of foreign 
acquisition on the post-acquisition performance of the firm in question. 
The second theoretical formulation relates the superior performance of foreign-owned firms to 
ex-ante selection bias. This bias comes from differences in micro-level features of firms that 
are acquired by foreign investors; and bias can either be a result of negative or positive 
selection. In instances of positive selection, foreign investors usually target high-performing 
domestic firms for acquisition, making their post-acquisition performance highly attributable 
to the selection process. Reviewed literature has referred to this as the “cherry-picking effect” 
(Rodríguez & Tello, 2014: 8), an effect that clustering results in chapter 3 also seem to reflect. 
The negative selection perspective posits that high-performing foreign firms may decide to 
acquire underachieving domestic firms and then remove their existing management in order to 
 
 
45 This theory that also guides analyses in the previous chapters is well detailed in chapter 2’s theoretical 
background section 
46 Bentivogli and Mirenda (2016) refer to this as ex-post forward linkages 
47 This is comparable to the operating efficiency theory in management literature, where acquisition is said to arise 
when the acquirer confirms complementarities with the targeted firm in terms of production operations. In this 
case, acquisition is likely to occur for those firms that are performing well. Post-acquisition performance in this 





fully exploit the firm’s potential48 (Bentivogli & Mirenda, 2016: 2). Acquisition of 
underperforming domestic firms can also be the result of information asymmetry about the 
firm’s performance. In this study’s context, this theoretical perspective is tested by an 
examination of the pre-acquisition differences in performance and structural features between 
the acquired firms and those firms that remained purely domestic. 
In order to fully understand whether foreign acquisition has a causal effect (FOP) on firm 
performance, I separated performance differences associated with pre-acquisition factors from 
those related to firm acquisition by foreigners. In this endeavour, I controlled for, among other 
aspects, endogeneity effects likely to arise from the selection process, and unobserved firm-
level heterogeneity that could potentially influence the outcome of interest. This is what makes 
the two theoretical underpinnings conjointly reinforcing in this study.    
4.2.2  Empirical Literature  
The body of empirical literature on the causal nexus between foreign acquisition and firm-level 
performance has been growing over time and is now very topical. Among recent studies on the 
topic is Wang and Wang (2015a), who employ propensity score matching (PSM) and 
difference-in-differences (DID) to investigate the effect of foreign acquisition on local firms in 
China, with a focus on various performance outcomes. Their findings reveal that, relative to 
non-acquired firms, acquired firms showed a post-acquisition increase in real wages, a decrease 
in capital labour ratio, a 10% rise in employment, and gains in productivity.  
Wang and Wang’s (2015a) wage results uphold those of Girma and Gorg (2007a), who found 
positive wage effects of acquisition in the UK for firms acquired by US foreign investors. 
Girma and Gorg also employ a difference-in-differences matching approach in their analysis, 
with their findings revealing substantial heterogeneity in the acquisition effect on wages, 
chiefly associated with nationality of acquirers and workers’ skill groups. Wage results 
mentioned above further corroborate findings by Conyon, Girma, Thompson & Wright (2002) 
who utilise panel data on firms in the UK for the period 1988– 1994, finding that acquired 
firms pay on average 3.4% more than similar domestic firms. They employ a difference-in-
differences method implemented in a regression framework (Conyon et al., 2002: 7).  
 
 
48  This is comparable to “the theory of managerial discipline” in management science, which has it that acquisition 
is a result of natural selection, in which inefficient firms are taken over by new shareholders and undergo 





Using panel data for 1991–1998, Almeida (2007) employs regression and generalised 
difference-in-differences estimation methods to investigate the acquisition effect on wages. 
Almeida’s findings show significant wage increments after takeovers among Portuguese firms. 
Employing both regression and PSM with DID on longitudinal data from Finnish firms, 
Huttunen (2007) finds a significant and positive effect of acquisition on wages in the second 
and third years after takeover. Similarly, in their analysis of foreign acquisition on New 
Zealand firms, Fabling and Sanderson (2014) find significant acquisition effects on wages. 
Acquired firms experience an average of 6 % to 8% increase in wages when compared to non-
acquired firms over a three-year horizon (Fabling & Sanderson, 2014: 13). This scholarly 
evidence confirms the acquisition effects on firm wages.  However, in line with the inherent 
inconclusiveness on this subject, still other studies have found differing results. In attempt to 
study the effect of foreign acquisition on wages and total factor productivity in the years 
following takeover, Bandick (2011) utilises firm-level data on Swedish firms for the period 
1993–2002. In this study, the probable endogeneity of the acquisition decision is handled using 
a combination of instrumental variable techniques and propensity score matching with 
difference-in-differences estimation methods. After addressing firm heterogeneity aspects, the 
study finds no effects of foreign acquisition on wage growths of acquired firms (ibid.). 
The productivity results from Wang and Wang (2015a) echo the findings of Matthias and 
Javorcik (2009) concerning Indonesian firms. Using longitudinal data from Survei Manufaktur, 
Matthias and Javorcik (2009) applied matching methods with difference-in-differences 
techniques and found  statistically significant increments in the productivity of acquired firms 
relative to similar non-acquired firms. Specifically, their findings indicate that acquired firms 
on average post between 10 % and 13.5% more on productivity when compared to non-
acquired firms that were similar in the pre-acquisition period (Matthias & Javorcik, 2009: 47). 
Productivity improvements are prevalent in the acquisition year and subsequent years; and the 
findings are robust to different measures of productivity. Elsewhere, using panel data for 1986–
2008 on Hungarian firms, Earle, Telegdy & Antal (2012) employ regression and propensity 
score matching with difference-in-differences estimation methods to investigate the wage 
effects of foreign ownership. Matching on pre-acquisition data and controlling for fixed effects 
for firms and detailed worker groups, these scholars not only find  an increase of between 12% 
and 28% on average wages but also  that these wage effects tend to rise with potential 
enhancements in productivity (Earle et al., 2012: 16). Their findings specifically indicate a 





Besides the mixed results on acquisition and productivity, where similar effects have been 
found, there are variations in the degree of such effects.  Some other studies have found 
comparatively lower effects of acquisition on firm productivity. Bandick (2011: 14) study of 
Swedish firms using matching methods and instrumental variables reveals only 1%–and 2% 
difference in productivity growth between acquired and non-acquired firms five years after 
takeover. Some studies also find no effect at all on productivity after a change in firm 
ownership. Applying a generalised method of moments (GMM) system estimation method on 
Italian firms, (Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2006) study controls for unobserved heterogeneity, 
measurement errors and input simultaneity but finds  no productivity effects  linked to foreign 
ownership. Similarly, Fabling and Sanderson (2014) utilised matching and difference-in-
differences approaches on New Zealand firms in an attempt to estimate the effect of foreign 
acquisition on firm performance. Their findings indicate that foreign acquisition has no 
significant effects on firm productivity. Combining matching methods and the difference-in-
differences estimation approach, (Salis, 2008) examines acquisition effects on productivity 
among Slovenian firms. Utilising data on firms in manufacturing between 1994 and 1999, study 
findings do not show convincing evidence of positive effects of foreign acquisition on total 
factor productivity for acquired firms over the period considered (Salis, 2008: 1031). Findings 
from Salis’s analysis echo those of Orazem and Vodopivec (2004), who employ regression 
methods to examine firm-level production efficiency in Slovenia for 1994–2001. Their findings 
indicate that changes in firm ownership have no impact on growth in total factor productivity 
(Orazem & Vodopivec, 2004: 24). It is therefore clear that acquisition effects on productivity 
also remain inconclusive, despite it being one of the most investigated performance outcomes 
at firm level. This implies that any further inquiry, as intended by this study, is essential. 
Acquisition effects on employment in Wang and Wang’s (2015a) findings converge well with 
several other empirical studies.  Earle et al. (2012) uses  panel data for Hungary for the period 
1986–2008 and finds positive acquisition effects on employment of about 7% for acquired 
firms relative to non-acquired firms. These findings  substantiate those of Lipsey’s (2008) study 
of  Indonesian firms. Using a panel of firms in the Indonesian manufacturing sector for the 
period 1975 to 1999, Lipsey employs regression and difference-in-differences with matching 
methods to examine employment growth after acquisition. Results indicate an annual 5.6 % 
growth rate of employment for foreign-acquired firms when compared to the always-private 





Post-acquisition growth in employment may be dependent on the path taken by new firm 
owners. If new ownership aims to create new sales opportunities and networks, a rise in 
employment is inevitable; however, if the acquisition is guided by managerial purging and 
restructuring, job losses are likely to occur (Fabling & Sanderson, 2014: 4). Notwithstanding, 
several other empirical findings reveal differing effects of foreign acquisition on firm 
employment. Employing a difference-in-differences methodology combined with propensity 
score matching, (Chari et al., 2009) finds employment declining in acquired firms relative to 
non-acquired firms. Huttunen (2007) examines the effect of acquisition on employment and 
wages for employee skill groups in Finnish firms. Employing regression and propensity score 
matching methods on a panel spanning 1988–2001, findings indicate a significantly negative 
effect on employment for highly educated workers. Maioli, Gong and Yundan  (2007: 24) 
examine the effect of foreign acquisition of SoEs in China using matching methods and 
difference-in-differences techniques. After controlling for growth, they find a 
contemporaneous negative effect on employment in acquired firms relative to those that did 
not change ownership. However, post-acquisition effects are found to be positive. 
Relatively few studies have examined foreign acquisition effects on capital investments, 
output, and capital intensity as firm-level outcomes. One study that examines acquisition 
effects on output is by Matthias and Javorcik (2009). Their findings reveal positive effects on 
output. On average, acquired firms had sales more than 50% higher than in relatively similar 
firms that were not acquired. Increments in output are chiefly attributable to various 
restructuring processes that may entail new technologies and production infrastructure, which 
are usually transferred to the newly acquired subsidiary firm from the parent plants abroad. 
This is supported by the theoretical formulations of the internalisation theory motivated by 
Dunning and other scholars. Further investigation on acquisition effects on capital investments 
by Matthias and Javorcik (2009: 51) finds positive and significant average treatment effects.  
The previous review of empirical literature on effects of foreign acquisition on firm 
performance highlights numerous important issues, which issues point to gaps that this study 
attempts to close. Evident in the review is the lack of consensus on the effect of foreign 
acquisition on studied firm-level performance outcomes. Whereas many studies find positive 
effects, some other empirical findings present differing results, especially regarding outcomes 
like; employment, wages, and productivity. This lack of consensus erases any doubts that 
further inquiry is necessary. It is further evident in the review that firm-level outcomes, 





investigations of the causal link between foreign acquisition and firm performance. These are 
equally important aspect of firm-level outcomes equally likely to be affected by foreign 
acquisition. Analysis in this chapter attempts to focus on these too. In the context of 
geographical orientation, to the best of my knowledge, virtually all studies have focused on 
either East Asian or on more developed Western economies. Focus on economies in Africa is 
scanty or non-existent so far, a gap that this analysis tries to close. Finally, in terms of methods, 
it is also glaring that application of matching methods and difference-in-differences estimation 
techniques is on the upswing in a bid to establish causal effects in the economics field49. In the 
context of this study, the method is appropriate more so as a robustness check, because foreign 
acquisition decisions are largely driven by firm-level features of targeted firms, evidencing 
“cherry-picking”, an aspect that has to be handled carefully if causality is to be identified with 
certainty. This also lends credence to the suitability of the two theoretical orientations chosen 
to guide this chapter’s analysis. Together they cater for pre-acquisition selectivity while 
meeting the endeavour to unmask post-acquisition causal effects of foreign ownership.  
4.3 Empirical strategy 
In the previous literature review section, regression techniques and matching with difference-
in-differences estimation are some of the most popular methods that have been applied in 
studying effects of foreign acquisition on firm performance. Although these methods have been 
used to analyse firms mainly in the developed world, this chapter utilises the same methods for 
analysis of firms in SSA. Regression is used as the main technique of analysis while matching 
is employed for the purpose of robustness checks. These methods are detailed later in this 
section. In order to examine the effect of foreign acquisition on firm-level performance 
outcomes, I have utilised a 12-year-long panel data set. This panel has firm-level information 
covering the period 1991–2002 on a sample of 312 firms anchored in Ghana’s manufacturing 
sector. Collected in six rounds by the World Bank and the Oxford Centre for the Study of 
African Economies under the RPED project, the sample is stratified by sub-sector, size, and 
location of firm. Foreign acquisition was identified through firms’ responses to the disclosure 
statement, “Is this firm under exactly the same ownership and same legal status as it was when 
we visited in … (year)? If not, then describe these changes.” If the description of the changes 
includes sale of some stake (at least 10%) to foreign investors, then the firm was taken to have 
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been acquired. However, all the acquired firms had over 40% ownership stake taken over by 
foreigners. Firms’ responses to this question were used to construct the acquisition variable 
which was a dummy. This implies that acquired firms were assumed to stay in same ownership 
conditions from the time of acquisition to the end of the study period. This meant that no 
reversals were allowed and effects of such in results estimations were not catered for. The way 
acquisition was identified and associated assumptions was dictated by the kind of data 
collection instrument used and the questions therein.  Therefore, all other firms except those 
that were; (i) fully or partially state-owned, (ii) privately owned by local Ghanaians or (iii) 
domestically-owned by both Ghanaians and the state, were dropped. This was because it is 
firms with such structure of ownership that were expected to be acquired by foreigners. After 
dropping some of the firms, 138 firms remained, with 8.7% of these firms identified as having 
been acquired during the study period. I deemed this number of firms and the extent of 
acquisition, being 12 firms, feasible for analysis using my proposed methods50. As earlier 
mentioned, the divesture programme in Ghana had a slow start, and was characterised by very 
low sell-outs until late 1990s, when new measures were put in place. 
On Table 4A in the appendix, the sample composition of these firms is shown. In terms of 
sector composition, the garment sub-sector posts the highest contribution at 21.9%, followed 
closely by metal and furniture. The small-scale, resource-intensive sub-sector (ssrii) is the 
smallest contributor at only 0.7%. More than half of the firms are located in Accra, followed 
by Kumasi with 37.7% of the firms in the sample.  
In Figure 4.1, the treatment variation plots for the sample51 are shown. The plots have firm 
identification numbers on the vertical axis and time (in years) on the horizontal axis. The upper 
panel shows treatment variation among large firms52, while the lower panel shows treatment 
variation among small firms. The red patch shows firms that were acquired by foreign 
investors, according to their response to the statement outlined earlier. The blue patch relates 
to those firms that did not change ownership during the study period. From the panels, it is 
noticeable that most firms changing ownership were acquired in 1998, followed by those that 
changed ownership in 1994, with only two or three firms changing ownership between 1996 
 
 
50 See studies by Earle et al (2012) using 1.78% treated firms, Abadie et al. (2012) with 2.63% treated firms, 
Fabling and Sanderson (2012) with 0.3% treated firms, and Bentivogli and Mirenda (2016) with 0.17% treated 
firms. 
51 Generated using R package PanelMatch. 





and 1997. This is more clearly revealed by the overall plot in Figure 4A in the appendix. It is 
also noticeable from Figure 4.1 that treatment is prevalent for the most part in large firms with 
only one small firm being among the treated. Prevalence of acquisition being more evident 
among large firms is yet another pointer to probable selection bias alluded to earlier. From the 
plots, it is further evident that there is a bigger pool of control firms to pick from for the 
matching stage of the analysis. 
 
 





In Table 4.1, the descriptive panel summary statistics for the sample are shown comparatively 
for firms that were acquired by foreigners and those that remained domestic throughout53. 
Except for firm age and skill intensity, the rest of the variables are expressed in log form. In 
the last column, p-values are associated with the “raw” differences between the group means 
of the acquired and non-acquired firms in the sample54. It is evident that the “raw” means 
between acquired and domestic firms are significantly different for numerous variables. 
Table 4. 1: Descriptive statistics for key variables for acquired and non-acquired firms 
Variable Overall Mean Overall Standard Deviation  
 Acquired Domestic Acquired Domestic P>|t| 
Employment 4.29 2.83 1.73 1.26 0.01 
Wage 10.34 9.99 0.38 0.40 0.00 
Productivity 14.74 13.89 1.60 1.25 0.13 
Output 19.06 16. 47 3.13 1.94 0.03 
Skill intensity 0.26 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.08 
Capital 18.30 15. 92 3.05 2.74 0.00 
Firm age 21.96 17.74 4.00 11.57 0.51 
Source: Author’s own computations based on sample data 
In order to achieve my investigative objectives, I employed both regression and matching 
methods with difference-in-differences estimation techniques. Regression formed the main 
component of the empirical strategy while matching was used for robustness checks on the 
core results. 
4.3.1 Regression methods 
On Table 4.1, it can be noted that the descriptive statistics on key observable variables for the 
acquired firms and the non-acquired firms reveal differences between the two groups in the 
sample on most variables. This is an initial pointer to the probable selectivity regarding the 
foreign acquisition decisions of target firms. In most cases, foreign investors select their 
acquisition targets based not on chance but on specific criteria (Weche Geluebcke, 2015: 746). 
This lack of randomness in the foreign acquisition process of firms is of great concern when 
 
 
53 We generate these summary statistics using the “xtsum” stata command and report the overall means and 
standard deviations. 
54 Generated by “reg outcomevar fdi, vce (cluster firm)” to sidestep difficulties in conducting T- tests on group 





estimating the causal effects of foreign acquisition on firm performance. I tried to control for 
any other observable and unobservable differences among firms by taking merit of the panel 
structure of the data. In the first stage of regression methodology, I estimated a pooled ordinary 
least squares (POLS) regression, which sets the standard for the separation of causal effects 
from the bias arising from selectivity and possible endogeneity. In the POLS, I regressed each 
key performance outcome against 𝐴𝑖𝑡 , an acquisition dummy equal to 1 from the time a specific 
firm was acquired fully or partly by foreigners, and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable is 0 for 
firms that remain domestically-owned throughout the study period. I then included various 
controls and time dummies.  
However, using the POLS does not solve problems associated with selection bias, possible 
heterogeneity and endogeneity issues. Among its limitations, the POLS disregard the space or 
individual firm effects. This model assumes that all firms are homogeneous in terms of 
dependent variables and that there are no other firm or industry effects on the regressands. Yet 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms, which may actually influence the outcome of interest 
can’t be ruled out easily. As it may be recalled, although not explicitly revealed in chapter 2, 
cluster analysis of firms in SSA, Ghana inclusive, in chapter 3, revealed likely inherent 
heterogeneities amongst clusters with foreign-owned firms. The POLS further assumes that all 
slope coefficients of the X variables and intercepts are identical for all firms in the data set, 
which is unrealistic (Puron-cid, 2014: 205). Such unrealistic assumptions may bias estimates 
(for instance, of the variance for each of the estimated coefficients) leading to incorrect 
statistical tests and confidence intervals (Baltagi, 2005). The likelihood is thus high that the 
POLS may distort the true picture of the relationship between the regressor and the regressands 
across firms if the assumptions are not fulfilled.   
I therefore conducted a second stage of regression analysis, in which I made the first attempt 
to sidestep selection, unobserved heterogeneity across firms, endogeneity issues, and the other 
limitations of POLS mentioned earlier. Endogeneity sources are myriad but mainly arise from 
all observable and unobservable time-invariant variables, which influence both the acquisition 
decision and the outcome variables of interest in this instance. Productivity differentials 
between foreign and domestic firms for example, partly account for higher wages in foreign-
owned firms (Davies & Lyons, 1991). Omitted variables are also a realistic source of 
endogeneity. For instance, in this case, R&D orientation by foreign-owned firms influences 
both output and productivity, yet we do not cater for it in this analysis as no information about 





measurement errors, especially on wages and outright concealment on capital levels to avoid 
tax. Elsewhere, bias caused by simultaneity is equally possible. I note that, whereas foreign 
acquisition can, for instance, lead to higher levels of productivity among firms, highly 
productive firms might have a higher likelihood of being acquired by foreigners, hence positive 
selection. Yet negative selection is equally possible. In the second stage of the regression 
method, a fixed effects (FE) regression model was estimated for each performance outcome. 
One of the conventional ways of reducing the effects of selectivity is causal estimations, is by 
estimating a fixed effects regression model (Mummolo & Peterson, 2017). FE regression 
estimation also reduces problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity across firms in 
estimating causal effects. In a given panel data set, if units of analysis (like firms in this case) 
are likely to systematically differ from each other in ways that may not be observable, which 
differences may affect the outcome of interest, unit effects are often used to eliminate all 
between-unit variation so as to produce estimates of a variable’s average effect within units 
over time (Wooldridge, 2010: 304). I therefore estimated a panel regression with firm fixed 
effects, which relates firm performance outcomes to acquisition status and controls. With slight 
modification, I adopted the following estimation equation as specified in Earle et al. (2012: 6): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛹𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                   (4.0) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡   is the natural log of a specific performance variable for firm 𝑖̇ in year  𝑡,  𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the 
acquisition dummy defined earlier. 𝛹 is the parameter of interest that captures the foreign 
acquisition effect on the outcome variable, while 𝜉𝑡 denotes the 12-year effects. 𝛾𝑖 captures the 
firm fixed effects while 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term. I estimated equation (4.0) for each of the outcome 
variables of interest while excluding any other time-varying covariates that could potentially 
influence both foreign acquisition and the outcome variable. Additionally, I reported robust 
standard errors.  
4.3.2 Empirical results from Regressions 
In Table 4.2, the regression results for both the POLS and FE estimations are shown. The upper 
section of the table holds the results for the POLS estimations. For all estimates firm-level 
results show positive and significant coefficients, after controlling for sub-sectors and year 







Table 4. 2: Effects of foreign acquisition on firm performance-estimates with OLS and   
FE 
Full-sample ols 1 2 3 4 5 6 

























Observations 1323 1500 1295 1297 1343 1210 
Sector-dum Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year-dum Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.273 0.300 0.354 0.349 0.334 0.159 

























Observations 1338 1536 1310 1312 1358 1225 
№ - firms (N) 134 138 131 138 133 137 
Acquired firms 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Sector dum Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dum Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 - within 0.045 0.262 0.026 0.043 0.049 0.035 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Own results based on sample data 
When a fixed effects model is estimated, the estimates are smaller. Results are, however, 
significant for wages, productivity, and output as observed in the lower part of the table. 
Specifically, it is evident that acquired firms tend to pay on average 9.9% more in wages when 
compared with non-acquired firms. The effects on wages corroborates the findings of Potter 
(2015: 8) in which workers in Ghana at former SoEs that were later privatised earned 
considerably more than their counterparts at similar SoEs that were not privatised.  
Foreign-acquisition effects on wages may be explained by various theoretical channels 
including but not limited to efficiency wages to reduce shirking and labour turnover. 
Additionally, after acquisition, within-firm disputes associated with resistance to new changes 
may occur and new managers might respond to this my increasing average wages. Wage 





restructuring is even more realistic in this case given that most of the acquired firms were 
hitherto state-owned, in which restructuring is almost obvious after foreign takeover55. 
Irrespective of the channels, foreign acquisition effects on wages are usually associated with 
improvements in productivity in line with firm production theory. In this analysis, this is 
indicated by the estimated effects on productivity.  
With reference to the results, acquired firms tend to be 35.8% more productive when compared 
to non-acquired firms. Acquisition effects on productivity are more than thrice the effects on 
wages, which is in line with the usual empirical interpretation that foreign acquisition 
stimulates productivity gains shared between employees and firm owners. Elsewhere, 
acquisition effects on output are even larger when compared to the rest of the outcome 
variables. It is noticeable that when compared to non-acquired firms, acquired firms tend to 
produce 43% more in output. The result on output corroborates earlier studies that were 
undertaken outside SSA such as those of Matthias and Javorcik (2009), Wang (2014), and 
Wang and Wang (2015b). Larger productivity and output effects can probably be attributed to 
the possibility of acquired Ghanaian firms, especially SoEs, being on a much lower boundary 
both technologically and organizationally prior to acquisition. This makes it relatively easier 
for foreign investors to raise productivity, output, and in the process also wages. This would 
be an interesting hypothesis to test but due to data limitations, this is not done in this thesis. 
The positive (although insignificant) acquisition effects on capital levels are also worth noting. 
Positive acquisition effects are evident in terms of capital investments at 17.5% in favour of 
acquired firms. Acquisition effects on capital are indicative of the superiority of foreign-owned 
firms in terms of investment levels. This can be attributed to, among others, the usually less 
stringent conditionalities foreign-owned firms face in terms of access to finance and other 
forms of capital. The likelihood of foreign-owned firms accessing finance easily is equally 
acknowledged in Aliber’s theory discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis. Positive acquisition 
effects are also evident in terms skill intensity at 2.7% in favour of acquired firms. Similar 
results are noticeable in terms of employment, where acquired firms tend to have 9% more in 
employment when compared to their non-acquired counterparts. A probable explanation for 
the insignificant effects on employment is foreigners’ inclination to acquire already-large 
domestically-owned firms. On average, large firms generally grow more slowly than smaller 
 
 
55 Although within-firm restructuring is also possible in privately owned firms, it is more likely to occur in 





firms (Karlsson, Lundin, Sjöholm & He, 2009: 188; Lipsey, 2008: 11); and hence it may not 
be surprising that growth in employment due to foreign takeover was not significant. In Ghana, 
during the divestiture programme, nearly all of the largest SoEs put up for sale were acquired 
by foreign investors (Potter, 2015: 6). 
In Table 4D in the appendices, we control for the effects of previous firm performance by 
including lagged dependent variables in the estimations56. Results as seen from the table 
generally support evidence of acquisition effects on firm level performance outcomes 
especially on wages and output. Unlike in the main static model, this estimation also yields 
significant effects for employment and skill intensity. These results might, however, be 
problematic since the included lagged dependent variable is usually correlated with the error 
term, even if for instance OLS fixed effects estimators are used. This usually leads analysts to 
either turn to instrumental variables (that are difficult to find) or use of estimation methods like 
system GMM to handle the resulting endogeneity concerns. In this analysis I opted to instead 
perform robustness checks on the results using matching and DID which handles endogeneity. 
The dissimilarity between the two sets (pooled OLS & FE) of results is usually an indicator of 
the degree of selection bias (cherry-picking) in the acquisition of firms by foreign investors 
whose decisions may also be based on the firm’s inherent time-invariant heterogeneities (Earle 
et al., 2012). In this thesis’ context, it is clear that the FE estimation greatly tackles selection 
issues and provides more reliable results than the pooled OLS.  Apart from employment, 
capital, and skill intensity, statistically significant acquisition effects on the rest of the variables 
are substantial. These results confirm that foreign acquisition tends to account for 
improvements in firm-level performance. These results therefore, answer the second key 
empirical question of this thesis by confirming that to a significant extent, firm level 
performance can be ascribed to ownership status. In this case specifically, results indicate that 
foreign-owned firms tend to perform relatively better than domestically-owned firms and this 
is partly due to differences in ownership. The size of the acquisition effects observed in Table 
4.2 is relatively similar or slightly lower from empirical findings in the literature. Javorcik et 
al. (2009) found a 49 percent, foreign-output differential. For productivity, Waldkirch (2014: 
26)  found a 51 percent differential. In Earle et al. (2012: 10), findings indicated a 16 percent  
 
 
56 I estimated an equation of the form; 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛹𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  where 𝜆 is the effect of previous 






wage differential in favour of foreign-owned firms using linked employer-employee data and 
an FE regression estimation method. In the next section I detail and justify the application of 
matching and DID estimation. Then I generate estimates of foreign acquisition to establish 
whether results that are at least to some extent reflective of regression estimates can be got. 
Through this estimation method, endogeneity is tackled and long run acquisition effects are 
also established. 
4.4 Matching and difference-in-differences estimation 
We earlier noticed from Table 4.1 that firms in the sample with foreign acquisition differ from 
those that are purely domestically-owned. Elsewhere, empirical evidence has shown that firms 
with foreign ownership usually pay, on average, higher wages and are also export-oriented 
(Matthias & Javorcik, 2009: 45). Because these differences do not give insights into whether 
the observed relatively superior performance of foreign-owned firms compared to 
domestically-owned firms is partly due to foreign ownership itself or otherwise, I estimated 
both POLS and FE regression models in an attempt to provide such evidence.  Using foreign 
acquisition and firm performance as the independent and dependent variables respectively, 
results indicated that foreign ownership positively affects firm-level performance. The FE 
model results indicated that foreign acquisition positively influences wages, productivity, 
output, employment, capital, and skill intensity. These positive effects are significant for 
wages, productivity, and output. FE was employed because of the inherent limitations of the 
POLS, specifically regarding selectivity, and probable unobserved heterogeneity across firms, 
which may affect outcomes of interest. However, these regression models also have some 
limitations in estimating causal effects. FE for instance may not be a panacea for all selectivity 
problems (McManus, 2011: 19) and does not handle endogeneity problems per se, a key source 
of  unreliable results in causal econometric literature. The use of FE trades consistency for 
efficiency, since it uses within-firm change, ignoring between-firm variations57. Additionally, 
from a broader perspective, under the FE estimation framework, firms act as their own controls. 
This implies that firms that change ownership largely drive the observed coefficient on the 
acquisition variable58. Because of some of these limitations, it was deemed proper to apply 
other estimation techniques as a form of robustness check on the regression results. Given the 
 
 
57 This meant I could not assess the effect of variables that have little within-firm variation. Moreover, 
parameter estimates may be imprecise with large SEs. 





nature of the data and the empirical question under investigation, I employed a matching with 
difference-in-differences estimation method in a bid to establish whether acquisition effects at 
least reflective of those from the FE estimations could still be obtained. In causal econometric 
literature, matching enables the analyst to create a feasible control sample for estimation 
purposes by restricting the control sample to only those firms with relative similarity to 
acquired firms in terms of observable pre-acquisition features. Matching therefore, enabled me 
to establish a counterfactual scenario for the acquired firms in furtherance of the study’s 
objective of establishing the average causal effects of foreign acquisition on firm performance. 
Matching coupled with difference-in-differences estimation would also solve the endogeneity 
issues explained earlier.   
4.4.1 Modelling foreign acquisition of firms 
One of the most crucial decisions in performing matching and successfully satisfying the 
assumptions that underpin this technique concerns the baseline covariates that are used in the 
matching model. Adequate identification and measurement of these covariates is essential 
(Tanner-Smith & Lipsey, 2014: 5). These covariates should satisfy two main properties 
according to these authors (page 6) i.e. (i) the covariate can independently predict any outcome 
variable of interest either directly or otherwise through a relationship with another covariate. 
This ensures that baseline differences between the conditions on that covariate would produce 
differences between the conditions on the outcome variable net of any effect of the acquisition 
and (ii) the covariate, or one with which it interacts, must differ between the conditions at 
baseline and measured with a good level of reliability. With no control over measurement, I 
handled identification in the inaugural stage of the matching strategy by empirically modelling 
the changeover process of potential target firms from local to foreign ownership. In this 
endeavour, I employed the probit model specified in (4.1), with a binary outcome variable of a 
firm being taken over by foreign investors. 
𝑃𝑟(𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) = 𝜙(𝑋𝑖𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1)                                                                                                (4.1) 
In (4.1), 𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a dichotomous variable describing the acquisition status of firm i in year t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 
is a vector of observable firm characteristics prior to acquisition and 𝜙 is a standard normal 
cumulative distribution function. In this model, I used the observable characteristics of 
prospective firms as predictor variables. The selection of the predictors included in (4.1) was 





that have employed matching with DID59. I lagged these predictors, except age, to ensure 
prediction is based on pre-acquisition performance of prospective firms. According to Matthias 
and Javorcik (2009: 45), potential foreign investors base their acquisition decisions hugely on 
basic observable information on targeted firms, for instance, the size of firms, capital levels, 
productivity, age, exportation status, among other characteristics. 
In Table 4.3, the results from the probit model60 are shown. Results indicate that firms that are 
relatively larger are more likely to be acquired by foreign investors. The coefficient on the lag 
employment covariate is positive and significant at 10%. Additionally, results indicate that 
firms that are relatively older, more productive and publicly owned are more likely to be 
acquired by foreign investors. The coefficients on these variables are positive and significant 
at 5% or 10%. Regarding public ownership, the significance is probably due to the policy shift 
that the Ghanaian government ushered in shortly after the initial waves of data collection. This 
saw some hitherto SoEs change ownership. The Ghanaian government also sold off its stake in 
some jointly owned enterprises to foreigners. Although a key predictor of foreign acquisition 
as indicated in numerous empirical studies, export status is nonetheless not significant in my 
data.                       
Table 4. 3: Probit results – Predicting foreign acquisitions 
Variables fdi Std Error 
lag employment 0.525* 0.319 
lag wage 1.182** 0.565 
lag productivity 0.448* 0.244 
lag exports 0.430 0.400 
lag public ownership 6.263*** 1.601 
Firm age 0.220*** 0.025 
Prob > chi2 0.000  
Chi2 223.54  
Pseudo R2 0.440  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
59 See studies like; Weche Geluebcke (2015), Fabling and Sanderson (2013), Chari et al. (2009) and Huttunen 
(2007). 





Given the results from the probit model, it was clear that use of such covariates at their baseline 
level would yield credible results from the matching process. As later details reveal, I used 
these covariates in the calculation of Mahalanobis distances, which were used in the refinement 
of the matched sets. 
4.4.2 The Matching Strategy 
In this analysis, I  adopted a matching procedure for causal inference with Time Series Cross 
Sectional (TSCS) data as recently devised by Imai et al. (2019). In this chapter, I use the words 
‘treatment/treated’ interchangeably with ‘acquisition/acquired’. We recall that the data set 
consists of 138 (N) firms covered for 12 (T) years. For every firm indexed by  𝑖 = 1,2 … 𝑁 , at 
year indexed by 𝑡 = 1, 2, … 𝑇, I had an outcome variable of interest,𝑦𝑖𝑡 . This outcome variable 
in my case may be one of employment, mean wage, productivity or output. I also had a 
dichotomous acquisition (treatment) variable,𝐴𝑖𝑡, which takes on the value 0 for firms that stay 
domestically owned throughout the 12 years and value 1 for firms that were acquired by 
foreigners and only from the period of acquisition to T. I also observe a vector of K time-
varying covariates, 𝑧𝑖𝑡. In a specific year, I assumed that  𝑧𝑖𝑡 is realised before 𝐴𝑖𝑡; and that 
outcome, 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is realised after 𝑧𝑖𝑡 and 𝐴𝑖𝑡 have been realised. This direction of the assumed 
causal order ensures that 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is not affected by the acquisition; and that the covariates therein 
take their values prior to the firm being acquired. Importantly, 𝑧𝑖𝑡 can include lagged outcomes 
(Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007: 3). 
4.4.2.1  Defining the Average Treatment Effect on the Acquired Firms  
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is one of the most commonly studied 
estimands in causal econometric literature (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007: 4)61. In this instance, 
ATT is the average effect of foreign acquisition on the performance variables of those firms 
that were acquired during the study period62. Defining my ATT started with specifying non-
negative integers F and L. The former represents the outcome of interest measured at F years 
after foreign acquisition of a firm. Given a firm acquired in 1994, F = 0 if our interest is in the 
average effect of acquisition on an outcome variable measured in 1994, an effect Imai et al 
(2019: 9) refers to as contemporaneous. F is set to 1 if one has an interest in measuring the 
ATT on an outcome of acquired firms one year after acquisition, whereas L specifies the 
number of lags to adjust for in the matching process. 
 
 
61 See other studies such as Heckman and Robb (1984) and Rubin (1977). 





I initially defined my ATT of foreign acquisition based on the specifications below. 
Let potential outcome under (not under) firm acquisition, Pa (P0), be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑎 = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 (𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙}𝑙=2
𝐿
)                                                                           (4.2) 
𝑃0 = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 (𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙}𝑙=2
𝐿
)                                                                           (4.3) 
Then 
  𝐴𝑇𝑇(𝐹, 𝐿) = 𝐸{𝑃𝑎 − 𝑃0|𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0}                                                                     (4.4) 
In both (4.2) and (4.3), the acquisition history, {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙}𝑙=2
𝐿
 =  {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2, ⋯ , 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝐿},  is set to the 
realised pre-acquisition period.  
Referring to the above specifications, if a firm for instance was acquired (𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1) in 1994 (t), 
and one sets F = 1, (4.2) would express the value of the potential outcome of interest in 1995 
(t + F); while (4.3) would give the would-be (counterfactual) potential outcome had the firm 
remained  domestically-owned i.e. 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 =  0. From (4.4), if L= 2, ATT (1,2) gives the 
ATT of foreign acquisition on the outcome of interest, for instance, average wage, one year 
after acquisition, while assuming that the possible outcome is dependent on the acquisition 
history for a probable two years back.  
4.4.2.2  Key Identification Assumptions   
In this analysis, identification of the effects is based on the following assumptions: 
The choice of the values of F and L in this analysis implies the assumption that the potential 
outcome for firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 + 𝐹 does not depend on the acquisition status of other firms, for 
example, 𝐴𝑖′𝑡′  with  𝑖
′ ≠ 𝑖 and for any 𝑡′  and  does not also depend on the previous acquisition 
status of the same firm after L years, {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙}𝑙=𝐿+1
𝑡−1
. By implication, except for some carryover 
effects up to L years, there is no allowance for spillover effects. 
Another key assumption in establishing causality using this matching method is that of 
unconfoundedness in treatment (acquisition) assignment. Specifically, in this analysis, given 
F, L and my estimand of interest, I assumed that conditional on the treatment, outcome, and 
covariate history up to 𝑡 − 𝐿, the treatment assignment is unconfounded. This assumption is 





{ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 (𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙}𝑙=2
𝐿
) , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 (𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙}𝑙=2
𝐿
)  } ⫫






                                                                        (4.5) 
where 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observed time-varying confounders for firm i at time period t. The 
assumption will be violated if unobserved confounders do exist. Additionally, if the treatment, 
outcome, and covariate histories before time 𝑡 − 𝐿 confound the causal relationship between 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹, the assumption will be violated. 
 
Together with another key assumption of overlap, assumption (4.5) forms the combined 
assumption of ‘strong ignorability’63. This combined assumption implies that we can estimate 
the ATT by adjusting for differences in covariates between the acquired and control firms 
(Imbens, 2015).  
Although the believability of the unconfoundedness assumption can be assessed64, it is not 
directly testable (Imbens, 2015: 31; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007: 2).  In analytical applications 
with TSCS data, however, analysts are more concerned with unconfoundedness, which is likely 
to arise from unobserved variables (Imai et al., 2019: 11). In this study therefore, I sidestepped 
the unconfoundedness assumption implied in (4.5) and employed a difference-in-differences 
(DID) approach. As proposed by Imai et al (2019), after conditioning on the acquisition, 
outcome and covariate histories, I adopted the parallel trends assumption, as specified in (4.6). 
E [𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 (𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙}𝑙=2
𝐿





]  =  E [𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 (𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙}𝑙=2
𝐿
) − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 |𝐴𝑖𝑡 =




]                                                                       (4.6) 
In (4.6), the conditioning set consists of lagged outcomes (except the immediate lag 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1), 
acquisition history and the covariate history. 
4.4.2.3  Generating the Matched Sets 
The next step in the matching process was to generate matched sets for acquired firms. For 
each acquired firm (i,t), I constructed a matched set 𝑀𝑖𝑡, of control firms that are identical to 
 
 
63 As conceptualized by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
64 For example, using lagged values of the outcome as pseudo outcomes and estimating the causal effect of the 





that specific acquired firm in terms of pre-acquisition history from time 𝑡 − 𝐿  to 𝑡 − 1.  The 
matched set is defined as: 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = {𝑖
′: 𝑖′ ≠ 𝑖, 𝐴𝑖′𝑡 = 0, 𝐴𝑖′𝑡′ = 𝐴𝑖𝑡′  for all 𝑡
′ = 𝑡 − 1, … … , 𝑡 − 𝐿 }                                    (4.7) 
for the acquired firms with 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1 and 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0. 
It can happen that some acquired firms do not have control firms with which they share 
identical treatment history i.e. acquired firms for which |𝑀𝑖𝑡 | = 0. For purposes of maintaining 
internal validity, such acquired/treated firms are excluded from the subsequent analysis. The 
matched set in (4.7) only adjusts for the acquisition history of the firms. But the parallel trends 
assumption in (4.6) requires further adjustments for other confounders, such as previous 
outcomes and probably time-varying covariates. This process of  performing further 
adjustments is what Imai et al. (2019) refer to as the refinement of the matched sets. 
Refinement, once undertaken, partly sets the stage for future confirmation of the parallel trend 
assumption specified in (4.6). In this analysis, I used the Mahalanobis distance65 in refining the 
matched sets. A description of this refinement is as follows;  
After matching each acquired (treated) firm with at most 𝜉 control firms from the matched 
set with replacement; thus,|𝑀𝑖𝑡| ≤ 𝜉, the average Mahalanobis distance (MD) between the 





∑ √(𝑣𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 − 𝑣𝑖′,𝑡−𝑙)
⊤
𝛴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙
−1 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 − 𝑣𝑖′,𝑡−𝑙)
𝐿
𝑙=1
                                             (4.8) 
for a matched control firm 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑀𝑖𝑡, where  𝑣𝑖𝑡′ = (𝑦𝑖𝑡′ , 𝑧𝑖,𝑡′+1
⊤ )
⊤
 and  𝛴𝑖𝑡′  is the sample 
covariance matrix of  𝑣𝑖𝑡′ . That is, given a control firm in the matched set, the standardized 
distance is computed using the lagged outcome variable and covariates and it is averaged across 
time periods.  
Once the distance measure 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡(𝑖
′) is computed for all control firms in the matched set, then 
the matched set is refined by selecting up to 𝜉 most similar control firms that satisfy a specified 
caliper constraint C and we give zero weight to the other matched control firms. This allows 
us to choose a subset of firms from the original matched set, that are most similar to the 
 
 
65 This metric has similarly been utilised in studies that have, as in this analysis, a combination of propensity 





acquired firm in terms of observed confounders. For the acquired firm (i,t), the refined matched 
set is defined as; 
𝑀𝑖𝑡
∗ = {𝑖′: 𝑖′𝜖𝑀𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡(𝑖
′) < 𝐶, 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡(𝑖
′) ≤ 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡
(𝜉)}                                                           (4.9) 
where 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡
(𝜉)
 denotes the 𝜉th order statistic of 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡(𝑖
′)  among the control firms in the original 
matched set 𝑀𝑖𝑡. Once the matched sets have been refined, the estimator can be employed to 
get the estimated ATT for the outcome variable of interest. 
4.4.2.4  The difference-in-differences (DID) Estimator 
After obtaining the refined matched sets, the ATT of changing firm ownership from domestic 
to foreign is estimated. This involves, for every acquired firm (i,t), the estimation of the 
counterfactual outcome, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹(𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2,. . … . . , 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝐿) using the weighted 
average of the control firms in the refined matched set. Then the difference-in-differences 
estimate of the ATT for every acquired firm is generated and averaged across all acquired 














𝑖′ (𝑦𝑖′,𝑡+𝐹 − 𝑦𝑖′,𝑡−1)
𝑖′∈𝑀𝑖𝑡
}                                                                                                                     (4.10) 
Where: 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡(1 − 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) ⋅ 1{|𝑀𝑖𝑡| > 0}; while 𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑖′ represents the  non-negative 
normalised weight such that 𝑤𝑖𝑡




𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1 only if firm (i,t) changes the acquisition status from the control condition at year 𝑡 − 1 
to the acquired status at year t, and has at least one matched control firm. 
In using matching and DID estimation for robustness checks on regression findings, one other 
aim was to establish acquisition effects in the long run. However, the specification of ATT in 
(4.4) does not specify the future treatment sequence. Because of this, the matched control firms 
might include those firms that get acquired before the outcome of interest is measured at time 
t+F. Likewise, some acquired firms might return to control conditions before time t+F. For 
instance, a foreign investor having been a victim of probably information asymmetry might 
withdraw from owning a stake in a domestic firm after realizing that the deal is not worthy as 





establish such reversals. In this chapter, the assumption and hence keen interest were in ATT 
of a stable policy change where the counterfactual scenario was that; (i) for an acquired firm, 
acquisition does not occur before the outcome is measured and (ii) for the acquired firms, 
foreign ownership will be in place for at least F time periods. Given that one of the motivations 
for choosing matching and DID estimation as my robustness check procedure was because of 
my desire to re-estimate acquisition effects and in a long run i.e. where F>0, I estimated an 
ATT of a stable policy change relative to no policy change among the acquired firms based on 
a re-defined specification as shown in (4.11).  
   𝔼 [ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 ({𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑙}𝑙=1
𝐹
= 𝟏𝐹 , 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, {𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑙}𝑙=2
𝐿
)   ̶ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 ({𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑙}𝑙=1
𝐹
= 𝟎𝐹 ,




= 𝟏𝐹 , 𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 1, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0 ]                         (4.11) 
Where 𝟏𝐹  and 𝟎𝐹 are F dimensional vectors of, respectively ones and zeros. The acquired 
(matched control) firms are those that stay under foreign ownership (control) conditions 
throughout F time periods after acquisition has taken place while the matched control firms are 
assumed not to get acquired by foreigners at least for F time periods after acquisitions have 
occurred.  
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = {𝑖
′: 𝑖′ ≠ 𝑖, 𝐴𝑖′𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖′𝑡+1 = ⋯ = 𝐴𝑖′𝑡+𝐹 = 0, 𝐴𝑖′𝑡′ = 𝐴𝑖𝑡′  for all 𝑡
′ = 𝑡 − 1, … , 𝑡 − 𝐿}                             
(4.12) 
To estimate the ATT based on (4.10), we utilize the idea of marginal structural models in order 
to make covariate adjustments while sidestepping post-treatment bias (Imai et al. 2019). 
Specifically, we first constrain the matched set for each acquired firm (𝑖, 𝑡) such that the 
matched control firms do not get acquired at least after time t+F. Then the propensity score is 
estimated by modelling the treatment assignment, for instance, by means of a logistic 
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Unlike the above setting, the model must be fit to all firms including those that are not in the 
matched sets in order to model the entire treatment sequence. Using the result from marginal 
















For 𝑖′ ∈ 𝑀𝑖𝑡 and 𝜔𝑖𝑡
𝑖′   = 0 if  𝑖′ ∉ 𝑀𝑖𝑡 . In the final step the DID estimator in (4.10) is employed 
to get an estimate of the long-term ATT under the specified treatment sequence as defined in 
equation (4.11). 
4.4.2.5  Covariate Balance Checks 
In a typical evaluation of any treatment, policy or intervention, the key question is not whether 
the treated and the untreated units should be compared, but rather which units should constitute 
the comparison such that they represent the treated had they not been treated (Imbens & 
Wooldridge, 2007: 7). In this study’s case, the question was which non-acquired firms best 
characterised the acquired firms (essentially in the pre-acquisition period) such that a valid 
counterfactual scenario could be achieved to facilitate the desired comparison. In propensity 
score matching, a key test of the suitability of the intended comparison between treated and 
control observations is a balance check on the covariates used in the matching. In this 
framework, I examined the resulting covariate balance between the acquired and the matched 
control firms to get insights into whether the two sets of firms were indeed comparable with 
respect to observable confounding variables. I examined the Standardised Mean Difference 
(SMD) of each covariate between the acquired and control firms in the pre-acquisition period. 
The mean difference was standardised at a given pre-acquisition period using the standard 
deviation of each covariate across all acquired firms in the data. 
Given an acquired firm (i,t) with 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1, the covariate balance for variable k at the pre-
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 is the total number of the acquired firms. This covariate 
balance measure was then further aggregated across all the acquired firms for every covariate 









                                                                               (4.15) 
4.4.2.6  Results from the Matching 
Matching on two (L = 2) lags and using Mahalanobis distance to refine the matched sets, I 





choice of F was crucial in this analysis. There are numerous explanations as to why foreign 
acquisition may not affect firm performance outcomes as soon as acquisition takes place66. It 
is, for example, realistic that changes in firms’ mean wages are usually linked to changes in the 
composition of the workforce (Huttunen, 2007: 500). Such changes in workforce composition 
come with costs of adjustment (Hamermesh, 1988). This implies that the changes may not be 
immediate and hence wages may as well not change immediately. Therefore, even after foreign 
acquisition, effects of the same on wages and employment may take some time to manifest67. 
However, employment adjustment in foreign-owned firms is usually faster than in purely 
domestically-owned firms (Barba Navaretti, Checchi & Turrini, 2002: 4).  
Additionally, any firm acquisition, be it foreign or domestic, is associated with internal post-
acquisition reorganisation68. This may entail introduction of new work practices, on-the-job 
training, new technologies and new production processes. This further implies that changes in 
variables such as mean wages, output, employment, and other performance outcomes may not 
occur immediately after acquisition69. Based on the above, I decided to set my F equal to at 
most three years after foreign acquisition of firms. The effect may well be contemporaneous. 
For instance, immediately after acquisition, new management may increase wages or stop some 
production processes, leading to reduced output and other attendant effects. 
On Table 4B in the appendix, the potential matched sets before refinement are shown. The first 
column contains the identification numbers for firms that were identified as having switched 
ownership, while the second column shows the respective years of this switch. In the third 
column, the number of control firms in the matched sets is shown. The variation in the number 
of control firms between 1998 switchers and 1994 switchers is because 1994 switchers can also 
use 1998 switchers as controls in the years before 1998. Overall, it is evident that the size of 
the matched sets was good enough to permit comparison. 
In Table 4.4, are the weighted DID estimates of the ATT effect of foreign acquisition, using 
Mahalanobis distance in the matching. Results show that, on average and a year after 
acquisition, acquired firms realised increments in employment, wages, and capital compared 
to relatively similar domestically-owned firms. When one considers all the outcome years, it is 
 
 
66 A reason why considering F ≥ 0 was deemed suitable in my analysis.  
67 Huttunen (2007:507) actually confirms that the effect might not be immediate. 
68 See Gbettor et al. (2013:2442) in their study on a Ghanaian telecom firm acquired by Vodafone. 





evident that acquired firms on average experienced a gradual rise in employment, wages, 
productivity, capital and output relative to similar domestic firms. This overall positive result 
is clearly visible in Figure 4.2, in which the ATT is plotted over time for some outcome 
variables of interest. These average treatment effects are statistically significant in terms of 
average wages and capital outlay in the second year after acquisition. Also noticeable is that 
employment effects are averagely positive but not significant just like in the FE estimation 
results. These results are generally reflective of the FE estimation results discussed earlier with 
slight differences visible for effects on output and productivity. These slight differences could 
be due to the fact that the two methods are somehow different and FE estimation is stronger 
and more precise than the matching method. Matching has been said to be weak since it is 
based on observable characteristics only. In the following discussion, however, I give a brief 
specific discussion of results from matching. 
Matching results show that acquired firms realised statistically significant increases in wages 
by an average of over 25 percentage points when compared to parallel non-acquired firms, 
especially in the first two years after acquisition. In the year of acquisition, the increase 
(contemporaneous effect) was 31.8% this being statistically significant. Similarly, when 
compared to similar non-acquired firms, acquired firms posted over 19% increments in capital 
levels in year two after acquisition, a result that is also statistically significant. However, in 
year one, the effect is not significant and exactly mirrors the effect obtained using FE estimation 
earlier on. Wage effects although much larger, are reflective of those results obtained by the 
FE estimation. In the context of specifically wage increments at firm level, and given that these 
were average wages measured as a total wage bill relative to employment, numerous 
mechanisms can be cited through which such (larger than FE results) wage increments could 
occur. Two such mechanisms would be; the same people remaining employed but experiencing 
an increase in wages; and a firm altering the mix of workers leading to fewer low-paid workers 
and higher-than-average paid workers. 
It is also shown that foreign acquisition has a positive ATT effect on productivity. On average, 
acquired firms posted over 10% increases in productivity relative to similar firms that remained 
domestically-owned over the study period. Although quite lower and insignificant unlike in the 
FE estimation, empirical studies employing similar methods of analysis, like Wang and Wang 
(2015b), find similar results regarding foreign acquisition and productivity. Nevertheless, 
statistically significant ATT on wages that are not accompanied by relatively similar effects on 





But this might occur due to numerous reasons. For instance, in Table 4.4, DID estimates 
indicate that employment increases, and that productivity also takes a positive trend in later 
years. This is may be suggestive of the fact that firms may be adding highly skilled or 
productive workers who may be equally well remunerated, but that it takes some time for all 
this to translate into increased output and productivity.   
In the context of purely firm ownership, Fabling and Sanderson (2014: 12) attempt to motivate 
why foreign-owned firms may pay higher wages even when productivity remains unchanged. 
Explanations given include but may not be limited to foreign owners potentially securing 
workers from outside the country in question (Ghana), who may actually demand higher 
remuneration than domestic workers. Additionally, new firm owners may want to avoid the 
spillover of their superior technologies and vital information to rival firms. One of the conduits 
for such spillovers is through workers who leave the firm in question for a rival. Therefore, to 
prevent such turnover, workers may be given higher wages for the same level or for a less-
than-proportionate increase in productivity. As hinted earlier in the discussion of FE results, 
foreign acquisition may result in the internal reorganisation of the acquired firm in terms of 
production and work practices, which might draw worker resistance and breed disputes. 
Managers might use increased wages to lessen such firm disputes regardless of the level of 
productivity (Conyon et al., 2002). Foreign-owned firms have also been known to offer more 
productive on-the-job training to workers. And if this is the case after acquisition, then workers 
in acquired firms are likely to have a steeper wage profile and to thus acquire a premium with 
time (Görg, Strobl & Walsh, 2007). This premium is empirically echoed by Konings and 
Vanormelingen (2015), who examine the impact of training on wages in Belgian firms. Using 
an unbalanced panel for the period 1997–2006, Konings and Vanormelingen (2015) estimate 
firm-level wage equations based on Mincer’s (1974) framework, finding a 12% wage premium 
for trained workers relative to untrained employees. The measurement of labour productivity 
may also be a solid explanation of the puzzle70. Elsewhere, rent-sharing across borders could 
account for the puzzle above. Wages in the acquired firm may to a great extent be linked to 
profits in the parent company abroad (Girma & Görg, 2007b: 100). This means that, at the same 
 
 
70 Foreign owners may practise transfer pricing by, say, reporting lower values of manufactured output going to 
parent firms outside Ghana, thereby reducing the measured value added. Under such circumstances, measurement 





productivity level, wages in the newly-acquired plant may significantly increase after 
acquisition.  
Table 4. 4: Weighted difference-in-differences estimates of ATT with Mahalanobis 
distance 

















































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
It is also noticeable that employment positively increased in acquired firms when compared to 
relatively similar non-acquired firms. It is evident that, for acquired firms relative to similar 
but not acquired firms, the increase in employment after acquisition is above 10% on average. 
Similar to the main FE results, DID acquisition effect on employment was not statistically 
significant as the effects on wages.  A visual display of the ATT results for some of the outcome 
variables is given in the plots in Figure 4.2. In each panel, the solid circles show the point 
estimates of ownership change (or acquisition), where it was assumed that the acquired firms 
remained foreign-owned throughout the study period. The vertical bars denote 95% confidence 
intervals based on 100 block bootstrap replicates. Referring to the plots, it is observed that the 
point estimates for the panel on wage are far from zero, especially from the acquisition year to 
the third year after acquisition. In addition, for capital, the distance between the point estimates 
and the horizontal dotted line widens from the acquisition year onwards. Regarding the rest of 
the outcome variables, these point estimates are close to zero, which indicates a picture 
reflective of the results in Table 4.4. It can also be noticed that generally variance tends to 
increase regarding each outcome variable irrespective of the nature of the effect. This is a 








Figure 4. 2: Plots of difference-in-differences ATT for some of the outcomes under 
consideration 
 
4.4.2.7  Covariate balance results 
Results from matching analysis are merited when the baseline (pre-treatment) covariates used 
in the matching are balanced between the treated and untreated units. In this thesis’ context, 
such a balance is what would merit this technique as a suitable robustness check for the main 
results obtained using the FE estimation methods. One of the most popular statistics used in 
assessing covariate balance in matching analysis, especially where propensity scores are used, 
is the standardised mean difference (SMD). This is because it is easy to compute and 
understand (Zhang, Kim, Lonjon & Zhu, 2019: 3). Utilising the specification in (4.11) and 
(4.12), I conducted balance checks for the covariates in the pre-acquisition period. 
In Figure 4.3, plots of covariate balance due to matching over the pre-acquisition period are 
shown. For each outcome variable, the SMD is plotted on the vertical axis over the pre-
acquisition period of two years on the horizontal axis. The panels in rows indicate the balance 
for outcome variables in the following order: employment, wage, productivity, output, capital 





a good balance of majority variables on the two-year period. However, there are variations in 
the extent of the balance for specific outcome variables and with specific refinement methods. 
For instance, for employment as the outcome, propensity weighing (1:3) shows better balance 
when compared to the rest while, for wages, the propensity score refinement seems to provide 
better balancing on covariates. Yet on capital and capital intensity, Mahalanobis distance 
refinement seemingly provides better balance. Despite these slight variations, estimates of ATT 
based on the three refinement methods yield similar results, as will be seen later. It can also be 
noticed that before the two-period mark –this being the pre-treatment period – for panel (1:1) 
and (3:1), the employment and productivity outcome variables remain constant, although with 
some imbalance. This is a positive confirmation for the parallel trend assumption alluded to in 
(4.7), a fundamental assumption that authenticates my choice of the DID estimator for 
robustness checks on the main results. Other outcome variables, such as output and capital 
were not part of the probit model and so cannot be directly investigated regarding this 
assumption. Overall, the balance checks lent credence to the matching and DID estimation 
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Besides meriting the matching results using covariate balance checks, I also performed further 
robustness checks specifically for the matching method by using other alternative matching 
and refinement methods. I specifically employed propensity scores and propensity weighting 
as refinement methods to re-estimate the average acquisition effect on the performance 
outcomes of acquired firms. The results from these two methods are shown in Table 4C in the 
appendix. These results are comparable in magnitude and statistical significance to those 
generated using Mahalanobis distance methods. This attests to the reliability of the preferred 
refinement method, Mahalanobis distance, used in the initial refinement of the matched sets. 
4.5 Conclusion from findings in chapter four 
A large body of research examines the link between foreign-owned investments and economic 
benefits that accrue to host economies. Investigation has been both at macro and micro levels, 
with tangible contributions pointed out over and above mere capital investments. As 
highlighted by Matthias and Javorcik (2009: 51), empirical focus has been guided largely by 
the assumption that foreign ownership solely is associated with tangible benefits both at macro 
level and at firm level. Whereas this assumption may hold for Greenfield investments, it is not 
clear in the case where foreign ownership arises out of acquisition of a formerly domestically-
owned firm. This is due to the likelihood of selection bias, which, more often than not, drives 
the acquisition decision of most foreign investors. In this study, I focused on ownership arising 
out of acquisition and identified the effect while taking care of firm-level heterogeneity and 
endogeneity effects by applying regression methods and robustness checks using matching and 
difference-in-differences estimation methods. 
This study differs from majority studies because, in addition to the usual outcomes, focus is 
extended to other outcomes thought to be influenced by foreign ownership. The study further 
looks at the effect on capital, one of the key impediments to investment and firm performance 
growth in developing countries. The country/region of focus is also worth noting as few causal 
studies on foreign ownership effects have been conducted in SSA.  
The results from regressions generally reflect those from matching with few and negligible 
differences. Whereas regression methods handle firm-level heterogeneity, the method used for 
robustness checks attempts to handle probable endogeneity. The minor differences in the two 
estimation results may be reflective of sample size issues. Evidence from this chapter’s findings 
indicates that foreign acquisition tends to cause significant rises in mean wages, productivity, 





intensity levels in acquired firms. A key empirical conclusion from the results is that, as the 
motivational discussion highlighted, foreign ownership indeed has significant effects on firm 
level performance outcomes along variables like; productivity, output, and wages. This 
revelation is in agreement with numerous scholarly findings highlighted earlier. However, the 
fact that results also indicate insignificant acquisition effects on other variables like; capital, 
employment, and skill intensity, shows that there is truth in conclusions by scholars like 
Navaretti et.al (2004), and Weche Geluebck (2015). Despite the sample size issues noted in 
this analysis, it is evident that the link between foreign ownership and firm performance is not 
correlative as some reviewed literature asserts.  
Currently, numerous developing economies, particularly in SSA, are in pursuit of policies 
aimed at attracting inward foreign owned investments. Such policies have been motivated by 
economic benefits believed to be associated with these investments, evidence of which has 
been mainly from the developed world and East Asian economies. By providing further 
evidence, this study cements the view that foreign acquisition (and consequent ownership) of 
domestic firms is, to a recognisable extent, responsible for improvements in firm performance.  
And by positively influencing firm-level performance, foreign investments impact on the 
overall wellness of host economies.  Although this evidence is observed in Ghana, its 
applicability to SSA is undoubtable given the structural similarities amongst African 
economies and generally the developing world. Study findings in this chapter therefore lend 










International literature is characterised by evidence of performance superiority of foreign-
owned investments over domestically-owned plants. This immediately elicits the question as 
to what accounts for the observed superior performance of these investments compared to local 
firms. Is it that these investments are systematically superior to (and hence different from) 
domestically-owned firms? Or do foreign investors simply decide to merge with or buy off 
those local firms that are already performing well? In the event that such foreign ownership 
indeed arises out of acquisition of a locally owned plant, to what extent should we attribute the 
resulting performance to foreign takeover? Do the stylised facts prevalent in international 
literature hold true for SSA economies where, despite increased inflows of foreign investments 
in recent years, economic outcomes such as exports and employment growth continue to be 
low? Answers to these and many other related empirical questions have long been the subject 
of scholarly investigation in the field of foreign direct investment literature. Thus far, available 
evidence remains inconclusive and biased in scope towards the Western world. 
This thesis intended to provide additional empirical evidence particularly relating to SSA. In 
this endeavour, the thesis addressed two specific research questions. Firstly, do foreign-owned 
investments differ systematically from domestically-owned enterprises; or does comparing the 
two forms of investments equate to simply comparing sub-groups of firms (for instance, large 
firms, where foreign-owned investments are most likely to be found, versus small and medium-
sized investments)? This empirical question was attended to in Chapters 2 and 3, which 
provided a country-specific perspective on Uganda, as well as a multi-country perspective 
focusing on 19 countries in SSA. In Chapter 4, the thesis addressed the second empirical 
question of whether foreign ownership (specifically arising out of acquisition of a formerly 
domestically-owned firm) has significant effects on firm-level performance.   
One of the approaches to use in an attempt to answer these empirical questions is to examine 
firm-level characteristic and performance differences between foreign-owned and 
domestically-owned firms. This involves an examination of how the two forms of investments 
differ along particular performance dimensions at the micro-level. A second approach is to 





ownership) and examine its likely effect on firm-level performance in the same way that Earle 
et al. (2012) have done. In an effort to provide the intended additional evidence on foreign-
owned investments, this thesis adopted both approaches.  
The evidence in this thesis came from three unique data sets, namely, two different firm panels 
and one comprehensive cross-sectional survey. The data sets had the unusual advantage of 
coming from SSA, a region hitherto neglected in earlier studies. Because of its geographical 
scope, this thesis therefore provides new and crucial evidence. Secondly, these data sets contain 
many foreign-owned firms (in the instance of the Uganda and UNIDO data) for better 
comparison and domestically-owned firms for control units (in the instance of the panel for 
Ghana). 
The methods applied to these data included cluster analysis methods using unsupervised 
machine learning techniques, and regression analysis coupled with conventional impact 
evaluation methods. In Chapter 2, cluster analysis methods were applied. Specifically, using 
machine-learning techniques, I applied agglomerative clustering to generate homogeneous 
groups of firms based on carefully selected performance indicators. I applied descriptive 
statistical analysis on resultant clusters of firms. Estimated averages arising from the results 
revealed that foreign-owned investments were likely to be systematically different from 
domestically owned investments. The findings suggest that comparative differences between 
foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms are not indicative of different sub-groups 
of firms, but rather that foreign-owned firms are systematically different along numerous 
performance indicators. Indeed, in the classification and regression tree (CART) analysis, 
foreign ownership was found to be a key segmenting variable in the creation of clusters firms. 
In Chapter 3, similar methods of analysis were adopted to investigate whether findings in 
Chapter 2 hold equally for a multi-country case and for economic groupings of countries by 
internationally reputable institutions. The core findings concurred with those in Chapter 2, 
adding revelations of intra- foreign-owned firms’ heterogeneities. Findings in both these 
chapters are also reflected in empirical findings in available international literature71.  
Regression methods and impact evaluation were used in Chapter 4 in order to investigate the 
effect of foreign acquisition on firm performance. In the context of acquisition or merging, one 
 
 






of the prominent theoretical strands holds that the performance premium is a result of foreign-
owned firms’ transfer of technical and managerial skills to the acquired affiliate in the host 
economy. Any empirical test on this theoretical strand necessitates that the analyst rules out 
the likelihood of pre-acquisition selection bias when examining the different performances of 
acquired firms and those firms that remained purely domestic. Using the stated methods, I 
estimated fixed effects regressions for numerous firm-level outcomes. Results indicated 
positive and significant effects of foreign acquisition on wages (9.9% in favour of foreign 
firms), productivity (35.8%), and output (43.3%). Further positive though not significant 
effects were revealed for capital (17.4%), employment, and skill intensity. Because fixed 
effects regressions couldn’t handle other econometric issues like endogeneity, I decided to 
employ impact evaluation methods as a robustness check for the regression results. I therefore 
matched firms on a set of pre-acquisition covariates, including lagged outcomes in order to 
construct a feasible control group of non-treated firms. I applied difference-in-differences 
estimation techniques and still found significant estimates of foreign acquisition effects on 
acquired firms lying in the positive range of 26% to 36% for wages; 5% to 20% on capital 
investments; and sizeable estimates (though not significant) for other outcomes, such as 
employment, output and productivity. While less significant than those generated by POLS and 
FE, these estimates, pointing to possible significant selection effect on the acquisition decision, 
are comparable to those from the FE and numerous empirical study findings in international 
literature72. These findings are also in disagreement with those of scholars such as Navaretti et. 
al (2004) and Weche Geluebcke (2015). Nevertheless, the estimates are highly suggestive that 
foreign ownership has positive effects on firm-level performance. Given that the empirical 
results from the analyses tend to support and reveal positive effects of foreign investment, yet 
the dismal economic outcomes observed in SSA and which motivated this investigation are 
observed at a time when inflows of such investments is on the rise, it becomes clear that these 
dismal outcomes are partly a result of other factors beyond the scope of this thesis’ inquiry. 
This implies that although these findings may be used to guide policy, caution has to be 
observed especially regarding the limited scope of the inquiry. 
This thesis contributes greatly to the growing empirical literature on foreign-owned 
investments. By using alternative methods in part of the analysis, it provides a robustness check 
 
 
72 See studies by; Wang &Wang (2015a), Conyon et al. (2002), Huttunen (2007), Fabling & Sanderson (2014), 





of the findings of earlier studies. The thesis provides further empirical findings in support of 
the now stylized fact that foreign-owned firms differ from domestically-owned firms. Findings 
confirm that these differences are systematic along numerous performance characteristics. 
These differences hold not only for specific economies but also for multi-country scenarios in 
SSA. Through the application of conventional impact evaluation methods and regression in 
part of the analysis, the thesis further found compelling evidence that foreign ownership has 
positive effects on firm-level performance. Acquisition decisions of foreign investors are also 
found to be subject to selectivity that is driven by factors such as firm size. These findings are 
important in informing domestic economic policies in developing economies, particularly in 
SSA, where the urge to attract foreign direct investments is evident. Findings in this thesis seem 
to support the thinking that such investments can partly contribute to solving current 
socioeconomic problems such as unemployment, low export volumes, scarcity of investment 
capital, and general wellness of host economies.   
A probable limitation of analyses in this thesis relates to data, especially in terms of the time 
when data collection was done. Analyses are based on data which is as recent as 2013. This is 
because these data are the most recent versions available for the specific countries selected for 
studies in this thesis. Findings in this thesis may thus be subject to recent changes in economic 
environments in the respective countries analysed and SSA in general. Although this is an 
insignificant limitation, caution should be observed when using the findings. Additionally, the 
geographical scope of Chapter 4 is also limited to only one country. It is possible that findings 
can vary across economies, even when similar phenomena are investigated using similar 
methods of analysis. Nevertheless, evidence from the three main chapters of this thesis is a 
noteworthy extension of scholarly literature on foreign direct investments, having important 
implications for policy as well. I briefly discuss some of these policy implications and potential 
areas for further scholarly research, in the next sections.   
5.2 Policy Implications 
From a general point of view, empirical evidence in this thesis shows that, at firm level, foreign-
owned investments are on average likely to perform relatively better than domestically-owned 
investments in a typical host economy environment. If the view that performance of economies 
at macro level is partly reflective of the performance of production units such as firms at the 
micro level holds, then an economy with more foreign-owned investments would be expected 





this perspective, a probable policy suggestion to developing economies, such as those in SSA 
(where this thesis was focused), would be to increase their efforts towards attracting more 
foreign direct investments. Evidence of foreign acquisition effects on performance at firm level 
in Chapter 4 also supports this policy suggestion. By having direct effects on firm performance 
at the micro level, evidence in this thesis confirms that foreign direct investments, ceteris 
paribus, may be effective in contributing to the overall wellness of the host economy, and that 
any policy orientation towards attracting more foreign-owned investments would probably be 
a step in the right direction.   
Findings in Chapter 4 suggest that foreign-owned firms most likely hire highly skilled workers; 
hence the high wage and productivity effects that are observed in foreign-owned firms. This 
might imply that if policymakers in a host economy decide to increase efforts to attract more 
foreign direct investments, more benefits are likely to be reaped if credible investments in 
human capital have been put in place. Based on this thesis’ findings, this is because more skilled 
nationals are likely to be employed as foreign investment inflows increase. Moreover, the 
importance of human capital in attracting foreign direct investment has been empirically 
confirmed for both developed and developing economies. Specifically, the level of educational 
attainment of the host country has been revealed as important in the foreign direct investment 
context73.  
Estimation results using matching in Chapter 4 further suggest that firms tend to follow a 
heterogeneous growth path. A high likelihood of firm-level heterogeneities is further 
demonstrated in Chapter 3 among clusters with purely foreign-owned firms. This indicates that, 
even among foreign-owned firms, there are probable variations in firm-level characteristics 
such as productivity and size. These variations, however, usually lead to systematic variations 
in firm-level market behaviour, especially regarding firms’ abilities to participate in 
international markets74. Reference to this thesis’s contextual background reveals low exports 
amongst SSA economies as one of the key elements. Yet exports, especially those with high 
technology intensity have significant positive effects on economic performance (Wabiga & 
Nakijoba, 2018). Highly productive firms are more likely to export. It may then be credible 
that policies aimed at export stimulation through attracting and incentivising foreign direct 
investments need to take into account likely firm heterogeneities if one is to go by evidence 
 
 
73 See the study by Karimi, Yusop, Hook and Chin (2013) on the effect of human capital on FDI inflows. 





from this thesis. This will ensure that more ‘cherries’ (as opposed to ‘lemons’) are attracted 
and incentivised.  
Finally, Chapter 2 contained the noteworthy finding that some foreign-owned firms may not 
significantly differ from domestically-owned firms in Uganda in terms of some performance 
indicators, such as export intensity. Indeed, clustering results indicated that a good number of 
foreign-owned firms is clustered in groups composed of mainly domestically-owned firms. 
This finding probably points to two policy-related issues: either the belief that numerous 
foreign investors target local markets in host economies as opposed to international markets, 
and may therefore not effectively contribute to the export desires of host economies; or that 
some domestically-owned investments actually match foreign-owned investments along some 
performance indicators. Some domestically-owned firms being clustered in groups largely 
composed of foreign-owned firms and posting higher mean values further corroborates the 
latter position. Given such findings, a probable implication could be that policies that seek to 
promote and hence optimise benefits from both domestic and foreign-owned investments, are 
relatively better than policies focused mostly on stimulating only one form of investment.  
5.3 Suggestions for the Future 
Studies such as that of Bentivogli et al. (2016), have found that the foreign ownership premium 
is only significant in the service sector. The justification is that such a sector is shielded from 
disciplinary measures in the international market, which gives the sector more room for 
performance enhancement. It would therefore be of great interest for researchers to extend my 
current analysis using data that covers both sectors. This would provide a robustness check for 
this empirical school of thought and provide better policy guidance. 
One firm-level outcome not considered, especially in Chapter 4 of this thesis, is the export 
performance of acquired firms. Yet the effectiveness of foreign-owned investments in 
improving export performance of host economies has been supported by available literature. 
Chapters 2 and 3 further find exportation as a key firm-level characteristic that differentiates 
foreign-owned and domestic firms. Were data available, it would be relevant to test this 
hypothesis in the context of SSAs economies. This would provide evidence about whether 
foreign ownership positively affects the export abilities of firms, or whether foreigners simply 





In order to deepen scholarly understanding of the probable welfare effects of foreign-owned 
investments on host economies from a microeconomic lens, future investigation may have to 
extend analysis to include more welfare dimensions, such as the quality of the work 
environment and labour market security. These two elements were not covered in this thesis 
due to data limitations. However, together with workers’ earnings, they complete the set of 
elements used in measuring and assessing job quality, a key determinant of workers’ welfare 
status. Some empirical studies have been conducted on whether foreign direct investments 
create quality jobs in host economies but this has mainly been done in Asian economies and 
the western world. 
Finally, Chapter 4 of this thesis provides evidence on the effect of foreign ownership on firm 
performance, a topical issue that still elicits attention in most empirical investigations on 
foreign direct investments. This evidence, however, is provided on a specific country case. The 
current case of Ghana may distract us from the influences of critical drivers of firm 
performance growth, such as institutions. It would therefore be prudent for future analysis to 
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Table 2 A: P-values for t-test statistics for clusters of all the datasets 
                                                                      Variables 
Clusters      ln_emp  lb_prdvty  capital_int  mat/worker work_educ mgt_exp    wage   exports               
NData 2006 
1~2             0.000       0.000        0.005           0.000              -              0.003      0.000     0.001 
               
NData2013 
1~2            0.000       0.000        0.123          0.019           0.670          0.002      0.182     0.001 
1~3            0.794       0.143        0.233          0.523         <0.000          0.525      0.506     0.374 
2~3            0.000       0.001        0.758          0.152         <0.000          0.066      0.129     0.089 
             
CNData 
1~2            0.000      0.000        0.009           0.000          <0.000         0.000      0.000     0.015 
1~3            0.000      0.000        0.002           0.000            0.824         0.000      0.000     0.000 
2~3            0.448      0.363        0.938           0.389          <0.000         0.365      0.682     0.538 




Table 2 B: Mean actual employment, output and firm exports for clusters of CNData 
                     Average employment        Average Output                 Average Exports     
                                                                  (000’000/=)                           (000’000/=) 
 
Cluster1                  41.77                            8397.7                                   3982.3 (47.4) 
Cluster2                 15.66                             1288.7                                     506.8 (39.3) 
Cluster3                 22.21                               428.9                                     233.7 (54.5) 










Table 2 C: p-values for the correlation matrix variables used in firm clustering 
 
Variables     empt   fdi_stake    prdvty     wage    mgt exp    k in’ty   mat/w’k  w_educ exports 
empt                   
fdi_stake     0.00             
prdvty          0.00      0.00         
wage            0.23      0.00         0.00        
mgt exp       0.00       0.00         0.17      0.56            
k in’ty          0.00       0.00         0.00       0.00      0.01           
mat/w’k       0.02       0.00         0.00       0.00       0.02         0.00        
w_educ        0.00       0.04         0.60        0. 50       0.13         0.33           0.90       
exports         0.30       0.57         0.91        0.34        0.04         0.21           0.02       0.00 












Table 2 D: Regression results using clusters as regressands on selected variables 
                                                                      Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables             emp’t        lbr_prdvty       mgt_exp          wage      work_educ    
 
as.factor (Cluster) 1                      -                   -                     -                     -                 - 
as.factor (Cluster) 2                 -0.826***     -1.314***      -0.238***     -0.560***     -0.113*** 
                                                (0.057)           (0.114)           (0.044)          (0.086)          (0.039) 
as.factor (Cluster) 3                 -0.815***     -1.250***      -0.127**       -0.593***     -1.934*** 
                                                (0.081)           (0.162)           (0.064)          (0.133)          (0.073) 
Constant                                  3.0689***    16.767***      2.416***      14.185***      2.636*** 
                                                (0.053)           (0.106)           (0.041)          (0.079)          (0.037) 
RSE                                          1.672            3.014             1.297             2.417               0.37 
                                              (df=1300)      (df=1054)     (df=1282)     (df=1003)        (df=286) 
Note:  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Source: Author’s results generated based on World Bank Enterprise Survey data 0/13 
 
 
                                              
Table 2 E: Principal components for variable clusters of 2013 and overall data 
                            2006                                      2013                                    overall data 
          Cluster1  Cluster2   Cluster3  Cluster1  Cluster2    Cluster3  Cluster1   Cluster2  Cluster3                                    
PC1   1.326     2.588       1.000        1.319        2.463       2.019        1.319       2.735      1.463 
   PC2   0.674     0.372           -           1.146        0.365       0.595        1.146      0.740       0.537 
   PC3     -          0.040            -           0.535        0.172       0.385        0.535      0.354           - 






Table 2 F: Regression selected variables, firm ownership and other controls 
Dependent variable:                              ln_wage                                        ln_mgt_exp 
Independent Variables             M1             M2             M3           M1            M2             M3       
 
fdi_dummy                            0.54***                       0.18***     0.23***                        0.21*** 
                                              (0.040)                          (0.059)     (0.019)                        (0.023) 
fdi_dummy_cat 10-40%                           0.88***                                         0.40***  
                                                                 (0.194)                                            (0.102) 
fdi_dummy_cat 40-60%                           1.17***                                         0.40***                 
                                                                 (0.141)                                            (0.063) 
fdi_dummy_cat 60-99%                           1.38***                                         0.55*** 
                                                                 (0.102)                                            (0.052) 
fdi_dummy_cat all_foreign                      0.34***                                         0.130*** 
                                                                 (0.044)                                            (0.022) 
sector_type_retail                                                       0.39***                                          -0.40*** 
                                                                                   (0.056)                                          (0.019) 
sector_type_others                                                     0.71***                                          -0.25*** 
                                                                                   (0.055)                                          (0.018) 
location_catkampala                                                   0.23**                                         -0.39*** 
                                                                                   (0.091)                                          (0.031) 
location_catlira                                                          0.50***                                        -0.39*** 
                                                                                   (0.186)                                          (0.056) 
location_catmbale                                                      -0.143                                           -0.74*** 
                                                                                   (0.143)                                          (0.044) 
location_catmbarara                                                    0.55***                                        -0.87*** 
                                                                                   (0.134)                                          (0.047) 
location_catwakiso                                                     0.141                                            -0.51*** 
                                                                                   (0.114)                                           (0.038) 
                                                                                                    
Observations                    1002             1001                441            1281      1281             723  
RSE                                 1.170             1.117            1.334            0.785     0.731         0.643 
Note:               *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, figures in parenthesis are standard errors 
                                   











Table 2 G: Descriptive Statistics, Weighted Mean and Median (real) values NData 2006 
Variable                                    Cluster1                                                Cluster 2                          
                                                   N = 89                                                  N = 474                            
Mean 
ln_employment                            3.22                                                      2.53 
ln_lbr_prdvty                               16.83                                                    15.74 
fdi_stake                                      93.42                                                    0.24 
ln_capital_intensity                     14.77                                                    14.27 
ln_material_perworker                16.08                                                    15.04 
ln_mgt_exp                                  2.21                                                      2.02 
ln_wage                                       14.64                                                    13.89 
ln_worker_educ                              -                                                            - 
ln_exports_absolute                    20.00                                                    18.08 
actual employment                      51.01                                                    27.55 
Median 
ln_employment                            3.22                                                      2.30 
ln_lbr_prdvty                              16.80                                                    15.59 
fdi_stake                                     100.0                                                     0.00 
ln_capital_intensity                    15.09                                                    14.31 
ln_material_perworker               16.01                                                    14.97 
ln_mgt_exp                                  2.30                                                     2.08 
ln_wage                                      14.27                                                    13.92 
ln_worker_educ                             -                                                            - 
ln_exports_absolute                   19.95                                                    17.67 
actual employment                     25.00                                                    10.00 








Table 2 H: Descriptive statistics, weighted mean and median (real) values of NData 2013 
Variable                                    Cluster1                       Cluster 2                         Cluster 3 
                                                   N = 93                         N = 102                           N = 567 
Mean 
ln_employment                            2.22                             2.95                                 2.09 
ln_lbr_prdvty                               15.21                           17.62                              15.58 
fdi_stake                                      0.19                             94.23                               0.13 
ln_capital_intensity                     13.13                           15.66                              14.98 
ln_material_perworker                12.66                           14.05                              13.89 
ln_mgt_exp                                  2.21                             2.45                                2.04 
ln_wage                                       13.10                           13.30                              12.53 
ln_worker_educ                           2.51                             2.45                                0.78 
ln_exports_absolute                    18.07                            22.01                             18.56 
actual employment                      18.26                           34.50                              14.99 
Median 
ln_employment                            2.08                             2.83                                2.08 
ln_lbr_prdvty                              15.03                           16.62                              15.23 
fdi_stake                                      0.00                            100.0                               0.00 
ln_capital_intensity                     15.24                          15.32                              15.05 
ln_material_perworker                12.63                          14.23                              13.76 
ln_mgt_exp                                  2.30                            2.40                                1.95 
ln_wage                                       13.22                          13.10                              13.13 
ln_worker_educ                           2.56                            2.64                                0.69 
ln_exports_absolute                    17.96                          22.98                              19.06 
actual employment                      8.00                            17.00                              8.00 
 













































Mean     
Lnwage 2.67 2.77 2.62 0.004 
fdi-stake 30.6 85.97 0.00 0.000 
lnemployment 4.03 4.39 3.83 0.000 
lncapital-intensity 3.24 3.37 3.17 0.007 
Lnsales 7.83 8.60 7.37 0.000 
lnlbr_prdvty 4.02 4.18 3.92 0.002 
lnmaterial_perworker 3.61 3.69 3.56 0.038 
lnemployee_training 3.49 3.63 3.40 0.027 
Lnexports 7.55 7.87 7.11 0.000 
lnresearch_invest 4.15 5.56 4.14 --- 
Median     
Lnwage 2.61 2.87 2.46  
fdi-stake 0.00 100 0.00  
lnemployment 3.91 4.32 3.69  
lncapital-intensity 3.07 3.17 3.00  
Lnsales 7.75 8.62 7.36  
lnlbr_prdvty 4.01 4.23 3.89  
lnmaterial_perworker 3.44 3.57 3.36  
lnemployee_training 3.20 3.29 3.12  
Lnexports 7.44 7.63 7.18  
lnresearch_invest 3.81 5.56 3.81  






Table 3A 2: Descriptive Statistics, mean and median (real) values for income groups  
 
Variable                          Uganda                Low income Ug excl    Lower Middle Income 
                                       F          D                     F            D                     F             D       
Mean 
lnwage                          3.05      2.63               4.58       4.29                 6.53        5.90 
lnemployment              4.18      3.59                4.46      3.96                 4.37        3.55  
lncapital_intensity        3.11      2.65               5.15       5.01                 6.31        5.92 
lnsales                           9.39     7.69                11.6      10.3                 13.3        11.3 
lnlbr_prdvty                  4.99     4.08                6.83      6.26                 8.37        7.50 
lnmaterial_perworker   4.21     3.32                5.99      5.53                 7.52        6.93 
lnemployee_training     4.50     3.48               5.79      5.38                  7.39        6.70 
lnexports                       8.45     8.14               11.0      10.0                  12.5        10.8 
lnresearch_invest          8.52     3.55                  -         5.46                    -           7.17 
actual employment        199      115                272       159                   261         110 
Median 
lnwage                          2.95     2.63               4.66       4.11                 6.54         5.86 
lnemployment               4.09    3.40               4.38       3.81                 4.27         3.47  
lncapital_intensity        3.08     2.60               4.93       4.87                 6.43         6.03 
lnsales                           9.22    7.30               11.8       10.2                 13.3         11.2 
lnlbr_prdvty                  4.94    3.96               7.05       6.25                 8.43         7.43 
lnmaterial_perworker    4.16   3.22               5.89       5.29                 7.46         6.93 
lnemployee_training     4.16    3.48               5.72       5.19                 7.36         6.59 
lnexports                       8.47    8.21               11.2       10.2                 12.5         10.5 
lnresearch_invest          8.52    3.22                 -           5.10                   -             6.94 
actual employment        60.0   30.0                80           45                    72            32 







Table 3 A 
Table 3 B: Absolute composition of firms by Income groupings and sector 
 
 Clusters    Uganda         LY            LM               F                   D          Manuf          Serv   
Cluster Total        
Cluster 1     412          2772           1000             2               4182          2335            1849         
4184 
   Cluster2      29            227               57              313               0              185              128           
313 
   Cluster3     340           946              266            1552              0              875              677         
1552 
   Cluster4      32            300              112              444              0              296              148           
444 
   Cluster5       0                4                   0                  2             2                   1                  3               
4 
   Total         813         4249            1435           2313           4184          3692              2805       
6497 
Source: Author’s own computations based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3 C: p -values for t-test statistics for the five clusters  
                                                                                     Variables 
 Clusters  wage  emp’t  cap’int  sales  prdvty  material training  expt  fdi_stk  inInv  new_inv            
1~ 2     0.000 <0.000   0.001  0.000   0.003     0.001   0.002    0.001 <0.000  <0.000   0.000        
  1~ 3     0.657 <0.000   0.372  0.000   0.610     0.186   0.521    0.006  <0.000 <0.000   0.643 
  1~ 4     0.000 <0.000   0.000 <0.000  0.000     0.000   0.001    0.000  <0.000 <0.000   0.000 
  1~ 5     0.410   0.698   0.951     -           -          0.955      -            -        0.185    0.942   0.159 
  2~ 3     0.000   0.000   0.001   0.007   0.002     0.000  0.001     0.094  <0.000   0.006   0.000 
  2~ 4     0.825   0.728   0.444   0.411   0.355     0.796  0.993     0.556  <0.000   0.610   0.367 
  2~ 5     0.235   0.508   0.698      -           -         0.696      -         0.235    0.281   0.427   0.328 
  3~ 4     0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000     0.000  0.000     0.001  <0.000   0.011   0.000 
  3~ 5     0.425   0.789   0.989       -          -         0.894      -            -         0.133   0.447   0.165 












Table 3 D: Hopkins statistic tests and optimal clusters for the data sets 
 
   Data set                       Optimal Clusters                   Value index                       H statistic       
 SSA                                   5.0                                    53394.01                          0.003 
   Ethiopia                             5.0                                    1690.22                             0.024 
   Kenya                                3.0                                    981.73                               0.019 
   Nigeria                               6.0                                   1893.91                              0.014 
   Tanzania                            5.0                                   2198.86                              0.015 
   Low income                       3.0                                  32155.99                             0.002 
   Lower middle-income       3.0                                  4688.98                               0.009 
   Source: Author’s own computations based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3 E: p-values for Correlation Matrix for SSA Data set 
 
Variables                           1          2          3          4          5         6        7         8          9       10 
1. employment                  -         0.73   0.75      0.84     0.83   0.00   0.18    0.00     0.00     0.00 
 2. lbr_prdvty                                  -      0.00      0.00    0.00   0.00    0.90    0.34     0.00     0.15 
 3. capital_intensity                                  -          0.00    0.74   0.00   0.89    0.47     0.00     0.04 
 4. material_perworker                                          -        0.00   0.00   0.90    0.73     0.00     0.03 
 5. wage                                                                             -      0.42   0.85    0.31     0.17     0.12 
 6. exports                                                                                   -       0.79    0.00     0.00     0.00 
 7. research_investment                                                                          -      0.04     0.65     0.88 
 8. employee_training                                                                                        -       0.00     0.75 
 9. sales                                                                                                                          -       0.07 
10.fdi_stake                                                                                                                              - 







Table 3F 1: Real mean values for clusters of Ethiopian firms  
                                                       Variables                                                                                       
Cluster    lnw   fdistk  lnempt  lncapint  lnsales lnlbrpvty  lnmat lntrn  lnexp  lnrsch  empt Total 
Mean 
Cluster 1 4.14  0.00     4.51      5.20       11.1      6.40      5.90    5.76     10.4    6.84     215       438 
                             
Cluster 2  5.06 33.3    4.41       11.9       11.8       7.36      6.95      -        7.81    9.53     170           3 
                           
Cluster 3  3.73 0.00    4.14       3.96       17.9       13.0      4.26      -           -         -          81           2 
                  
Cluster 4  4.51 99.2    4.62       6.22       11.5       6.62      6.08    7.20     11.3      -         271       91 
            
Cluster 5  4.51 50.7    4.81       5.97      11.5        6.61      6.26    6.33     10.9     -          198       35 
 
Ethiopia  4.22 19.2     4.55        5.43      11.2       6.47      5.95     6.08     10.6   6.94     222      569  
Source: Author’s own computations based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3F 2: p-values for t-test statistics for the Ethiopian five clusters  
                                                                                     Variables 
 Clusters  wage  emp’t  cap’int  sales  prdvty  material training  expt   
 1~ 2       0.000  0.934       -        0.758  0.319    0.261     -            -         
   1~ 3       0.502   0.701      -         -        -         0.156        -            -         
   1~ 4       0.019   0.516   0.000  0.222  0.274    0.000     0.001     0.017          
   1~ 5       0.058   0.095   0.009  0.312  0.478    0.220     0.319     0.429               
   2~ 3       0.186   0.852       -          -         -        0.044       -            -          
   2~ 4       0.001   0.869       -     0.879   0.419    0.325       -            -          
   2~ 5       0.007   0.511       -     0.911   0.420    0.419       -            -         
   3~ 4       0.284   0.000       -         -          -        0.115       -            -         
   3~ 5       0.273   0.524       -         -          -        0.064       -            -          
   4~ 5       0.996   0.382   0.459 0.858  0.984     0.574    0.171     0.503          







Table 3G 1: Real mean values for clusters of Kenyan firms  
                                                       Variables                                                                                       
Cluster      lnw   fdistk  lnempt  lncapint  lnsales lnlbrpvty  lnmat  lntrn  lnexp  lnrsch empt Total 
Mean 
Cluster 1 3.58  1.86     4.41       3.73       10.5      5.75      4.87     4.80     9.12    6.07    234     352 
                             
Cluster 2 3.93  43.0     5.26       5.16       11.6       6.36     5.73    6.17     11.0    9.53     556       75 
                           
Cluster 3 3.93  92.7     4.85       4.75       11.4       6.31     5.77    5.55     10.8      -        386     187 
               
Kenya    3.73   34.5     4.64        4.25      11.0       6.06     5.26     5.11     10.1   6.07     320     614  
Source: Author’s own computations based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3G 2: p-values for t-test statistics for the Kenyan clusters  
                                                                                     Variables 
 Clusters   wage  emp’t  cap’int  sales  prdvty  material training  expt  fdi_stk   
 1~ 2      0.006  0.000    0.000  0.000 0.000     0.000      0.004   0.000 <0.000 
   1~ 3      0.001  0.000    0.000  0.000 0.000     0.000      0.010   0.000 <0.000  
   2~ 3      0.958  0.037    0.128  0.411 0.770     0.847      0.192   0.516 <0.000 
         Source: Author’s own computations based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3H 1: Real mean values for clusters of Nigerian firms  
                                                       Variables                                                                                       
Cluster    lnw  fdistk  lnempt  lncapint  lnsales lnlbrpvty  lnmat   lntrn  lnexp  lnrsch  empt  Total 
Mean 
Cluster 1  2.42   0.68     4.16     3.06       8.44      4.33      3.66     4.16     8.94    4.33     177    482 
                             
Cluster 2 3.28    24.3    5.69     4.37      14.9      8.60      5.00    6.42     8.42       -       549       6 
                           
Cluster 3 2.59   40.0    5.46      4.05      10.8      5.44    5.17    4.38        -        10.2     337       5 
                  
Cluster 4 2.62  99.4    4.61       3.32       8.84      4.60   4.03    4.40     9.37       -         251     56 
            
Cluster 5 3.11 59.7     5.17       3.94       10.2       5.18      4.07    4.46     7.44   -         427     46 
 






Nigeria  2.52  15.3     4.31       3.18      8.73       4.49      3.77     4.26     8.73   4.48   208    596  
Source: Author’s own computations based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3H 2: p-values for t-test statistics for the key clusters in Nigeria  
                                                                                     Variables 
 Clusters   wage    emp’t  cap’int  sales   prdvty  material training   expt    fdi_stk                 
 1~ 2       0.294   0.064   0.107   0.000   0.000    0.307   0.034         -         0.130  
   1~ 3       0.424   0.053   0.583   0.116   0.170    0.004    0.485         -         0.184 
   1~ 4       0.362   0.022   0.425   0.335   0.411    0.188    0.528      0.684  <0.000 
   1~ 5       0.001   0.000   0.017   0.000   0.006    0.231    0.461      0.217  <0.000    
   2~ 3       0.396   0.776  0.855    0.032   0.008    0.893    0.035         -         0.592 
   2~ 4       0.419   0.160  0.186    0.000   0.000    0.455    0.025         -         0.002 
   2~ 5       0.822   0.475  0.568    0.000   0.000    0.479    0.026         -         0.042 
   3~ 4       0.909   0.154  0.683    0.166   0.280    0.010    0.965         -         0.072 
   3~ 5       0.067   0.609  0.953    0.635   0.720    0.019    0.852         -         0.466 
   4~ 5       0.085   0.051  0.177    0.008   0.162    0.918    0.898      0.174  <0.000    
   Source: Author’s own computations based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3I 1: Real mean values for clusters of Tanzanian firms  
                                                       Variables                                                                                       
Cluster     lnw  fdistk  lnempt  lncapint  lnsales lnlbrpvty  lnmat lntrn  lnexp  lnrsch  empt   Total 
Mean 
Cluster 1 0.80   0.00     3.62       1.25       5.40       1.94      1.63    1.86     5.55    2.54     73     304 
                             
Cluster 2 4.17   0.00     4.70       1.68       9.53       5.14      4.42    6.46     6.04    6.28     115      2 
                           
Cluster 3 0.65   0.00     3.95          -         14.3       10.4       1.31      -        13.5       -          52      1 
                  
Cluster 4 0.81  98.5     4.32       1.51      7.30       2.79      2.15    2.40     6.43      -         137 112 
            
Cluster 5 1.17 52.4     4.78       1.80      7.96        3.09      2.67    2.57     6.40      -       407     40 
 
Tanzania 0.87 28.6     3.89       1.39       6.12       2.29      1.88     2.19     6.07   2.65     117     459  






Table 3I 2: p-values of t-test statistics for the three key clusters in Tanzania  
                                                                                     Variables 
 Clusters   wage    emp’t    cap’int    sales    prdvty   material   training     expt     fdi_stk 
 1~ 4       0.936   0.000      0.165     0.000   0.000      0.001       0.073       0.085   <0.000 
   1~ 5       0.039   0.000      0.095     0.000   0.000  0.001       0.044       0.037   <0.000 
   4~ 5       0.048   0.037      0.398     0.142   0.342      0.087       0.674       0.973   <0.000 
         Source: Author’s own results based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3J 1: Real mean values for clusters of Lower income economies  
                                                       Variables                                                                                       
Cluster    lnw    fdistk  lnempt  lncapint  lnsales lnlbrpvty  lnmat lntrn  lnexp  lnrsch  empt Total 
Mean 
Cluster 1 2.38   0.06     3.91      3.10       7.12       3.70      3.32    3.22   7.05    4.09     156 3189 
                             
Cluster 2 2.26   98.0     4.33      3.01       7.86       3.55      3.14    3.09   7.24      -        243  1470 
                           
Cluster 3  3.02  47.0     4.63       4.17       9.40      4.91      4.39    4.02   8.51      -        278    403  
                  
Overall    2.41   32.2     4.09       3.18       7.55      3.77      3.35    3.27   7.32   4.10      191 5062 
Source: Author’s own results based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
 
Table 3J 2: p-values of t-test statistics for clusters of lower-income economies 
                                                                                     Variables 
 Clusters   wage   emp’t  cap’int  sales  prdvty  material training  expt  fdi_stk   
 1~ 2      0.075 <0.000    0.403  0.000  0.159     0.045      0.365  0.302 <0.000 
   1~ 3      0.000 <0.000    0.000<0.000 0.000     0.000     0.001   0.000 <0.000  
   2~ 3      0.000   0.014    0.000   0.000 0.000     0.000     0.000   0.000 <0.000 






Table 3K 1: Real mean values for clusters of Lower middle-income economies  
                                                       Variables                                                                                       
Cluster   lnw    fdistk  lnempt  lncapint  lnsales lnlbrpvty  lnmat lntrn  lnexp  lnrsch  empt   Total 
Mean 
Cluster1 3.16   1.10    3.61      3.33       8.39      4.65      4.14    3.93   7.93    4.19     116   1046        
                             
Cluster2 3.81  99.2    4.24       3.40       10.4      5.58      4.84    4.51   10.0      -         257    283           
                           
Cluster3 3.48  60.7    4.67       3.86       10.2      5.28      4.58     4.27  8.39      -          301   106        
                  
Overall   3.32 24.9     3.81       3.39       8.93      4.88      4.31     4.07   8.86   4.28     158   1435 
Source: Author’s own results based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3K 2: p-values of t-test statistics for clusters of lower middle-income economies 
                                                                                     Variables 
 Clusters   wage   emp’t  cap’int  sales  prdvty  material training  expt  fdi_stk   
 1~ 2      0.000   0.000    0.591  0.000  0.000     0.000     0.009   0.000 <0.000 
   1~ 3      0.042   0.000    0.032   0.000 0.009     0.047     0.301   0.389 <0.000  
   2~ 3      0.069   0.014    0.093   0.582 0.271     0.303     0.502   0.006 <0.000 
         Source: Author’s own results based on AIS Survey Data, 2010 
 
Table 3L 1: Mean values for SSA clusters without fdi_stake as a  clustering variable 
                                                       Variables                                                                                       
Cluster       lnw    fdistk   lnempt   lncapint   lnsales  lnlbrpvty   lnmat   lntrn   lnexp   lnR&D     
Mean 
Cluster 1   2.61    29.0      3.76       3.16        7.40        3.90        3.53     3.02     6.89     3.45           
                             
Cluster 2  3.04     41.3      6.47       3.59        10.6        4.40        3.98     5.38     9.01     5.47             
                           
Cluster 3  2.53     44.3      8.42       2.93        10.9        3.15        2.42     4.09     9.77     3.26 
 
Cluster 4 4.57      67.1      5.92       4.99        13.8        7.80        7.09     6.03     13.9        - 
               
SSA         2.67     30.6      4.03        3.24        7.83       4.02         3.61     3.49     7.55       - 







Table 3L 2: p-values for t-test statistics for the fdi-less clusters  
                                                                                     Variables 
 Clusters   wage   emp’t   cap’int   sales     prdvty   material   training    expt    fdi_stk   
 1~ 2      0.006 <0.000    0.000  <0.000    0.000     0.000      <0.000   <0.000   0.000 
   1~ 3      0.868 <0.000    0.620    0.000    0.144     0.030        0.112     0.000    0.044  
   1~ 4      0.000   0.000    0.000  <0.000  <0.000     0.000        0.000   <0.000   0.000 
   2~ 3      0.273 <0.000    0.181    0.541    0.023     0.004        0.064     0.218    0.680  
   2~ 4      0.000   0.015    0.000    0.000  <0.000     0.000        0.090   <0.000    0.000 
   3~ 4      0.000   0.000    0.001    0.000    0.000     0.000        0.013      0.000    0.018  











Table 4 A: Sample composition 
Sub-sector                    Frequency       Percentage            cum-frequency 
  Bakery                           180                   10.9                         10.9                        
  Garment                         360                   21.9                         32.8                     
Textile                              36                     2.2                         35.0 
Wood                               72                     4.4                          39.4   
Furniture                        312                   19.0                          58.4 
Metal                              324                   19.7                          78.1  
Machines                          48                     2.9                          83.9  
Chemical                          48                     2.9                          83.9  
SSRII                               12                     0.7                           84.7 
Food                               216                   13.1                          97.8             
Drink                                36                     2.2                          100   
Total                             1644                   100                            --- 
Location 
Accra                              876                   52.9                          52.9 
Cape coast                        36                     2.2                          55.1 
Kumasi                           624                   37.7                          92.8 
Takoradi                         120                     7.2                           100 
Total                             1656                    100                            --- 











                       
Table 4 B: Matched sets before refinement 
Firm ID                                  Year               Matched set size 
                           7                                          1994                      134  
                           68                                        1996                      133                              
                           69                                        1994                      134                              
                           77                                        1997                      132 
                           113                                      1998                      126 
                           147                                      1998                      126                        
                           150                                      1994                      134 
                           178                                      1998                      126 
                           158                                      1994                      134 
                           267                                      1998                      126 
                           275                                      1998                      126                              
                           161                                      1998                      126 







Table 4 C: Weighted difference-in-differences estimates of ATT with ps.weight &  
 ps.match 
Variables                          F  =  0                 F  = 1                      F  = 2                        F = 3 
  Employment                  0.015                 0.051                      0.095                       0.037 
                                       (0.094)              (0.072)                    (0.110)                    (0.115)  
Wage                             0.222**             0.228**                  0.179                       0.021 
                                     (0.106)              (0.098)                    (0.203)                    (0.238)   
Productivity                  0.159                -0.002                     -0.032                      -0.089 
                                     (0.416)              (0.418)                    (0.324)                    (0.288)  
Capital                          0.043                 0.160*                     0.180*                     0.161  
                                     (0.058)              (0.100)                    (0.116)                    (0.126)  
Output                           0.132                 0.028                       0.002                       0.110 
                                     (0.328)              (0.336)                    (0.325)                    (0.304)  
K_int                             0.009                -0.050                     -0.020                       0.075 
                                     (0.188)              (0.151)                    (0.209)                    (0.231) 
Using ps.match 
  Employment                  0.040                 0.005                      0.066                       0.063 
                                       (0.137)              (0.091)                    (0.126)                    (0.149)  
Wage                             0.334***           0.343***                0.465**                   0.285 
                                     (0.122)              (0.133)                    (0.216)                    (0.189)   
Productivity                  0.148                 0.037                     -0.034                      -0.019 
                                     (0.406)              (0.404)                    (0.344)                    (0.314)  
Capital                          0.061                 0.187*                     0.201*                     0.127  
                                     (0.055)              (0.109)                    (0.119)                    (0.132)  
Output                           0.093                 0.025                     -0.024                       0.009 
                                     (0.341)              (0.339)                    (0.322)                    (0.301)  
K_int                             0.125                 0.112                      0.208                       0.220 
                                     (0.206)              (0.180)                    (0.180)                    (0.215) 













Table 4 D: Effects of Foreign Acquisition on firm performance - Estimates with lagged 
dependent variables 
FE-full sample 1 2 3 4 5 6 





































observations 1194 1398 1156 1157 1217 1062 
№ - firms (N) 138 138 138 138 138 137 
sector – dum’s Y Y Y Y Y Y 
year - dum’s Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2- within 0.287 0.365 0.184 0.231 0.642 0.040 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Own results based on sample data 
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